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ABSTRACT 
Child pornography has quickly escalated in the U.S. to one of most severely punished 
crimes in the federal criminal justice system.  Responding to a moral panic, Congress passed the 
Protect Act of 2003.  This act lengthened for child pornography offenses the term of supervised 
release, which is a term of post-conviction supervision, from a maximum of three years to a 
minimum of five years to life.  Congress also directed the United States Sentencing Commission 
(USSC) to include a policy statement in the federal sentencing guidelines directing judges to 
impose lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.  This policy covers all 
offenses enumerated under child pornography statutes including possession, receipt, 
transportation, distribution, and production.  If the policy is followed directly, one would expect 
that the exact same sentence of lifetime supervised release would be meted out across all child 
pornography cases. However, only approximately 33% of child pornography offenders convicted 
in federal court in fiscal year 2012 received a life term of supervised release. Such variation 
suggests two things: (1) a disconnect between Congressional will and the will of the sentencing 
court, and (2) the possibility of unwarranted supervised release sentencing disparities for child 
pornography offenders.  
Since the passage of the Protect Act of 2003, no studies have examined judicial decision-
making in the context of supervised release sentences and child pornography offenders.  This 
issue is important in that the supervised release sentence has significant consequences for those 
receiving the most severe terms.  Specifically, those who receive lifetime supervision are subject 
to lifelong formal social control and the possibility of life imprisonment if revoked.  This study, 
which examines the effects of individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level contextual 
factors on supervised release, is the first to explore the correlates of supervised release sentences 
for child pornography offenders.  The focal concerns, the court communities, and social/group 
threat perspectives of judicial decision-making serve as the theoretical underpinnings to explain 
individual-level and district-level variation in sentencing outcomes.   
The individual-level data for this dissertation comes from the USSC dataset for fiscal 
year 2012.  These data are supplemented with district-level contextual factors tabulated and 
compiled from the USSC 2012 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Statistics; 2012 
Federal Court Management Statistics (FCMS); the USSC 2012 study of child pornography 
offenses; and the Federal Election Commission’s 2013 report on the 2012 Federal Elections.  
District-level factors examined in the study include region, percent who voted Republican in the 
2012 presidential election, district size, child pornography caseload pressure, guidelines 
compliance rate, Kimbrough-based policy disagreement, and mandatory minimum state-level 
penalties for possession of child pornography.  Multilevel modeling techniques are used to 
analyze the data.   
Preliminary data analyses reveal that approximately 27% of the variability in supervised 
release sentence length is at the district–level with the remainder at the individual-level.  
Findings also indicate that at the individual level, both legal (offense seriousness, plea, criminal 
history, detention, number of counts, departure/variance) and extralegal factors (race, education, 
citizenship, age, family ties) influence the sentence of supervised release.  Findings also show 
that the effects of some of these factors vary across courts, meaning that there is variability in the 
extent to which individual district courts consider certain factors as relevant for their sentencing 
 v 
decisions.  Finally, I find that at the district-level, courts located in the Western region of the 
United States sentence child pornography offenders to longer sentences of supervised release 
than those located in the East.   
The findings from this study highlight the problematic nature of a statutory supervised 
release range of 5 years to life for all child pornography offenses.  This wide range allows for 
disparity in sentencing decisions.  With little guidance from the USSC, judges must decide on 
their own how to impose the sentence of supervised release, and extralegal and court contextual 
factors appear to play a role in this decision.  In order to reduce disparities found in these 
sentences and promote greater uniformity and fairness in sentences, the USSC should consider 
revising the supervised release sentencing guideline.  One way would involve the USSC 
calculating the supervised release sentence in the same manner that the sentence of imprisonment 
is calculated.  This strategy would base supervised release sentences solely on legal factors such 
as offense seriousness and criminal history, thereby reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities 
and promoting greater uniformity and predictability of sentences.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
‘There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in which it treats its children.”1 
Background 
Child pornography is one of the fastest growing offenses prosecuted in federal courts. 
According to a special bulletin published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in 2006, 
69.4% of sex offenses referred for federal prosecution were child pornography offenses, a figure 
up from 21.8% in 1994, representing a growth of 82% (BJS, 2007).  More recent statistics place 
federal prosecution of child pornography offenses well over 2,000 cases per year (USSC, 
Sourcebook 2012).  Although still only a small percentage of the overall federal court caseload, 
it is the punishment - particularly the supervised release sentence for child pornography offenses 
- that pales in comparison to other offenses.2     
Both the sentences of imprisonment and supervised release term for child pornography 
offenses have increased in severity over the past thirty years (USSC, 2009; Kaiser and Spohn, 
2014).  The increase is due in large part to punitive legislation born out of what many argue is a 
“moral panic” and a political culture of fear of the sexual exploitation of children (Basbaum, 
2010; Hamilton, 2011; Spearit, 2011).  As Hamilton (2012) points out, “As child pornography is 
the most visible type of child sexual exploitation offense, it appears to have taken on the status of 
a signal crime, acting as an alarm to society that children are in danger” (p.1684).  The fear 
ignited by the public, the media, and moral crusaders sparked sweeping congressional changes to 
federal child pornography laws.  These laws ultimately call for longer minimum and maximum 
                                                          
1 Nelson Mandela 
2 In fiscal year 2012, child pornography offenses comprised approximately 2.4% of all offenses adjudicated in 
federal court, a minority compared to drug and immigration offenses, which comprised 62.4% of all cases (USSC, 
Sourcebook 2012). 
2 
sentences of imprisonment.  But it is the supervised release sentence that is most remarkable – a 
sentence aimed at total formal social control. 
Supervised release is a period of post-conviction community supervision that is imposed 
at the time of sentencing.3  Not to be confused with parole, supervised release adds a period of 
supervision to be served upon completion of the sentence of imprisonment.  Parole on the other 
hand, is period of supervision carved out from the length of the original sentence.4  For child 
pornography offenders specifically, the supervised release term is particularly important because 
of the statutory override found in 18 U.S.C 3583(k), which enhances the length of the term from 
a maximum of three years to a minimum of five years to life.  No other category of offenders in 
the federal system faces a more serious supervised release term.  Congress declared harsher 
penalties for all child pornography offenders with specific directives to the United States 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) to include policy statements in the sentencing guidelines 
regarding the imposition of supervised release.  According to the policy statement, if the offense 
of conviction is a sex offense, the statutory maximum term of supervised release, which is a life 
term, is recommended. 
Statement of the Problem 
If the policy statement in the guidelines recommending the maximum supervised release 
term for all child pornography offenses is followed directly, one would expect a sentence of 
lifetime supervised release would be meted out across all child pornography cases.  However, 
                                                          
3 A sentencing court is authorized and, in some cases, statutorily required to impose a term of supervised release in 
addition to a term of imprisonment (see general supervised release statute under 18 U.S.C 3583 in Federal Criminal 
Code and Rules). 
 
4 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal offenders who committed their offenses on or 
after November 1, 1987. 
 
3 
federal data reveals that there is a great deal of variability in the length of supervised release 
sentences and that judges give out life sentences in over a third of cases (Vinyard, 2016).  In 
fiscal year 2010, the average term of supervised release for non-production cases was 
approximately 20 years (220.3 months for offenders convicted of possession and 273.7 months 
for offenders convicted of receipt, transportation and distribution offenses).  The average term of 
supervised release for offenders sentenced for production of child pornography was nearly 27 
years (USSC, 2012, p.316).  Such data suggests two things: (1) a disconnect or policy 
disagreement between Congress and the sentencing court; and (2) the possibility of unwarranted 
supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenders.  An unwarranted 
sentencing disparity refers to unequal sentencing resulting from unfair, unjustifiable or 
unexplained causes rather than a legitimate use of judicial discretion (Rigsby, 2010). 
Significance of the Problem 
It is particularly important for researchers and policymakers alike to explore potential 
supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenses for several reasons.  
First, Congress did not differentiate between child pornography offense types when it set the 
statutory range of punishment for supervised release and ordered the USSC to include a policy 
statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervision.  In other words, Congress has explicitly 
stated that all child pornography offenses are serious and deserve equal supervised release 
sentences.  But some judges may not be willing to sentence similarly for offenses that are 
essentially different, which leaves room for disparity.  As Kaiser and Spohn (2014) point out, 
one of the main criticisms of the current child pornography sentencing scheme is its failure to 
distinguish between variations of severity.  Because of this, they argue it is possible that judges 
will be more likely to use their discretion when imposing sentences.   
4 
Perhaps one of the most important reasons to examine the supervised release sentences of 
child pornography offenders is the nature and potential consequences to those sentenced to the 
most severe term.  For example, the supervised release statute allows for the revocation of 
supervised release for an offender who violates the terms of release, which could result in the 
incarceration of the offender for the remainder of the period.5  As an example, if an offender who 
is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) 
engages in any conduct constituting a new sex offense, including child pornography, while on 
supervised release, the court must revoke the term of supervised release and require the offender 
to serve a term of imprisonment.  Thus, child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervised 
release if revoked, would face life imprisonment.  Second, irrespective of the threat of life 
imprisonment if revoked, child pornography offenders sentenced to lifetime supervised release 
will likely never be discharged from supervision.6  Supervision includes at least twice monthly 
meetings with a probation officer either in the home, probation office, or community.  The 
offender must also adhere to the standard conditions of supervised release (i.e., not leaving the 
judicial district without permission) as well as special sex offender conditions including but not 
limited to polygraph testing, sex offender treatment, sex offender registry, no contact with 
children under the age of eighteen, restricted use of a computer/internet, and a search condition 
allowing probation officers to search the residence, vehicle, office, and other personal items.  In 
                                                          
5 See 18 U.S.C 3583(e)(3) authorizing the incarceration of a defendant that violates the terms of supervised release. 
 
6 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may terminate an offender’s term of supervised release “at any time after the 
expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the 
defendant released and the interests of justice.” Such early terminations may occur even in cases where a statute 
originally required the sentencing court to impose a term of supervised release in excess of one year. Such early 
terminations have occurred in a relatively small percentage (12%) of total supervision cases in recent years. (USSC, 
2010). 
 
5 
other words, a life term permanently binds an offender under a criminal justice sentence where 
the potential threat of revocation looms indefinitely.    
Ramifications for lifetime supervised release sentences do not solely rest with the 
offender.  Practical implications also exist for the federal criminal justice system.  For instance, 
U.S. Probation Offices across the nation are tasked with the supervision and monitoring of these 
offenders for life, which among other things, requires advanced and specialized training in 
surveillance, electronic monitoring, and treatment techniques (Cornish, 2010; Palmiotto and 
MacNichol, 2010).  U.S. Probation Offices may also have to allocate more funding toward sex 
offender treatment at the expense of other services such as drug treatment and mental health 
treatment in order to compensate for the increased number of offenders serving lifetime 
supervised release.    
Moreover, additional officers may need to be hired to keep pace with the increased 
workload of child pornography offenders on community supervision (Bishop, 2010).  For 
instance, the U.S. Probation Office in the Eastern District of Missouri (ED/MO) recently created 
a specialized sex offender unit.  This unit, which is comprised of eight officers and one 
supervisor, supervises only child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervision.7  One of 
the reasons for the creation of this unit was the caseload size.  The ED/MO, District of Arizona 
and the Central District of California have the largest sex offender caseloads in the federal 
system (DSS Report, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2014).  Similar resources for 
manpower may also be needed at U.S. Attorney’s Offices and Federal Public Defenders Offices.  
These agencies are responsible for the prosecution and defense of supervised release violators.  
                                                          
7 Each officer supervises approximately 35 offenders. 
6 
Likewise, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) will require resources as they are tasked with housing 
offenders whose supervised release terms are revoked. 
Purpose/Objective 
Despite the serious implications associated with sentencing child pornography offenders 
to lifetime supervised release, few empirical studies have addressed the factors that influence this 
sentencing decision.  In fact, there is only one published article (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014) that 
examines judicial discretion and child pornography offenses and this study focuses on the 
likelihood of downward departures.  Even more scarce is empirical literature that uses the 
supervised release sentence as the dependent variable.  This dissertation remedies this gap in two 
ways.  First, I focus on the sentence of supervised release as the dependent variable.  This is 
important because much of what matters in sentencing decision-making for the sentence of 
imprisonment and/or the decision to incarcerate is well established.  Research consistently finds 
that legal factors at the individual-level including criminal history and offense seriousness are the 
best predictors of imprisonment sentence length and the decision to incarcerate.  Research also 
finds that extralegal factors including gender, race, and age also influence imprisonment length 
and/or the decision to incarcerate. Missing in federal sentencing research is whether and the 
extent to which these factors influence the sentence of supervised release.  And more 
importantly, whether these factors contribute to unwarranted supervised release sentencing 
disparities.  Second, I marry the sentence of supervised release with the offense of child 
pornography, an offense recognized as one of the most serious federal crimes (Rigsby, 2010).  
The intersection of the supervised release sentence with the offense of child pornography draws 
together the purpose of this dissertation which is the exploration of factors that influence 
supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders.   
7 
Overview and Outline of the Dissertation 
In an earlier inquiry of supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography 
offenses, I explored the individual-level effects of legal and extralegal factors on the decision to 
impose lifetime supervised release (Vinyard, 2016).  I found both legal and extralegal factors are 
statistically associated with the likelihood of being sentenced to the most severe term.  
Specifically, legal factors such as sentence length (months of imprisonment) significantly 
increased the likelihood that child pornography offenders were sentenced to lifetime supervised 
release, while a downward departure/variance significantly reduced the likelihood of lifetime 
supervised release.  Additionally, I found that older child pornography offenders were more 
likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised release.  But major limitations of this work include 
the failure to use a multilevel methodology (hierarchical modeling) and failure to consider how 
district-level contextual factors influence supervised release sentencing outcomes. The problem, 
as explained Wu and Spohn (2010), with failing to use a multilevel approach in analyzing federal 
sentencing data is that aggregated data may cloud important differences among district courts 
and lead to misleading conclusions about the existence of unwarranted disparity.  Sentencing 
research over the past several years using a multilevel methodology has revealed that sentence 
length varies significantly across courts and district-level contextual factors do play a role in 
federal sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase, and 
Schulz, 2005).   
In view of the aforementioned limitations, this dissertation improves upon my initial 
efforts by using a multilevel methodology that includes both individual-level legal and extralegal 
factors as well as district-level court contextual factors hypothesized to influence supervised 
release sentences of child pornography offenders.  These district-level factors, which will be 
8 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four, include district size, child pornography 
caseload, guidelines compliance, region, political ideology, mandatory minimum state-level 
penalties for possession of child pornography, and Kimbrough-based policy disagreement.8  In 
addition, instead of focusing solely on the most severe supervised release sentence (life) as I did 
in previous research, I also consider supervised release length and a four-category ordinal 
measure of the supervised release sentence. My rationale for transforming the dependent variable 
is explained in greater detail in Chapter Four.  My three indicators of the dependent variable aid 
in providing a more comprehensive picture of supervised release sentences of child pornography 
offenders.  I also improve on my previous analysis by adding additional case and individual 
independent variables not used before.  These variables include: offense severity score, number 
of counts of conviction, detention status, offense type, number of dependents, and citizenship 
status. 
Altogether using a more superior analytic technique, along with the addition of 
individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level contextual factors not previously considered, 
this dissertation asks and answers: 
1. What proportion of the variability in supervised release sentences is at the individual-
level versus the district-level?   
 
2. What individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables account for variability in 
supervised release sentences? 
 
2A. Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of supervised release 
sentences differ across offense type (non-production versus production)?  
 
                                                          
8 U.S. v. Kimbrough (2007) is a case involving crack cocaine decided by the Supreme Court that allows judges to 
use their discretion and reject a guideline for policy reasons.  According to Hamilton (2014), some sentencing judges 
have used the rationale applied in Kimbrough to disregard or reject the child pornography guidelines based on a 
policy disagreement.  The result is a circuit split on whether judges can disregard the child pornography guideline 
based on this split. 
9 
3. Above and beyond individual-level variables, are district-level contextual variables 
related to supervised release sentencing outcomes?  
 
4. Do the effects of individual-level variables on sentence length differ across courts? If 
so, can these differences be explained by characteristics of the court and district? 
Equally important in this dissertation, is a discussion of moral panic and its tether to child 
pornography.  Moral panic as described by Cohen (1972) occurs when a group of people who 
have social, political or economic power believe that a particular subgroup is threatening the 
established status quo.  In this conceptualization of moral panic, Congress has a formative role in 
responding to the public’s rising anxieties about the sexual exploitation of children through stiff 
legislation.  This trend is evident in the increase over time in statutory minimum and maximum 
sentences of imprisonment and supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders. 
Given the argument that punitive legislation of child pornography offense is driven by moral 
panic (Basbaum, 2010), Chapter Two begins with a detailed review of the fear of child 
pornography and the moral panic surrounding this group of offenders.  Then I discuss 
congressional response to this panic as well as disagreements within the federal judiciary on how 
to sentence child pornography offenders.  
Chapter Three lays out a discussion of prominent theories of judicial decision-making 
including uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution, focal concerns, court communities, and 
social/group threat.   Uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theorizes that judicial actors 
attempt to make rational decisions, but do so within a context of uncertainty (Albonetti, 1991).  
The focal concerns perspective proposes that judicial sentencing decisions are guided by three 
key concerns: blameworthiness, community protection, and practical constraints and 
consequences (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998).  I use the courts communities 
perspective, which states that courts function like communities with their own working norms 
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and organizational relationships, to explain differences in sentencing outcomes across districts 
(Eisentein, Fleming, and Nardulli, 1988, Ulmer, 1997).  I also employ Blalock’s (1967) 
social/group threat perspective which says that as a subordinate group increases in size, the 
dominant group will feel threatened and in turn in-part methods of social control to maintain 
their superior status, to explain differences across district courts.  Each of the theoretical 
perspectives outlined above are explained in greater detail in Chapter Three, followed by a 
review of the empirical literature more generally as it pertains to individual and contextual 
influences in sentencing.  Drawing from theory and the empirical literature, Chapter Three 
concludes with a restatement of the research questions followed by theorized hypotheses of the 
influence of individual-level legal and extralegal factors and district-level contextual factors on 
supervised release sentencing outcomes. 
Next, Chapter Four provides information on data sources, descriptions of measures, and 
the analytic strategy employed to test the research questions.  Chapter Five presents the findings, 
followed by a detailed discussion in Chapter Six.  In Chapter Seven, implications of the research 
are addressed, followed by ideas for future research, and final thoughts.  The dissertation closes 
with two appendices -  Appendix A and Appendix B.  Appendix A includes the results of 
supplemental data analyses using ordinary least squares regression, logistic regression, and 
ordinal regression that assess the robustness of the multilevel models.  Appendix B is an 
illustration of the sections and format of a standard presentence report as approved and adopted 
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  Each appendix is identified in the body of 
relevant chapters and cross referenced to the end of the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER TWO:  MORAL PANIC, CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE, AND JUDICIAL 
DISSONANCE 
Introduction 
Federal child pornography offenses are unique and unlike other federal offenses in terms 
of statutory and guideline punishment for the supervised release sentence.  This chapter provides 
the underlying context of these penalties, starting with “moral panic.”  Specifically, I trace how 
the fear of child sexual exploitation escalated to a full-on moral panic of child pornography 
offenders.  Next, I detail the development of child pornography legislation in response to this 
panic, and discuss congressional manipulation of sentencing policy as described by legal 
scholars (Stabenow, 2009).  Afterwards, a discussion of child pornography recidivism in the 
context of actual risk versus moral panic is presented.  To aid in understanding child 
pornography legislation alongside federal sentencing policy, I include an outline of the federal 
sentencing structure.  More specifically, I discuss the specialized sentencing structure for child 
pornography offenders with particular attention to the supervised release sentence.  Finally, this 
chapter introduces the main thesis of this dissertation, which is the apparent disconnect between 
congressionally mandated severe sentencing policies such as lifetime supervised release and 
actual sentencing decisions.  
Fear of Child Sexual Exploitation 
The origin of modern day child pornography laws and policies begins in the late 1970s 
when the problem of child sexual abuse was "discovered” (Adler, 2001; Jenkins, 1998).  The 
term “discovered” is used lightly, as the treatment of children as sexual objects is as old as 
humanity (Jenkins, 1998; Wortley and Smallbone, 2012).  Throughout the twentieth century, 
child pornography was a hidden and restricted activity (Jenkins, 1998).  But it was not until the 
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1960s, a decade characterized for its sexual liberalism that child pornography came out of hiding 
and openly flourished.  Wortley and Smallbone (2012) advance this change in public sentiment 
was due in large part to social liberalization and relaxation of obscenity laws in Scandinavia 
(Jenkins, 2001; Wortley and Smallbone, 2012).  Indeed, the sexual liberation movement of the 
1960s is credited with the development of pedophile organizations such as NAMBLA (North 
American Man/Boy Love Association) and British Pedophile Information Exchange (Jenkins, 
2001).  These groups openly expressed the idea of sexuality between adults and children.  
Moreover, the 1960s marked a time when well over 250 child pornography magazines were 
circulating in the U.S. with titles such as Lolita and Children-Love Taken (Wortley and 
Smallbone, 2012).  As a result of seeming public tolerance, there was a mini-boom in the amount 
of child pornography being produced (Jenkins, 2001). 
The 1970s marked a reversal of the pendulum when feminists, social workers, and 
decency campaigners began raising concerns over child abuse (Jenkins, 2001).  During this 
period, the public, the media, and interest groups began recognizing child sexual exploitation, 
including child pornography, as a form of abuse (Jenkins, 2001).  Immediately thereafter, the 
public began to react unfavorably to any sexual interest and/or contact between adults and 
children (Jenkins, 2001).  This reaction soon transformed to a national and political concern that 
linked child pornography not only with child abuse, but with every other social ill involving 
children at the time, including kidnapping, child murders and organized sex rings (Bella, 2011; 
O’Brien, 1983; Jenkins, 2001).  The media served to fuel public outrage.  For example, a 1977 
NBC television news broadcast claimed that “as many as two million American youngsters were 
involved in child pornography." (Jenkins, 2001, p.33).  That same year, the Chicago Tribune 
reported that "child pornography has become a nation-wide multi-million dollar racket that is 
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luring thousands of juveniles into lives of prostitution and exploiting up to 100,000 children at 
any time” (Jenkins, 2001, p.34).  Consequently, child pornography was touted as the new social 
menace of the time (Bella, 2011; Jenkins, 2001; Adler, 2001).   
Following increased public scrutiny, the federal government stepped in and passed the 
first laws against producers, transporters, distributors, and receivers of obscene child 
pornography (Wortley and Smallbone, 2012; Rogers, 2013).9  During this time, the states began 
passing their own laws against child pornography even without the obscenity requirement 
(Rogers, 2013).10  This led to the notable landmark 1982 Supreme Court ruling in New York vs. 
Ferber (1982) (Adler, 2001).  In this case the Supreme Court held that child pornography was 
not protected by the First Amendment even if it was not obscene because it was intrinsically 
related to the sexual abuse of children (Adler, 2001; Rogers, 2013).  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court defined the harms linked to child pornography as: 
The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. The materials produced are a 
permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated 
by their circulation…pornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than 
does sexual abuse or prostitution.  Because the child’s actions are reduced to a recording, 
the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took 
place.  A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the 
                                                          
9 Obscenity refers to material that is more than indecent.  Specifically, it is regarded as any material depicting actual 
sex with a minor.  The Child Protection Act of 1984 ultimately declared all sexual depictions of children as obscene 
whether or not the child was participating in sexual activity (Jenkins, 1998). 
 
10 The obscenity requirement was based on congressional fear that the courts would strike the legislation as 
unconstitutional if not included (Rogers, 2013). 
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recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography 
(Rogers, 2013, p. 1017).  
The public campaign waged against child pornography and the landmark Supreme Court 
decision in New York vs. Ferber succeeded in driving child pornography back underground 
(Wortley and Smallbone, 2012). 
Child pornography later re-emerged with vigor in the 1990s due in large part to the 
proliferation of the Internet (Jenkins, 2001).  The Internet and associated technologies including 
peer-to-peer networks, bulletin boards, and chat rooms are charged with exponentiating and 
revolutionizing the child pornography industry by increasing the volume that is available, the 
efficiency with which it is disseminated, and the ease by which it can be accessed (Wortley and 
Smallbone, 2012).  From 1996 to 2002, online images of sexual exploitation of children 
increased by almost 2,000% (Spearit, 2009).  It is estimated that there are at least 100,000 
websites containing child pornography (Wortley and Smallbone, 2012).  One report showed that 
from 2005 to 2009, the U.S. had the largest share of commercial child pornography websites, 
accounting for almost half of the global volume (Spearit, 2009). 
Moral Panic and Child Pornography 
The public’s fear of child pornography that began in the 1970s and escalated with the 
emergence of the Internet, has all the makings of moral panic.  By definition, moral panic is the 
sudden eruption of outrage towards a specific group disproportionate to any harm caused.  Cohen 
(1972) was first to coin the term and his definition more specifically includes: (1) concern about 
the potential or imagined threat; (2) moral outrage toward the actors who embody the problem; 
(3) widespread agreement that the threat exists and that something should be done about it; (4) an 
exaggeration of the number or strength of cases, in terms of damages, moral offensiveness, and 
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risks if ignored; and (5) the panic erupts and dissipates suddenly without warning.  Garland 
(2008) added two more elements: (1) the actors who embody the problem are viewed as 
threatening to the status quo; and (2) without action, they risk destroying society.   
Jenkins (1998) and others have invoked Cohen’s model of moral panic to explain societal 
fear of child pornography.  Jenkins (2001) claims that it was during the initial crusade against 
child pornography in the 1970s that moral crusaders competed to assert the most incendiary 
claims about child pornography, including that it was a well-organized, multi-billion dollar 
industry and that the number of children exploited was in the millions.  Jenkins (2001) notes that 
while most of these claims were discredited, fear persisted.  As Walker (2010) describes: 
“Anxiety over child sexual abuse and the inability to protect children from harm is a 
salient fear in present society.  Despite other, more probable dangers, these issues remain 
a large concern.  Moreover, they are an agreed upon social harm.  Child sexual abuse is 
decried unanimously as a moral wrong and a violation of social norms.” (p.198) 
Similarly, Ost (2002) explains that the main causes of the moral panic over child pornography 
“are the moral values which affirm the sacred status of the child and the rights that our society 
has ascribed to children.” (p.443)  
The only criterion of Cohen’s moral panic model that appears not to have been met in the 
case of child pornography offenders is the fifth.  Meaning, at this time, there is no dissipation of 
the panic.  Unlike other panics such as the Salem Witch trials or the crack cocaine epidemic, 
both of which had a start and end date, the panic over child sexual exploitation has been durable, 
long-lasting and now in its fourth decade (O’Hear, 2008).  Walker (2010) argues the only thing 
that has changed with the child pornography panic is the fervent role of the state in responding. 
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The federal government has created a number of laws intended to severely punish and control 
child pornography offenders. 
Congressional Response to Child Pornography 
 Increasing scope of the law and manipulation of sentencing policy. 
 Many legal scholars contend that the current federal laws and resulting sentencing 
policies surrounding child pornography are inspired by moral panic directed toward child 
pornography offenders (Adler, 2001; Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2011).  Wortley and Smallbone 
(2012) point out that laws indeed are an expression of society’s moral sentiments and that in 
furtherance of this expression, Congress has taken an undifferentiated approach that all child 
pornography offenses are universally heinous and deserve strict punishment.  The rationale for 
such appears based on three concerns (Basbaum, 2010).  First, is the notion that restricting child 
pornography reduces the demand, which in turn reduces the sexual abuse of children.  Second, 
many believe that possession of child pornography leads to actual hands on physical and sexual 
abuse of children, and whets the appetites of pedophiles.  Third, many argue that child 
pornography is not a victimless crime and in fact constitutes a permanent record of the child 
abuse and each viewing of an image is akin to another episode of abuse (Basbaum, 2010). 
Walker (2010) explains that policymakers consider child pornography offenders a 
defined controllable risk that justifies ever-increasing surveillance and governmental intrusion.  
As a result, federal child pornography legislation has grown increasingly expansive and punitive, 
calling for lengthier periods of incarceration and supervised release (see Table 2.1 below). 
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Table 2.1 
Development of Child Pornography Laws in the U.S. 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Legislation 
 
 
Comment 
1977 
 
 
Protection of Children Against 
Sexual Exploitation Act 
Outlawed commercial 
production, transportation, 
distribution and receipt of 
obscene material featuring 
children under age 16; 
established 10 year maximum 
for first time offenders and a 
15 year maximum and 2 years 
minimum for a subsequent 
offense 
1982 New York v. Ferber (1982) 
 
 
Supreme Court held child 
pornography is not protected 
by the First Amendment 
1984 Child Protection Act Eliminated commercial 
purpose requirement and 
removed the obscenity 
requirement from production 
and distribution and changed 
the age of a minor from 16 to 
18 
1988 Child Protection and 
Obscenity Enforcement Act 
Extended child pornography 
laws to use of a computer to 
transport, distribute or receive 
illegal material 
1990 Osborne v. Ohio (1990) 
 
Supreme Court upholds 
criminal sanctions for private 
possession of child 
pornography 
1990 Child Protection Restoration 
and Penalties Enhancement 
Act 
This act made the mere 
possession of child 
pornography a federal crime 
1996 Child Pornography Prevention 
Act 
Bans virtual child 
pornography – computer 
generated images that appear 
to depict real children.  This 
Act was later struck down by 
the Supreme Court 
2003 Protection Act (Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to 
Outlawed attempts to trade 
material under the pretense 
18 
End the Exploitation of 
Children Today) 
that they are, or contain child 
pornography; enhanced 
minimum and maximum 
sentence lengths for 
possession, transporting, 
distributing, receiving, and 
production of child 
pornography; amended the 
guidelines to reduce 
incidences of sentencing 
departures and increased 
guideline offense levels in 
child pornography cases; 
prohibited judges from 
considering family ties and 
responsibilities as well as 
community ties in cases 
involving a minor victim; 
amended the Bail Reform Act 
to create a presumption that 
child pornography defendants, 
except those charged with 
simple possession, are 
dangerous to the community 
and should be denied bail; 
lengthened the supervised 
release range from three 
years to five years to life 
2008 Protect Our Children Act Created a new offense – 
unlawful production with 
intent to distribute, or 
knowingly distributing child 
pornography that is an adapted 
or modified image of an 
identifiable minor 
2012 Child Protection Act Raised the statutory maximum 
penalty for possession, 
attempted possession, or 
conspiracy to possess child 
pornography from 10 to 20 
years for offenders who 
possess images of minors 
under the age of 12 
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Table 2.1 demonstrates the increasingly punitive stance Congress has taken towards child 
pornography offenses.  This message was made explicit by President George W. Bush in a press 
statement upon signing of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006:11  
Protecting our children is our solemn responsibility.  It is what we must do.  When a 
child’s life or innocence is taken it is a terrible loss - it’s an act of unforgiveable cruelty.  
Our society has a duty to protect our children from exploitation and danger.  By enacting 
this law we’re sending a clear message across the country: those who prey on our 
children will be caught, prosecuted and punished to the full extent of the law (Kimball, 
2011, p.1535).  
 An analysis by the USSC of child pornography laws revealed three key beliefs held by 
Congress about child pornography: (1) commercial and non-commercial distribution and receipt 
of child pornography contribute to molestation and abuse of children; (2) child pornography had 
become a highly organized, multi-million dollar industry that operates on a nationwide scale, and 
federal law enforcement efforts should not be limited to large scale distributors of child 
pornography; and (3) child pornography causes substantial harm to both the victim and to society 
as a whole (USSC, 2009).  These beliefs comport with parts of Cohen (1972) and Garland’s 
(2008) definitions of moral panic, which include concern about the potential threat; moral 
outrage toward the actors who embody the problem; and widespread agreement that the threat 
exists and that something should be done about it.  
                                                          
11 According to the Fact Sheet, this law was promoted as a strengthening of federal laws to protect children from 
sexual abuse and other violent crimes, prevention of child pornography and a means of making the Internet safe for 
children (see Fact Sheet found at www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release/2006).  This Act had no 
direct impact on child pornography laws.  
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 In sum, this section described the congressional expansion of and increased statutory 
penalties for child pornography offenses.  This provides important context for understanding the 
next section, which discusses congressional input in the federal sentencing guidelines for child 
pornography offenses.  
Congressional manipulation of the federal sentencing guidelines. 
The preceding section discussed the expanding scope of the law and rationale behind 
child pornography laws.  This section discusses the evolution of the child pornography 
sentencing guidelines and congressional manipulation for severe sentences based on moral panic 
rather than empirical evidence.  Although the focus of this dissertation is on the supervised 
release sentence, most of the guideline manipulation by Congress impacts the sentence of 
imprisonment.  This is because the guideline for the supervised release sentence is open to far 
less congressional manipulation than the sentence of imprisonment: There are no adjustments or 
enhancements built into the supervised release guideline schemata.  Nonetheless, this section 
establishes the foundation for congressional support for severe sentences and shows how this 
position extends to the supervised release sentence.  This discussion sets up the final section of 
this chapter, which details the disharmony between congressional policy and the will of some 
sentencing courts.   
While Congress is tasked with setting statutory minimum and maximum sentences of 
imprisonment and supervised release for child pornography offenses, the USSC’s duty is to set 
proposed sentence lengths within the statute. 12  But power held by the USSC to make and 
                                                          
12 The sentencing guidelines are created by the USSC - an independent body of neutral experts in the judicial branch 
(Krohel, 2011).  The duties of the USSC are to formulate and constantly refine national sentencing policy by 
developing and monitoring the guidelines.  This is done through an empirical methodology that considers data from 
national experience and past sentencing practices (Freidman and Supler, 2008). 
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influence federal sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenses, has slowly migrated 
toward congressional actors (Bowman, 2005).  Over the past twenty years Congress has directly 
intervened or manipulated the work of the USSC, directing the agency to increase guideline 
penalties and reduce incidences of downward departures for child pornography offenses in an 
effort to achieve guideline sentences at or near statutory maximum sentences (Friedman and 
Supler, 2008).13   
The first of many congressionally mandated guidelines enhancements came in 1990 after 
Congress passed, as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Child Protection Restoration and 
Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 (USSC, 2009).  This Act contained a general directive 
regarding child sex abuse crimes that instructed the USSC to amend existing guidelines for 
offenses involving sexual crimes against children so that more substantial penalties may be 
imposed if the USSC determines current penalties are inadequate (USSC, 2009).  But this was 
true so long as Congress agreed that the penalties proposed by the USSC were adequate.  For 
example, in 1991 after possession of child pornography was criminalized, the USSC had to 
determine whether to treat possession cases as equivalent to trafficking cases or whether to create 
a separate guideline.  The USSC proposed to refine the guidelines for trafficking in child 
pornography and implement a new guideline for the lesser harms of possession, receipt, and 
transportation of child pornography (USSC, 2009).  Congress disagreed with the USSC’s 
proposal.  Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina stated Congress’s position: “The Sentencing 
Commission has undermined Congress’s attempt to assure severe punishment for dealing in child 
pornography.” (USSC, 2009, p.20).  Congress responded to the USSC’s proposed amendment 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
13 For a complete history of congressional efforts pushing lengthier child pornography sentences – see History of 
Child Pornography Guidelines (2009). 
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with superseding legislation that directed the USSC to raise the base offense level for all child 
pornography offenses and return the offense of receipt of child pornography back to the 
trafficking guideline (USSC, 2009).   
 In December 1995, Congress passed the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 
1995, which directed the USSC to increase all penalties covering child pornography offenses, 
including increasing the base offense levels.  In October 1998, Congress legislated the Protection 
of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 which again addressed penalties for child 
pornography offenses.  One of the main provisions of the Act was that it directed the USSC to 
ensure that sentencing guidelines and policy statements within the guidelines were consistent 
with congressional intent that offenders convicted of child pornography offenses be sentenced 
severely.  Later, in 2003, specific directives in the Protect Act ordered the USSC to make 
adjustments to the offense levels for child pornography offenses based on the number of images 
and/or videos (Stabenow, 2009).  Additional adjustments were included for images portraying 
depictions of sadistic and masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.  No empirical 
evidence or rationale was provided to justify these enhancements (Stabenow, 2009).   
Congressional manipulation of the child pornography guidelines has contributed to 
average child pornography imprisonment lengths growing from 36 months in 1994 to 109.6 
months in 2007, an increase of 300% (Friedman and Supler, 2008).  Such congressional action 
has not been without public support.  Various lobbyists, including Morality in Media, Inc., 
Citizens for Decency Through Law, and dozens of concerned citizens have favored 
congressional proposals for increases in sentence severity (USSC, 2009; Friedman and Supler, 
2008). 
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Although most Congressional changes to the federal sentencing guidelines for child 
pornography offenses were directed at the sentence of imprisonment, they did not ignore the 
sentence of supervised release.  Unlike the guidelines for the sentence of imprisonment, the 
supervised release guidelines do not allow for direct congressional manipulation because there 
are no adjustments or enhancements built into the supervised release guideline schemata.  
Instead, Congress passed the Protect Act of 2003 (see Table 2.1), which among other things 
lengthened the supervised release term for child pornography offenders from a maximum of 
three years to a minimum of five years to life.  Congress specifically directed the USSC to 
include a policy statement in the supervised release guidelines recommending the maximum 
sentence of life for anyone convicted of a child pornography offense.  Congress justified the 
enhanced supervised release term with deterrence and rehabilitation arguments: 
[18 U.S.C. 3583(k)] responds to the long-standing concerns of federal judges and 
prosecutors regarding the inadequacy of the existing supervision periods for sex 
offenders, particularly for the perpetrators of child sexual abuse crimes, whose criminal 
conduct may reflect deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not likely to disappear 
within a few years of release from prison.  The current length of the authorized 
supervision periods is not consistent with the need presented by many of these offenders 
for long-term--and in some cases, life-long-monitoring and oversight (Shockley, 2010, p. 
356). 
Congress’s supervised release policy appears to provide punishment for child 
pornography offenders on the basis of their risk for future offending rather than punishment 
directly related to the instant offense.  Hessick (2010) calls this preventative punishment.  
Preventative punishment is when you punish behavior in order to avoid the risk of future crime.  
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Thus, the supervised release policy appears to reflect notions of public protection and a belief 
that the recidivism rate of child pornography offenders is high and they cannot be rehabilitated.  
It also assumes all child pornography offenders are equally at risk for reoffending regardless of 
the crime or social circumstances.  Thus, a particularly salient question likely in the minds of 
judges before they impose supervised release sentences is how likely are child pornography 
offenders to commit a sexual offense involving contact with a child while on supervised release?  
The next section assesses empirical evidence of actual risk posed by child pornography 
offenders. 
Moral Panic vs. Real Danger: Empirical Evidence of Recidivism  
As previously mentioned, some legal scholars argue that the increasingly punitive stance 
by Congress toward child pornography offenders is the result of moral panic and a political 
culture of fear of the sexual exploitation of children (Basbaum, 2010; Spearit, 2011; Stabenow, 
2009).  Others argue that the impetus behind Congress’s punitive stance is an underlying 
presumption that anyone involved in child pornography is really an undetected child molester 
(Hamilton, 2011).  An exploratory psychological study on child pornography offenders by 
Bourke and Hernandez (2009) bolstered this presumption.  They found that what judges knew at 
the time of sentencing about the offender’s documented criminal sexual history (as found in the 
presentence report), underestimated their self-reported criminal sexual history disclosed at the 
end of treatment.14  Although the study had many limitations, including generalizability, it armed 
Congress and those who agree with its findings with empirical evidence to justify previously 
imposed punitive child pornography statutes and guidelines.   
                                                          
14 At the time of sentencing, only 26% of the offenders had a prior documented contact offense.  By the end of 
treatment, 85% admitted they had at least one hands-on offense. 
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There is much concern by Congress about the likelihood that child pornography offenders 
will commit contact sexual offenses against a child, but long-term recidivism studies are 
unavailable.  However, researchers are beginning to explore this issue and have concluded that 
the rate of sexual recidivism for child pornography offenders is less than commonly assumed.  
For example, the USSC conducted its own study of 610 non-production offenders sentenced in 
fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to assess known general recidivism and sexual recidivism.  The 
general recidivism rate for the sample was 30%, a rate similar to all federal offenders, and the 
sexual recidivism rate was 7.4% (45 of the 610).  Of those 45 sexual recidivists, 3.6% were 
arrested for or convicted of a sexual contact offense (i.e., rape or sexual assault of an adult or 
child); 2.3% were arrested for or convicted of a subsequent child pornography offense and 1.5% 
were arrested for or convicted of a non-contact sex offense involving obscenity or commercial 
sex.  The minimum follow up period was twenty-four months and the average follow-up period 
for all of the offenders was eight and half years. 
A 2005 Canadian study by Seto and Eke monitored 201 child pornography offenders with 
the objective of answering two questions: (1) how likely are child pornography offenders to incur 
new charges or convictions of any kind?; and (2) how likely are they to specifically incur new 
charges or convictions for contact sexual offenses?15  They found that 17% of the sample 
offended again during 2.5 year time period and 4% committed a new contact sexual offense 
(defined as physical contact with the victim).  Child pornography offenders with prior records 
were significantly more likely to offend again in any way during the “at risk” period.  Child 
pornography offenders who had committed a prior contact sexual offense were most likely to 
                                                          
15 Seto and Eke examined new charges or convictions post-conviction of the instant child pornography conviction.  
They also examined their criminal records to identify potential predictors of later offenses.  Fifty six percent of the 
sample had a prior criminal record, twenty-four percent had prior contact sexual offenses, and fifteen percent had 
prior child pornography offenses.  The average time at risk was 2.5 years. 
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offend again, either generally or sexually.  They found that, of 76 men with a history of child 
pornography offenses but no contact offenses, only one person committed a contact sexual 
offense during the follow-up period.   
More recently, a meta-analysis by Seto, Hanson and Babchisin (2011) examined the 
recidivism rates from nine follow-up studies of child pornography offenders (N = 2,630).  The 
meta-analysis revealed that 4.6% of child pornography offenders committed a new sexual 
offense; 2.0% committed a contact sexual offense, and 3.4% committed a new child pornography 
offense.  These results suggest child pornography offenders are unlikely to commit a detected 
contact sexual offense. 16  But for those who did sexually recidivate, risk factors included 
criminal history, younger offender age, substance use, self-report sexual interest in children, low 
education, history of prior treatment for sexual offending, and being single.  These factors varied 
across the nine studies, except for criminal history which was common to all. 
Though these few recidivism studies appear to undermine congressional rationale for 
severe supervised release sentencing for child pornography offenders, such studies do have 
limitations.  The use of criminal records to measure re-offending frequently leads to an 
underestimation of actual sex crimes (Basbaum, 2010) because sex offenses against children 
often go unreported or undetected.  Thus, recidivism studies of child pornography offender 
should be viewed with caution and considered as known rates of recidivism (USSC, 2012).  
Nonetheless, these studies expose a serious flaw in the rationale behind strict sentencing for child 
pornography – namely that it is built around panic.  The supervised release sentence rose 
                                                          
16  The average time at risk was 1.5 to 6-years. 
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dramatically from a maximum of three years to five years to life, in part due to the belief that 
child pornography offenses lead to contact offenses. 
But some judges in the federal judiciary appear not to respond to moral panic with severe 
sentencing.  On the contrary, a number of sentencing courts have expressed their disagreement 
with the severity of child pornography sentencing guidelines through increased use of below-
guidelines variance and downward departures (USSC, 2009, 2012).  Before providing evidence 
of such sentencing variation, a review of the sentencing structure of the federal courts as well as 
the specific sentencing structure for child pornography offenses is necessary to show where 
variability and unwarranted supervised sentencing disparities can occur. 
Sentencing Structure of the Federal Courts     
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). 
Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed unfettered sentencing discretion as long as they 
imposed sentences within the statute.  The problem with indeterminate sentences was that 
similarly situated defendants often received different sentences (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011).  
As a means of limiting disparities in sentencing, Congress in 1984, passed the SRA which 
established a statutory framework for federal sentences (Kimball, 2011; USSC Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012).  The SRA was motivated in part by Congressional desire 
to establish a rational sentencing system to provide for certainty, uniformity, and proportionality 
in criminal sentencing (Rigsby, 2010).  The intent of Congress was to eliminate an unjustifiably 
wide range of sentences for similarly situated offenders. 
As such, the SRA also transformed federal sentencing from an indeterminate system to a 
determinate system through the use of presumptive sentencing guidelines (Rigsby, 2010).  The 
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guidelines operated to constrain judicial discretion.  That is, judges had to use the guidelines to 
calculate the guideline range, which was developed based on the seriousness of the offense and 
the defendant’s criminal history (Kimball, 2011).  Although the guidelines were mandatory, a 
judge could depart from the guidelines, but if and only if a particular case presented atypical 
features or upon a 5K1.1 motion filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the defendant’s 
substantial assistance.17  The guidelines were intended to base judicial sentencing entirely on 
legally relevant factors such as the seriousness of the offense and prior criminal history. 
The SRA set forth several substantive requirements that have guided the USSC’s actions 
in the area of child pornography offenses (USSC, 2009).  Statutory provisions outlining the 
Commission’s duties direct the Commission to act in a manner consistent with all pertinent 
provisions of any federal statute when creating guidelines and establishing sentencing policy.  
Accordingly, under the SRA, the USSC is required to consider the same factors that a sentencing 
court must consider (USSC, 2009).  For example, the SRA directs the Commission to take into 
account certain characteristics of the offender, including criminal history, while assuring that the 
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, 
and socioeconomic status of offenders.   
Additional characteristics the SRA instructs the USSC to consider are the offense, 
including the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense; the community view of the 
gravity of the offense; the public concern generated by the offense; the deterrent effect on others 
particular sentence may have; and the current incidence of the offense in the community and in 
the nation as a whole (USSC, 2009).  Such characteristics are used by the Commission to 
                                                          
17 Substantial assistance motions or 5K1.1 motions as they are typically called, are filed by the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office when the defendant provides a substantial form of assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person engaged or previously engaged in a federal crime.  This motion allows judges to depart below any statutory 
minimum sentence.   
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establish the relative seriousness of the offense as compared to other offenses and to maintain 
proportionality throughout the guidelines (USSC, 2009). 
The supervised release sentence. 
The enactment of the SRA effectively eliminated parole and established supervised 
release.  As explained in Chapter One, supervised release is a term of post-conviction 
supervision overseen by federal district courts with the assistance of federal probation offices 
(USSC, 2010).  Initially, when the law for supervised release was written, the primary goal of 
supervised release was to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of 
a long prison term, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who had spent a fairly short period 
in prison for punishment or other purposes, but still needed supervision and training programs 
after release.18  Accordingly, this meant that supervised release was not originally intended for 
purposes of control, revocation, or community safety.  The law for supervised release was later 
amended in 1984 and 1986 respectively, to include provisions for affording adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; providing protection to the public from further crimes committed by the 
defendant; and providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment (USSC, 2010). 
A sentencing court is authorized and in some cases required to impose a term of 
supervised release to follow a term of imprisonment.19  Once a sentencing court determines that a 
term of supervised release is authorized or required, it must then decide the length of the term.  
Under 18 USC 3583(b), the primary statute governing supervised release, the maximum 
                                                          
18 See S. Rep. No 98-225, p.124 (1983). 
 
19 A sentencing court is required to impose a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment when supervised 
release is required by statute or when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed.  The guidelines 
authorize the court to depart from the supervised release guideline and not impose a term of supervised release if 
supervised release is not required by statute. 
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authorized supervised release term for Class A or B felonies is five years; it is three years for 
Class C and D felonies; and one year for Class E felonies or misdemeanors.  According to 
Section 5D1.2, Application Note 3 of the federal sentencing guidelines, in determining the length 
of supervised release, the court is required by statute to consider the guidelines and, among other 
factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the 
defendant; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (3) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct; and (4) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.  
The guidelines also indicate that a defendant with a more serious criminal history warrants a 
greater need for supervision.  Finally, the guidelines direct the court to ensure that the term 
imposed on the defendant is long enough to address the purposes of imposing supervised release 
on the defendant.  
When a court imposes a term of supervised release, it must set conditions of supervision 
which may include mandatory, standard and/or special conditions.  The court also has discretion 
to order any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation and any other condition 
it considers to be appropriate as long as the condition is reasonable and appropriate to the 
effective supervision and rehabilitation of the offender (USSC Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, 2012).  Common conditions include maintaining stable employment and refraining from 
use of illegal controlled substances.  For child pornography offenses, common special conditions 
include: (1) requiring the defendant to participate in a program for the treatment and monitoring 
of sex offenders, including polygraph testing; (2) limiting the use of a computer or interactive 
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computer service in cases in which the defendant used such items; (3) limiting contact with 
children under the age of eighteen without supervision and with the approval of the probation 
office; and (4) requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any time, of the defendant’s 
person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, other electronic 
communication or data storage devices or media based upon a reasonable suspicion concerning a 
violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant (USSC 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012, p. 424).  Appeals courts have held that such 
conditions are reasonable as long as they are tailored specifically to each offender and are 
reasonably related to the effective supervision and rehabilitation of the offender. 
Supervised release is very similar to probation and parole in that if an offender violates 
the terms of release, the sentencing court is authorized, and in some cases required, to revoke the 
term of supervised release and require the offender to serve all or part of the supervised release 
term in prison (USSC, 2010).  Moreover, in the instance of a finding of a violation, the court may 
also extend the supervised release term, provided that the statutory maximum term was not 
previously imposed. 
Specialized sentencing structure for child pornography offenses. 
Congress has made it clear that child pornography is a serious crime.  As a means of 
deterring offenders, eliminating the market and ending the abuse of children, Congress has said 
harsh punishment for all child pornography offenders is warranted (Hamilton, 2011).  The 
statutory penalties for these offenses reflect this sentiment.  Simple possession offenses prescribe 
no statutory mandatory minimum penalty and a maximum term of 10 or 20 years of 
imprisonment.  However, if an offender has a prior sex offense conviction, possession would 
result in a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years and a maximum term of 20 
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years (USSC, 2012).  Receipt, transportation, or distribution offenses carry a statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 20 years (with 
increased minimum and maximum penalties if the offender has a prior conviction for a sex 
offense).  In justifying this punitive legislation, Congress has said that intrastate distribution, 
receipt and possession of child pornography fuel the interstate market and is harmful to the 
children depicted and to society as a whole (Krohel, 2011).  Production offenses prescribe a 
statutory mandatory minimum term of 15 years of imprisonment and a maximum term of 40 
years (with increased minimum and maximum penalties if the offender has a prior sex offense).   
The sentencing guidelines for the sentence of imprisonment for these cases generally fall 
into two categories: non-production offenses and production offenses.  Non-production offense 
types include possession, receipt, transportation, and distribution.  These offense types represent 
approximately 90 percent of all federal child pornography prosecutions (USSC, 2012).  The 
other 10 percent of federal cases are production offenses (USSC, 2012).  Non-production cases 
are sentenced under 2G2.2 of the federal sentencing guidelines and production offenses are 
sentenced under 2G2.1.  Each of these guidelines respectively, provide sentence enhancements 
or reductions to the base offense level for specific offense characteristics such as the use of a 
computer, material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence, 
and the number of images/videos possessed.  The base offense level for a non-production offense 
such as possession of child pornography is 18, while the base offense level for a production 
offense is 32. 
Specialized supervised release sentencing structure for child pornography. 
Prior to the Protect Act of 2003, offenders convicted of child pornography offenses were 
subject to the general supervised release provision in 18 USC 3583(b).  This meant that the 
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maximum term of supervised release a court could impose was three years because child 
pornography offenses are either Class C or D felonies.  The Protect Act significantly lengthened 
the supervised release term, creating an override from the general supervised release statute to 18 
USC 3583(k).  Under 18 USC 3583(k), the length of the supervised release term for child 
pornography offenses is a minimum of five years to life.  The enumerated offenses in 18 USC 
3583(k) includes an array of offenses varying in statutory maximum sentences, which 
demonstrate Congress’s recognition that offenses have differing degrees of seriousness 
(Shockley, 2010).  But there is an equalization of all child pornography offenses enumerated 
under 18 USC 3583(k), meaning regardless of the charge, all child pornography offenders are 
subject to a supervised release range of five years to life.   
Supervised release sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses including child 
pornography offenses are found in Chapter Five, Part D of the Guidelines Manual.  To aid in 
understanding the supervised release sentence, Section 5D1.2 of the guidelines manual is 
recreated here: 
5D1.2 Term of Supervised Release 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if a term of supervised 
release is ordered, the length of the term shall be: 
(1) At least three years but not more than five years for a defendant 
convicted of a Class A or B felony. 
(2) At least two years but not more than three years for a defendant 
convicted of a Class C or D felony. 
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(3) One year for a defendant convicted of a Class E felony or a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
(b) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a)(1) through (3), the length of the term of 
supervised release shall be not less than the minimum term of years 
specified for the offense under subdivisions (a)(1) through (3) and may be 
up to life, if the offense is- 
(1) Any offense listed in 18 USC 2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of 
which resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious 
bodily injury to another person; or 
(2) A sex offense. 
(Policy Statement) If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, 
however, the statutory maximum term of supervised release is 
recommended. 
(c)  The term of supervised release imposed shall not be less than any 
statutorily required term of supervised release. 
As shown, Section 5D1.2(b)(2) provides that a sentencing court must impose at least the 
statutory minimum term or life if the offense is a sex offense. The policy statement within the 
sentencing guidelines explicitly recommends the maximum term of supervised release (life) be 
imposed if the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense. Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, such policy statements are to be considered by the sentencing judge (Shockley, 
2010).   
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The policy statement within the guidelines recommending the maximum supervised 
release term has been criticized because it was promulgated before the Protect Act of 2003 
increased the maximum term in child pornography offenses from three years to life (Shockley, 
2010; USSC 2012).  Meaning, before the Protect Act, it was the intent of Congress for child 
pornography offenders to receive three years of supervised release.  Defense attorneys point out 
that the USSC never amended the language in Section 5D1.2 following the Protect Act of 2003, 
and that it does not necessarily comport that Congress intended for all child pornography 
offenders to receive lifetime supervised release (Stabenow, 2009).  Nonetheless, the life term has 
been upheld by appeals courts.  In U.S. v. Cope (2008), the appeal court ruled that imposition of 
lifetime supervised release is a reasonable sentence even for possession of child pornography 
cases.   
Another criticism of the blanket policy recommendation for lifetime supervised release is 
that it does not differentiate among child pornography offenders with regard to the type of child 
pornography offense committed and need for lifelong monitoring (USSC, 2012).  Specifically, 
18 USC 3583(k) includes an array of child pornography offenses with varying seriousness, as 
evidenced by the wide range of maximum sentences of imprisonment (Shockley, 2010).  
Hamilton (2012) argues that such a blanket policy recommendation for lifetime supervised 
release represents a deontological perspective that judges all sexual images of children as 
immoral and therefore deems anyone who possesses, receives, distributes, transports or produces 
such images to be a criminal who deserves strict punishment and social control.  The USSC, in 
their 2012 report to congress on child pornography, noted that they were considering amending 
the supervised release guideline in a manner that provides guidance to judges on how to impose a 
term of supervised release within the statutory range of five years to life that is more tailored to 
36 
an individual offender’s risk and corresponding need for supervision (p.326).  To date, there 
have been no changes to the supervised release guidelines for child pornography offenses.  
The length of the supervised release term is of particular importance for child 
pornography offenders subject to the enhanced supervised release provisions because the statute 
also provides for the revocation of supervised release resulting in the incarceration of the 
offender for the remainder of the period.  Another concern with the supervised release statute and 
revocation for child pornography offenders is the potential problem of revocation versus 
prosecution (Shockley, 2010).  For example, if a child pornography offender serving lifetime 
supervised release for possession of child pornography commits another possession of child 
pornography offense, they would face a revocation sentence of five years to life.  The revocation 
sentence could entail an even greater punishment than if the offender were prosecuted for 
committing a second offense for possession of child pornography, which carries a sentence of 
imprisonment of 10 to 20 years.  Shockley (2010) argues “By allowing a steeper punishment for 
a second offense via the revocation process than that intended by Congress, the system 
undermines legislative intent” (p.32). This potential problem highlights why the supervised 
release sentence imposed for child pornography offenders is significant.  Statistics regarding how 
often child pornography offenders on supervised release are revoked for committing new child 
pornography offenses and returned to prison are not available.   
Return of Judicial Discretion – U.S. v. Booker (2005), Rita v. U.S. (2007), Gall v. U.S. (2007), 
and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) 
 The constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines was successfully challenged in 
2005 with the landmark U.S. v. Booker (2005).  The Supreme Court held that the mandatory 
Guidelines were unconstitutional.  To remedy this, the Supreme Court excised the mandatory 
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nature of the guidelines, rendering them advisory.  The Supreme Court reasoned that an advisory 
guideline system, while lacking the mandatory features that Congress enacted, retains other 
features that help to further congressional objectives, including promoting certainty and fairness 
in sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and maintaining flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted (USSC Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012).  
Excising the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines restored discretion to federal judges. 
Although the Booker case demonstrated an inclination toward providing judges with 
greater discretion, it was not the only significant case with implications for federal sentencing.  
Decisions in Rita v. U.S. (2007), Gall v. U.S. (2007), and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) extended 
judicial discretion even more.  In Rita v. U.S. (2007), the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether it was proper to apply a presumption of reasonableness to within guideline sentences on 
appeal.  The Supreme Court found that a sentencing court could presume that a within guideline 
sentence was reasonable (Rigsby, 2010).   
Following the Rita decision, the Supreme Court had to determine in Gall v. U.S. (2007) 
whether it was proper to apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the 
guideline range (Rigsby, 2010).  The Supreme Court ruled that appellate courts may not apply a 
presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence that departs from the guidelines (Basbaum, 2010; 
Rigsby, 2010).  In other words, sentencing courts have the power to impose any sentence so long 
as they explain their reasoning for the sentence.   
In Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a 
sentencing judge’s policy disagreement with the crack cocaine guidelines was permissible to 
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impose a below-guideline sentence.20  This case ultimately extended discretion to permit a 
categorical rejection of a guideline for policy reasons (Hamilton, 2014).  The Supreme Court 
ruled that as long as a sentencing court appropriately considers the factors in 18 USC 3553(a) 
when imposing a sentence, the sentence is reasonable even if it does not fall within the 
prescribed sentencing guideline range (Basbaum, 2010; Rigsby, 2010).   
Although the issue at hand in each of these Supreme Court decisions was the sentence of 
imprisonment, and although the Supreme Court was silent specifically on the sentence of 
supervised release, these cases have significant implications for supervised release sentences of 
child pornography offenders.  Specifically, the rendering of the guidelines as advisory in effect 
rendered Chapter 5, Part D (Supervised Release) advisory as well.  This means the policy 
statement recommending the maximum term of supervised release for child pornography 
offenders is also advisory.  And while the supervised release guidelines are also advisory, judges 
must still consider them and any other applicable policy statements contained therein before 
imposing the supervised release sentence.  At the same time, many circuit courts have authorized 
their district courts to use the decision in Kimbrough to depart from the guidelines in child 
pornography cases based on a policy disagreement (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014).   According to 
legal scholars, district courts situated within circuits that authorize judicial departures based on 
Kimbrough, have used the rationale in Kimbrough to impose below guideline range sentences of 
imprisonment (Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2014).  Thus, if some district courts are applying the 
rationale in Kimbrough to categorically reject child pornography guidelines for the sentence of 
                                                          
20 In U.S. v. Kimbrough, the sentencing judge declined to follow the sentencing guideline range of 228 to 270 
months for crack cocaine trafficking and instead imposed a downward variance of 180 months in prison.  The 
district court based this variance in part on the fact that the guidelines treat one gram of cocaine base as equivalent to 
one hundred grams of powder cocaine.  The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s sentence.  The Supreme Court 
ruled that the crack cocaine guideline does not exemplify the USSC’s exercise of its institutional role because it was 
not based on empirical evidence and national experience (Basbaum, 2010).   
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imprisonment, it is not an illogical conclusion that they may also apply Kimbrough to reject the 
policy statement in the supervised release guideline for lifetime supervised release.   
Judicial Dissonance 
 Child pornography sentencing is arguably the hottest topic in federal sentencing today 
(Hamilton, 2014).  This is because there is a “tug of war” between Congress and some judges in 
the federal judiciary as to how to sentence these cases.  As previously noted, Congress’s position 
is for severe sentences.  But some judges have responded in the opposite manner, refusing to 
follow the child pornography guidelines, willing to risk reversals of their sentences and face 
congressional backlash.  Why one may ask?  Because a number of scholars and judges believe 
the child pornography guidelines and resulting sentencing policies are a by-product of moral 
panic and congressional manipulation (Basbaum, 2010; Rogers, 2013).  Additional grievances 
are that child pornography guidelines are not empirically based and are too severe.  Indeed, a 
survey of district court judges conducted by the USSC in 2009, shows that 70% believed the 
guidelines range for possession of child pornography was too high; 69% believed the range for 
receipt was too high; and 30% believed the range for distribution was too high.21  Some judges 
have expressed their discontentment with the guidelines by imposing sentences that fall below 
the recommended guidelines range, both before and after the Protect Act of 2003, which sought 
to eliminate downward departures for child pornography offenders (Rigsby, 2010).   
Legal researchers offer three possible explanations for why judges are imposing non-
guidelines sentences (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011).  First, some judges view the current 
sentencing structure for child pornography offenses, particularly non-production offenses, as too 
severe.  The child pornography guidelines as they currently stand call for enhancements if certain 
                                                          
21 It should be noted that criticism by judges and others is not directed at guideline ranges for producers of child 
pornography, but rather at disproportionately harsh sentences for non-production case (Hughes, 2013). 
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factors such as use of a computer/Internet, number of images, or if images involved children 
under the age of twelve, are present.  Some judges find these often-applicable enhancements, 
inherent factors in the crime of child pornography.  For example, the Internet, which requires the 
use of a computer, is touted as revolutionizing the way child pornography is accessed, 
disseminated, and managed.  Meaning, hard photographs of child pornography are virtually 
obsolete.  Therefore, most people charged with child pornography receive the enhancement for 
use of a computer/Internet.  Some judges believe these enhancements unfairly increase the 
guidelines range and use their discretion to circumvent what they believe are overly harsh 
sentences (Rigsby, 2010).  In other words, sentencing courts are more likely to depart from the 
child pornography guidelines than from other guidelines, particularly for non-production 
offenses, because they believe the guideline sentence is too harsh.  Indeed, Kaiser and Spohn 
(2014) found that judges were more likely to use downward departures for non-production child 
pornography offense compared with sexual abuse offenses.  Some of the reasons judges gave 
when granting departures suggested that they believed the guidelines for non-production cases 
were too harsh (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014).  
A second explanation is that some judges view child pornography as a victimless crime 
and/or view child pornography offenders as harmless (Hamilton, 2011).  In her review of judicial 
justifications of non-guidelines sentences, Hamilton (2011) highlighted one judge’s view: “From 
my experience, most of these men have no prior criminal history.  They usually have healthy 
family lives and productive careers” (p.562).  Similarly, U.S. District Judge Robin J. Cauthron 
during her 2009 testimony to the USSC in which she advocated reducing the severity of child 
pornography guidelines said “It is too often the case that a defendant appears to be a social misfit 
looking at dirty pictures in the privacy of his own home without any prospect of touching or 
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otherwise acting out to any person” (Cardona, 2009, see section titled “Several Medical 
Problems”). 
A third explanation is that child pornography offenders represent a different demographic 
than judges are accustom to encountering.  Indeed, trends in federal data have distinguished child 
pornography offenders from the overall average defendants involved in federal prosecutions.  
Child pornography offenders, who account for 2.3% of federal prosecutions, are 99.3% male and 
88.7% white; moreover, 35.1% have completed some college, 17.5% are college graduates and 
27.2% are age 50 and older (USSC Sourcebook, 2010).  Kimball (2011) argues that judges are 
using these characteristics in addition to family ties and employment to justify below guideline 
sentences.  Krohel’s (2011) review of sentences imposed on child pornography offenders 
highlighted one such example.  In United States v. Grossman (2008), the offender pled guilty to 
possession of child pornography.  The guideline sentencing range was 135 to 168 months and the 
supervised release range was five years to life.  The judge imposed a non-guideline sentence of 
60 months imprisonment and 10 years supervised release.  In justifying the sentence, the judge 
noted he was “troubled” by the discovery that the thirty-five year old married father was facing 
more than ten years in prison for a single-count of possession of child pornography.  The judge 
also highlighted that the offender was educated in justifying the non-guideline sentence.   
Many of the below-guidelines opinions rely on the Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough 
line of cases (Basbaum, 2010).  Under these cases, and Kimbrough in particular, district courts 
may refuse to follow the guideline ranges if they find that the guidelines do not exemplify the 
Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role.  For example, in United States v. 
Ontiveros (2008), the recommended guideline range was 97 to 121 months for a defendant 
convicted of receiving child pornography.  The range was so high in part because of 
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enhancements for computer use, distribution, and possession of a large number of images/videos 
(over 600).  The judge disregarded the guidelines, and imposed a five-year sentence, pointing out 
the defendant's lack of criminal history, his steady employment, and his efforts to stop viewing 
child pornography as justification.  Most important in the court's consideration was a finding that 
section 2G2.2 does "not reflect the kind of empirical data, national experience, and independent 
expertise that are characteristic of the Commission's institutional role." (Basbaum, 2010).  
Notwithstanding the above, discontentment in the judiciary is not unanimous.  There are 
some judges and scholars who support the guidelines and concur with Congress’s position that 
all child pornography offenses including possession offenses are serious and warrant serious 
punishment.  Like Congress, some judicial officers believe child pornography offenses fuel the 
interstate market increasing the production of child pornography resulting in more children being 
sexually abused.  Judges who take this position do not find the guidelines excessive and 
expectedly comply with the guidelines ranges, including the policy statement to impose lifetime 
supervised release.22 
As can be seen, the lack of agreement between Congress and some judges in the federal 
judiciary coupled with judicial discretion provided by Booker and its progeny has led to variation 
in child pornography sentencing outcomes.  On one hand, a person convicted of a non-
production offense could receive a sentence as lenient as probation if his/her sentencing judge 
deviates from the guidelines.  On the other hand, another person convicted of the same offense 
could receive a sentence up to ten years if his/her sentencing judge abides by the guidelines.  The 
literature contributes much of the below-guideline sentencing to a variety of factors including 
                                                          
22 The author is a former Senior U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern District of Missouri and has prepared 
hundreds of presentence reports for child pornography offenders.  The statement is based on five years of direct 
observation of judicial officers imposing guideline sentences including lifetime supervised release for child 
pornography offenses in the U.S. District Court/Eastern District of Missouri. 
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extralegal factors.  It is possible, however, that the extent to which these types of extralegal 
factors come into play in the supervised release decision depends on the type of offense.   
Judicial Dissonance – Non-production versus Production 
There are two types of child pornography: non-production and production.  Non-
production includes possession, receipt, transportation and distribution.  According to the 
USSC’s 2012 report on child pornography, much of the sentencing disagreements within the 
judiciary is for non-production offenses.  This is because of the consensus that production 
offenses are more serious (USSC, 2012).23 To demonstrate, in 2010, the USSC surveyed judges 
regarding their feelings about the production guideline and 67% responded that the mandatory 
minimum statutory penalty for production was appropriate.  In a similar tone, 72% responded 
that the guideline ranges for production offenses were generally appropriate. 
 At the same time, the USSC finds that some courts, although a minority in the judiciary, 
have also expressed criticism of the production guideline and have rejected this guideline based 
on similar policy grounds as for non-production offenses. As a result, production offenses have 
also witnessed judicial discretion in the sentences imposed.  According to the USSC, data for FY 
2010 reveals that since Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, 56.8% of production cases were 
sentenced within the guideline range and 35.9% were sentenced below the guideline range 
(USSC, 2012). 
But we still do not know how this judicial dissonance affects the sentence of supervised 
release, and more specifically, whether it plays differently for production and non-production 
child pornography offenses.  Neither Congress nor the USSC has differentiated between non-
production and production offenses when it comes to the supervised release sentence.  That is, 
                                                          
23 The average sentence of imprisonment in fiscal year 2010 for non-production offenses was 63 months and 160 
months for production offenses (USSC, 2012).   
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the supervised release guideline recommends lifetime supervised release for production and non-
production cases.  Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson (2010) point out that different offense types 
present qualitatively different implications for attributions of offender blameworthiness and 
community protection, which may ultimately impact the sentence imposed.  For instance, 
because production is generally viewed as more serious, judges may be less likely to consider 
extralegal mitigating factors because the seriousness of the offense overrides any potential 
extralegal mitigating factors.  At the same time, judges may be more willing to consider 
extralegal factors aside from seriousness in non-production cases because non-production 
offenders are viewed as less dangerous and blameworthy.  Accordingly, if judges perceive 
producers as more culpable than non-producers, production cases may receive more severe 
sentences or be sentenced to lifetime supervised release a vast majority of the time.  However, 
data from fiscal year 2012 shows that not all production offenders are sentenced to lifetime 
supervised release.24  As such, uncovering the correlates of supervised release sentences for both 
production and non-production cases is important to help specify the nature of these sentences.  
This is particularly important given the variability of supervised release sentences and the 
potential for unwarranted supervised release sentencing disparities.  
Conclusion 
In sum, a combination of punitive child pornography statutes, born largely out of moral 
panic, alongside congressional manipulation of the child pornography sentencing guidelines and 
sentencing policy, has culminated into a seeming “power struggle” between Congress and some 
judges.  Some judges are using their recently regained discretion in Booker and its progeny to 
impose below guideline sentences for child pornography offenders resulting in wide variation in 
                                                          
24 Preliminary data analysis reveals that of the 237 production cases sentenced in fiscal year 2012, 57.4% received 
lifetime supervised release. 
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sentencing outcomes and potentially unwarranted sentencing disparities.  The variation in 
sentencing outcomes among child pornography offenders is so great that one legal scholar 
likened child pornography sentencing to a lightning strike, wherein congressionally mandated 
severe sentences like lifetime supervised release strike some offenders and miss others (Rigsby, 
2010).  In the next chapter, I discuss leading theoretical perspectives used to explain variation in 
sentencing outcomes and unwarranted sentencing disparities, followed by a review of the 
empirical sentencing literature. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND HYPOTHESES  
Introduction 
Other than the presentence report and the policy statement within the guidelines 
recommending lifetime supervised release, federal judges have little to assist them in making 
supervised release sentencing decisions for child pornography offenders.  Complicating this issue 
is the fact that supervised release decisions are “back end” sentences.  That is, sentences imposed 
at adjudication, but served after a period of incarceration.  In other words, judges impose 
supervised release sentences including conditions of post-release supervision at the time the 
sentence of imprisonment is imposed.  Unlike state parole boards who make “back end” 
discretionary release decisions of sex offenders with the aid of the presentence report, 
institutional records, and institutional risk scores (Huebner and Bynum, 2006), federal judges 
have limited knowledge of the offender and no tools for predicting future behavior with any 
degree of certainty.  
In the face of incomplete information, what factors influence judges’ decisions regarding 
supervised release sentences for child pornography offenders? Although the answer to this 
specific question is unknown, the extant sentencing literature reveals that in addition to legal 
factors including offense severity and criminal history, characteristics of the offender such as 
race (Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000), age (Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 1995; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998), education (Mustard, 2001), and gender 
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998) also influence sentencing decisions. 
  More recently, research found that above and beyond offender and case-level 
characteristics, contextual influences such as court contexts also are related to criminal 
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sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson, 
2010).  This is particularly important for sentencing studies using federal data because of the 
federal courts’ geographic organization and structure.  The geographic organization and structure 
of the federal courts suggests that an exclusive focus on individual-level factors has the potential 
to omit important court contextual factors related to the sentencing decision.  Indeed, Kautt 
(2002) calls into question the validity of a single-level approach to federal sentencing outcomes.  
Similarly, Johnson (2006) argues that from a methodological standpoint, sentencing studies that 
fail to incorporate court context not only risk omitted variable bias, but may also risk model 
misspecification.  Researchers have found that together, both individual-level and court 
contextual factors provide a more comprehensive understanding of the correlates of sentencing 
outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 2006).   
Multilevel sentencing studies using federal data have almost exclusively focused on more 
common offense types such as drugs, fraud, firearms, and immigration (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 
Ulmer and Kramer, 2008; Eisentein et al., 2010).  This is significant because there are 
differences between these types of offenses and child pornography offenses that may yield 
different outcomes.  The most obvious difference is the supervised release statute: for all child 
pornography offenses, the general supervised release statute found in 18 U.S.C 3583(b), is 
trumped by 18 U.S.C 3583(k) which authorizes the term and length of the supervised release 
specifically for child pornography offenses.  Another difference is the personal characteristics of 
child pornography offenders. Trends in federal data depict the average child pornography 
offender as an older white male with at least a high school diploma whereas the typical federal 
offender is a young minority male with less than a high school education (USSC Sourcebook, 
2012).  Some legal scholars argue that it is these demographic differences between child 
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pornography offenders and the typical federal offender that may lead to differential and 
preferential treatment of child pornography offenders in the sentencing process (Kimball, 2011, 
Krohel, 2011).  For example, Krohel (2011) argues that some judges use extralegal factors such 
as employment and family ties to impose below-guideline sentences for child pornography 
offenders.   
  Empirically, however, we do not know how these differences play out in the supervised 
release sentencing process because few studies focus solely on child pornography offenses.  In 
fact, I know only one empirical study, conducted by Kaiser and Spohn (2014), that examines 
individual and case-level factors to determine whether downward departures are more likely for 
child pornography offenders than in case involving sexual abuse.25  In general, they find child 
pornography offenders receive significant reductions in sentences.  More specific findings from 
Kaiser and Spohn’s (2014) study are discussed throughout this chapter.  Another study by 
Patrick and Marsh (2011) examines the influence of characteristics of the offense, offender, and 
victim on sentence length of child sex offenders, not specifically child pornography offenders.26  
They find that characteristics of the offense play the largest role in sentencing outcomes.  Neither 
Kaiser and Spohn (2014) nor Patrick and Marsh (2011) however, examine supervised release as 
the dependent variable.  As such, there is no way to know whether the correlates of sentencing 
decisions observed for general offenders hold true for child pornography offenders and the 
sentence of supervised release.  To be clear though, this dissertation does not aim to compare 
sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders with sentencing outcomes for the typical 
federal offender.  Instead, I expound that what we know about sentencing outcomes generally 
may or may not hold true for child pornography offenders and the sentence of supervised release. 
                                                          
25 Kaiser and Spohn’s analytic approach utilized a three-stage analysis: tobit regression, propensity score matching, 
and the rate at which judges go outside the traditionally accepted reasons for giving a below-guideline sentence. 
26 Patrick and Marsh’s analytic approach utilizes binomial and linear regression techniques. 
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Many theoretical perspectives have been espoused to explain why individual-level legal 
and extralegal factors and court contextual factors influence sentencing decisions.  In this 
chapter, I focus and review four of these perspectives – uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution, 
the focal concerns perspective, the courts as communities perspective, and social/group threat.  
Following my discussion of theoretical perspectives, I review empirical work on the correlates of 
sentencing outcomes.  This includes summarizing the findings reported by a large body of 
individual-level sentencing research as well as multilevel studies that examine both individual-
level and court context simultaneously.  I close this chapter with a review of my research 
questions and hypotheses. 
Sentencing Disparities: Theoretical Explanations at the Individual-Level 
Because my study is a multilevel analysis, my conceptual approach to supervised release 
sentencing decisions draws on four theories of judicial decision-making – uncertainty 
avoidance/casual attribution; the focal concerns perspective; the court communities perspective; 
and social/group threat perspective.  This approach provides theoretical grounding for including 
individual-level factors and district-level court contextual and environmental factors to explain 
supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders.  First, I present 
Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theory of judicial discretion, 
followed by the focal concerns perspectives.  Both of these perspectives provide a framework for 
understanding why individual-level extralegal factors influence sentencing decisions despite the 
formal guidelines system (Doerner & Demuth, 2010). Afterwards, I present the court 
communities perspective and group threat perspective, as these perspectives are frequently used 
to explain sentencing outcomes across courts. 
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Uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution. 
Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/casual attribution perspective theorizes that 
judicial actors attempt to make rational decisions, but do so within a context of uncertainty.  This 
perspective merges research of the structural perspective of rational decision-making (March and 
Simon, 1958; Simon 1957; Thompson 1967) with the social-psychological perspective of causal 
attribution in punishment (Shaver, 1975; Hawkin, 1981; Carroll & Payne, 1976; Heider, 1958; 
Fontaine & Emily 1978; Lippman, 1922).  Rational choice is a decision wherein all possible 
alternatives to an outcome and potential ramifications of the outcome are identified and known 
even though in reality, a decision-maker rarely has complete information (Albonetti, 1991).  
Rational choice surmises that complete knowledge of a situation eliminates uncertainty in 
decision-making.  Accordingly, in a situation having incomplete knowledge, the court actor 
attempts to reduce uncertainty by relying upon a rationality that is the product of habit 
(Albonetti, 1991).  This means decisions are based on past experiences, stereotypes, and 
prejudices (March and Simon, 1958).  Stated differently, decision makers achieve a measure of 
rationality by developing “patterned responses” that serve to avoid, or at least reduce, uncertainty 
in obtaining a desired outcome (Albonetti, 1991).  
Next, Albonetti (1991) links the concept of “patterned responses” to causal attribution, a 
second theoretical perspective useful in understanding discretionary decision-making.  The 
causal attribution perspective on punishment says that judgments of causality are premised on 
both personal and environmental forces that are thought to contribute to behavior (Albonetti, 
1991).  In other words, court actors attribute meaning to past and future behavior consistent with 
stereotypes associated with members of certain social groups.  Thus, according to Albonetti 
(1991): 
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based on the work on uncertainty avoidance and casual attribution in punishment, judges 
would attempt to manage uncertainty in the sentencing decision by developing patterned 
responses that are themselves the product of an attribution process influenced by causal 
judgments.  Judges would rely on stereotypes that link race, gender, and outcomes from 
earlier processing stages to the likelihood of future criminal activity.  Imposing 
punishment in the criminal justice system, similar to other highly discretionary decisions, 
is the result of “satisficing” or simplifying causal assumptions in an effort to achieve 
rationality (p.250). 
This perspective would suggest that extralegal factors may play a role in judicial stereotypes of 
child pornography offenders and their risk of recidivism when imposing supervised release 
sentences. 
The Focal Concerns Perspective. 
The focal concerns perspective is one of the more widely cited individual-level 
frameworks used to explain the influence of legal and extralegal factors on sentencing decisions.  
Drawing from Albonetti’s (1991) work, the focal concerns perspective draws on the notion of 
uncertainty avoidance and causal attribution.  This perspective asserts that judges or court actors 
base sentencing decisions on three main considerations: blameworthiness, protection of the 
community, and practical constraints and consequences (Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998).   
Blameworthiness. 
 Blameworthiness centers on issues of culpability and just deserts (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998).  The main objective of blameworthiness is to assess whether the legal sanction imposed is 
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consistent with the seriousness of the offense (Huebner & Bynum, 2006).  Judges’ views of 
blameworthiness are constructed by legal factors including offense severity, guilty pleas, 
criminal history, and the offender’s role in the offense such as being a leader or organizer 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  For example, offenders with longer criminal histories generally 
receive more severe punishments because such histories suggest greater culpability 
(Wooldredge, 2010).   
The federal sentencing guidelines take into account indicators of blameworthiness to 
assist judges in making sentencing decisions.  Blameworthiness is evaluated through the 
applicable offense level (offense seriousness), the offender’s criminal history, the offender’s role 
in the offense, and acceptance of responsibility.  For example, Chapter Two of the USSC Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual pertains to the offense conduct.  This chapter is organized by 
offense type and each offense has a corresponding base offense level.  Generally, more serious 
offenses have higher corresponding base offense levels.  Additionally, offenses may have one or 
more specific offense characteristics that adjust the offense level upward or downward increasing 
or decreasing the applicable punishment.   
Thus, in the case of child pornography offenses, production of child pornography carries 
a greater base offense level and corresponding punishment than a non-production offense like 
possession of child pornography.  This is because production of child pornography carries a 
statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment.  The legal literature suggests that 
judges’ view of the seriousness of child pornography is linked to the charge (Rigsby, 2010; 
Krohel, 2011; Hamilton, 2011).  If this is the case, possessors may be deemed least culpable, 
followed by the receivers, transporters and distributors, who may be perceived as equally 
culpable, with the producers being most culpable.  In their analysis of FY 2010 sentencing data, 
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the USSC found that variability of sentences was more likely to found within non-production 
cases (USSC, 2012).  For instance, USSC FY 2010 data shows 39.8% of non-production cases 
were sentenced within the guideline range, in comparison to 56.5% for production offenses.   
Another indicator of blameworthiness taken into account by the guidelines is criminal 
history.  The federal sentencing guidelines also allow for incremental increases in punishment 
based upon an offender’s criminal history.  According to the introductory commentary of 
Chapter Four of the federal sentencing guidelines which pertains to criminal history: 
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first 
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.  General deterrence of criminal 
conduct dictates that a clear message is sent to society that repeated criminal behavior 
will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.  To protect the public from 
further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal 
behavior must be considered.  Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited 
likelihood of successful rehabilitation. (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual, p. 3). 
Together with offense severity and criminal history, the offender’s role in the offense is 
another indicator of blameworthiness factored into the guidelines.  Specifically, the federal 
sentencing guidelines also allow for increases or decreases in punishment based upon the role the 
defendant played in the offense (aggravating or mitigating role).  With regard to an aggravating 
role, Chapter Three, Section 3B1.1 states:  
This Part provides adjustments to the offense level based upon the role the defendant 
played in committing the offense.  The determination of a defendant’s role in the offense 
is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of Section 1B1.3 (Relevant 
Conduct) i.e., all conduct included under Sections 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and not solely on the 
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basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction (2012 USSC Guidelines 
Manual, p.341). 
Alternatively, an offender who is deemed a minimal or minor participant would be entitled to 
decreased punishment.  In essence, the role the offender plays in the offense speaks to the 
offender’s level of culpability and likelihood of recidivism, which is important for supervised 
release. 
Finally, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility for the instant offense is another 
indicator of blameworthiness captured by the guidelines. Acceptance of responsibility is 
addressed in Chapter Three, Part E of the federal sentencing guidelines.  Pursuant to Section 
3E1.1(a), if a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, he/she 
is entitled to a two-level decrease in their total offense level (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual).  
In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this decrease, considerations include, but are 
not limited to the following: truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense, and 
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct; voluntary termination 
or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; voluntary payment of restitution prior to 
adjudication of guilt; voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the 
offense; and post-offense rehabilitative efforts (i.e., counseling or drug treatment).  An additional 
one-level deduction pursuant to Section 3E1.1(b) is available upon a motion by the government 
stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own 
misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby 
permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government to allocate 
their resources efficiently. 
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Protection of Community.  
Protection of the community refers to the level of danger an offender poses to the public 
and addresses judges’ concerns with protecting the community from offenders who they believe 
are likely to recidivate (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Similar to 
blameworthiness, this concern is influenced by legal factors such as the seriousness of the 
offense and the offender’s criminal history.  In the case of the criminal history of child 
pornography offenders, the guidelines under Chapter Four, Section 4B1.5 (Repeat and 
Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors) also makes special provisions for increases in 
punishment for any offender who commits the instant federal offense subsequent to sustaining at 
least one sex offense conviction.  
Although all of the references to criminal history in the federal sentencing guidelines 
apply toward the sentence of imprisonment, this focal concern could also be extrapolated to the 
supervised release sentence.  That is, the criminal history of an offender identified as a repeat and 
dangerous sex offender in a crime involving minor may play into the focal concerns of judges 
that there may be a likelihood of recidivism and may impact the ultimate length of the supervised 
release sentence.   
In the case of child pornography offenders, Congress has explicitly stated through 
legislation that all child pornography offenders are dangerous and the public is in need of 
protection from these offenders.  This notion of protecting the community from child 
pornography offenders is exemplified in the enhancement for lifetime supervised release and 
implies that these offenders cannot be rehabilitated, although a preliminary view of the data 
indicates that not all judges are imposing lifetime supervised release for all child pornography 
offenders.  Protection of the community is one of the statutory sentencing factors judges are 
mandated to consider when imposing the supervised release term.  In determining where within 
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the five years to life range to impose supervised release for child pornography offenders, the 
court is to consider the guidelines as well as statutory sentencing factors which include the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the offenders; deterrence; 
public protection; and needed educational/vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment. 
Exactly how judges assess community protection and recidivism of child pornography 
offenders before imposing the supervised release term is unknown. But it is likely they employ 
cues similar as to the sentence of imprisonment, such as offense seriousness and criminal history.  
The legal literature finds that judicial perception of seriousness of child pornography is linked 
with the charge (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011).  That is, non-production offenses are viewed as 
less serious than production offenses for reasons including lesser statutory imprisonment 
penalties and no “hands on” or actual victim.  This may come into play as judges impose the 
length of the supervised release sentence.  Meaning, we may find that those convicted of less 
serious or non-production offenses receive more lenient supervised release terms than those who 
produce child pornography because they are considered less culpable. 
In like manner, criminal history, particularly any prior history that includes a prior sex 
offense conviction, and where the offender received a sentencing enhancement for being a repeat 
and dangerous sex offender against minor, may be more likely to receive a longer supervised 
release term or life.  This is because the commentary in Application Note 5 of Section 4B1.5 
specifically addresses public protection (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual). According to 
Application Note 5 (Treatment and Monitoring), the statutory maximum term of supervised 
release is recommended for any offender receiving the enhancement for being a repeat and 
dangerous sex offender against a minor.  The maximum term is lifetime supervised release. 
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In addition to offense seriousness and criminal history, offender characteristics such as 
race, employment, education, and family ties also contribute to this focal concern (Albonetti, 
1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  For example, in describing evolving perceptions of minority 
crime, Mauer (1999) explains that it was not until the 1970s and early 1980s that the stereotype 
of the young black man evolved from petty theft to ominous predator.  Such fear has resulted in 
minority offenders being stereotyped as more dangerous and criminally responsible (Welch, 
2007).  Previous research has linked the defendant’s race/ethnicity to notions of dangerousness 
and recidivism (Albonetti, 1991; Steen, Engen, & Gainey 2005).  The threat that minorities are 
thought to pose has resulted in harsher sentencing outcomes (Welch, 2007).   
But while race is relevant in sentencing of other types of crimes, it may not matter here 
given the unique makeup of child pornography offenders (i.e., older, white, male, educated).  
Instead, it may be possible that other extralegal statuses such as family ties, education, and 
employment inform the sentencing decisions of child pornography offenders. For example, 
education and employment have been linked with notions of reduced dangerousness.  As an 
illustration, in U.S. v. Ontiveros (2008), the defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography.  
The guideline sentencing range was 97 to 121 months imprisonment and a supervised release 
range of five years to life.  The judge disregarded the guideline range and sentenced Ontiveros to 
five years of imprisonment, followed by lifetime supervised release.  In justifying the non-
guideline sentence, the court noted the defendant's lack of criminal history and his steady 
employment.  In the same fashion, judges may view child pornography offenders who are 
married and/or have children as less dangerous than those child pornography offenders who are 
unmarried and living alone.  The thought being that marriage/family curtails or insulates 
offenders from engaging in new criminal behavior.  At this time, the USSC does not collect data 
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on marriage/family, but they do collect data on dependents.  Information concerning marriage 
and family ties are indicated in presentence reports.  
Practical Constraints and Consequences. 
The final focal concern is practical constraints and consequences.  This concern refers to 
how sentencing decisions impact the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the 
individual defendants and their families and communities (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  
Organizational concerns include efficiency, flow of cases, overcrowding of correctional 
organizations and maintaining positive working relationships among courtroom actors 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Practical consequences for the individual offender include concerns 
about the offender’s ability to do time, health conditions, special needs, and disruption of family 
ties (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
Legal scholars maintain practical constraints and consequences are considerations that 
some judges consider before imposing sentencing for child pornography offenders (Hamilton 
2011; Krohel, 2011).  Specifically, Hamilton (2011), notes “when downward varying, judges 
also appeared concerned defendants would suffer ills beyond the sentence imposed, such as 
informal stigmatic harms and vulnerability to civil suits” (p.563).  The case of U.S. v. Beach 
illustrates Hamilton’s point.  In this case, the district court varied downward from a guideline 
range of 210-240 months to a sentence of 96 months. In justifying the sentence, the court 
considered the special conditions (mental health treatment, sex offender treatment, sex offender 
registration, and no Internet use) of the three-year supervised release term a consequence and 
unnecessary hardship (Friedman and Supler, 2008). 
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Likewise, Krohel (2011) uses the case of U.S. v Grossman (2006) to demonstrate the 
sentencing court’s concern of disruption to the family.  In Grossman, the offender pled guilty to 
possession of child pornography.  The guideline sentencing range was 135 to 168 months and a 
supervised release range of five years to life.  The court imposed a non-guideline sentence of 
sixty months imprisonment and ten years supervised release.  The court highlighted its concern 
of disrupting Grossman’s family ties with a sentence of more than ten years imprisonment.  And 
while the guidelines do not provide judicial actors with guidance on this particular focal concern 
and how it relates to the sentence of supervised release, it is not unreasonable to think that judges 
may consider practical constraints and consequences of the supervised release sentence of child 
pornography offenders.   
Equally important to the practical constraints and consequences the supervised release 
sentence may have for the individual offender, there may also be constraints and consequences to 
the functioning of the criminal justice system that play into the focal concerns of judges, namely 
the functioning of U.S. Probation Offices.  U.S. Probation Offices are tasked with monitoring 
and supervising child pornography offenders post-conviction.  Indeed, the general nature of child 
pornography offenses and history and characteristics of these offenders led to the formation of 
separate and specialized policies for the supervision of these offenders (see Part I – Sex Offender 
Management in the Guide to Judiciary Policy).27  In addition to specialized monitoring, the 
supervision of child pornography offenders requires specialized training in surveillance, 
electronic monitoring, and treatment techniques (Cornish, 2010; Palmiotto and MacNichol, 
2010).  There are also financial costs to probation offices including funding for sex offender 
treatment and the hiring of additional officers to supervise these offenders.  As mentioned in 
                                                          
27 Part I – Sex Offender Management provides specific guidance to U.S. Probation Officers in performing their 
duties related to the investigating and supervising persons charged or convicted of sex offenses. 
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Chapter One, the U.S. Probation Office in the Eastern District of Missouri recently created a 
specialized unit comprised of a supervising probation officer and seven line officers to supervise 
child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervised release.  This appears to be a trend as 
the U.S. Probation Office for the District of Nevada instituted a similar specialized supervision 
unit specifically for child pornography offenders.  In as much as there may be practical 
constraints and consequences for U.S. Probation Offices, this may play into the concerns of 
judges in considering the sentence of supervised release. 
Similar resources for manpower may also be needed at U.S. Attorney’s Offices and 
Federal Public Defenders Offices.  These agencies are responsible for the prosecution and 
defense of supervised release violators.  Likewise, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) will require 
resources as they are tasked with housing offenders whose supervised release terms are revoked.  
In essence, all of these considerations are resources that judicial actors may be sensitive to when 
imposing the supervised release sentence of child pornography offenders.   
To summarize, uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution and the focal concerns 
perspective of case processing and judicial actors’ decision-making provides a framework for 
understanding why legal and extralegal factors might continue to influence supervised release 
sentencing decisions despite a formal guideline system (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer, 1997; 
Spohn & Holleran, 2000).  The next section reviews the empirical literature on the correlates of 
individual-level sentencing outcomes generally because very little empirical literature exists that 
examines sentences for child pornography offenders and/or the supervised release sentence.   
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Empirical Literature  
 Legally relevant sentencing factors. 
USSC data for FY 2010 show that there is substantial variability in supervised release 
sentences imposed on child pornography offenders (USSC, 2012).  And while prior research has 
not examined the individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level factors that influence 
supervised release decisions, it is not unreasonable to assume that factors which influence the 
sentence of imprisonment may also influence supervised release decisions.  This is because like 
the sentence of imprisonment, the sentence of supervised release also mandate that judges 
consider the guidelines as well as statutory sentencing factors which include the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the offender; deterrence; public 
protection; and needed educational/vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment of the offender.  In addition, the theoretical perspectives discussed earlier imply that 
these considerations may also come into play in supervised release decision-making.  Although 
some factors, like offender race, may operate differently for child pornography offenders due to 
the unique characteristics of this population of offenders.  
By and large, prior research consistently finds that differences in legal factors operating 
at the individual-level – such as offense seriousness, criminal history, multiple charges, and 
mode of conviction – are the best predictors of whether the defendant is incarcerated and for how 
long (Johnson, 2006; Kautt, 2002).  Indeed, the federal sentencing guidelines base guideline 
calculations for punishment on legal factors such as those mentioned above.  It may follow then, 
that these same legal factors may account for the bulk of variation of supervised release 
sentences.  Because the extant literature routinely finds that legal factors play a dominant role in 
sentencing decisions as they should, a review of these factors will not be elaborated upon.   
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Individual-level: extralegal influences on sentencing decisions. 
Extralegal characteristics have also been found to influence sentencing outcomes.  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the extralegal characteristics of child pornography 
offenders are vastly different than those of the average offender convicted in federal court.  The 
typical child pornography offender is an older white male with at least a high school diploma, 
whereas the average federal offender is young minority male with less than a high school 
education (USSC, 2012).  Moreover, most child pornography offenders are employed full-time 
(Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell, 2011).  Given the uniqueness of child pornography offenders, 
extralegal factors may operate differently for these types of offenders.  To be clear, this study is 
not comparing child pornography offenders to other types of offenders in terms of sentencing 
outcomes, but this study is interested in determining whether and to what extent extralegal 
factors account for variability of supervised release outcomes for child pornography offenders.     
The federal sentencing guidelines manual devotes an entire section (see Chapter 5, 
Section H) to a discussion of offender characteristics including sex, race, national origin, creed, 
religion and socioeconomic status that are clearly identified as irrelevant and prohibited from 
consideration.  Additional characteristics, such as age, education, vocational skills, mental and 
emotional conditions, physical condition, employment record, family and communities ties are 
identified “as not ordinarily relevant in determining if a departure is warranted” (see Chapter 5, 
Section H).  This means that courts are not to consider these characteristics unless they are 
present to an unusual degree.  Although legal factors operating at the offender level are the best 
predictors of whether the offender is incarcerated and for how long (Johnson 2006; Spohn & 
Holleran 2000), empirical studies have also found extralegal factors such as race, age, gender, 
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education and socioeconomic status play a role (for comprehensive reviews see Chiricos and 
Crawford, 1995; Spohn, 2000, Zatz, 2000).  
Race effects.  
 Early studies found that race had little substantive effect on sentencing outcomes (Kleck, 
1981; Kramer & Steffensmeier, 1993).  More recent studies utilizing federal data have concluded 
that blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans receive harsher sentences than whites (Albonetti, 
1997; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Mustard, 2001).  For example, 
Doerner and Demuth (2010) used USSC data for fiscal year 2001 to examine the independent 
and joint effect of race/ethnicity, gender and age on sentences imposed on 33,305 offenders 
convicted in federal court.  They found that Hispanics and blacks, males, and younger offenders 
received harsher sentences than whites, females and older offenders.  In another federal 
sentencing study, Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) found that blacks, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans received harsher sentences than whites and that these differences were only partly 
explained by offense-related variables.  In her examination of the literature on race and 
sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines, Spohn (2013) reviewed eight 
methodologically sophisticated studies and found that each of these studies revealed that racial or 
ethnic minorities were sentenced more harshly than whites, either for all offenses or for some 
types of offenses.  
Mitchell (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 71 published and unpublished studies on 
race (i.e., being black in comparison to being white) and sentencing outcomes.  This analysis 
included a mix of studies that used federal data and state level data.  As a whole, the studies 
found that even after taking into account offense seriousness and prior criminal history, blacks 
were generally sentenced more harshly than whites.  Mitchell (2005) also found that the 
64 
magnitude of unwarranted disparity was generally statistically significant, but substantively 
small and variable. 
Based on the literature, it would appear that race influences sentencing outcomes to the 
extent that methodological problems are eliminated.  But if and how this factor influences child 
pornography offenders and supervised release sentences is unknown.  Few studies examine the 
effects of extralegal factors on sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders.  Kaiser and 
Spohn’s (2014) study is one of the few that does.  They examined the effect of race and other 
extralegal characteristics on the likelihood of downward departures for child pornography 
offenders, and they found no differences by race.  Patrick and Marsh (2011) examined whether 
race and other non-legal factors had an impact on sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex 
offenders (not specifically child pornography offenders) and also found that race was not related 
to sentencing outcomes.  However, race differences have not been explored for the sentence of 
supervised release, which is a different consideration than the sentence of imprisonment because 
federal judges consider general deterrence and incapacitation for the sentence of imprisonment, 
but recidivism and community protection post-release (USSC, 2010). 
Age effects. 
 Many empirical studies on sentencing outcomes fail to extensively address age (for 
exceptions see Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  That is to say that age is 
not the primary focus and is frequently used as a control variable (Steffensmeier, Kramer & 
Ulmer, 1995; Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000).  Studies that have examined the impact of age 
on sentencing measure age in one of three ways: (1) a continuous variable; (2) two subgroups, 
“young offenders” and “old offenders”; or (3) multiple narrowly defined categories.  Models that 
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code age as a continuous variable assume a linear effect (Klein, Petersilia & Turner, 1988; Myers 
& Talarico, 1987; Wolfe et al., 2010).   
In their review of studies that examine the influence of age as a continuous measure, Wu 
and Spohn (2009) found that some studies concluded that older offenders were sentenced more 
severely than those who were younger (e.g., Curry, Lee, & Rodriguez, 2004; Helms & Jacobs, 
2002; Mustard, 2001) or that age was inversely correlated with prison terms (e.g., Kempf-
Leonard & Sample, 2001; Spohn, 1990;Ulmer, 2000), whereas others found that age did not have 
a significant effect (e.g., Bushway & Piehl, 2001; Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Engen & Gainey, 
2000; Hebert, 1997; Johnson, 2006; Kautt & Spohn, 2002; Nobiling, Spohn, & DeLone, 1998; 
Pasko, 2002; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996; Wooldredge, 2007).   
Studies that analyze age into two subgroups “young offender” and “old offender” do so 
because prior research has found that older offenders (age 50 and older) are sentenced more 
leniently than younger offenders (under age 50) and, if imprisoned, older offenders receive 
shorter sentence lengths (Champion, 1987; Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000).  However, those 
studies that compartmentalized age into more narrowly defined categories find that a curvilinear 
relationship emerges with those adults ages eighteen to twenty-one receiving more lenient 
sentences than adults ages twenty-one through twenty-nine but similar leniency for thirty to 
thirty-nine year olds (Steffensmeier et al., 1995).  Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argue that models 
assuming a linear continuous age effect are inappropriate.  Age influences sentence severity in a 
curvilinear fashion and is best depicted by an inverted U-shape, with offenders over 50 or under 
21 receiving the least severe sentences (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  
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According to Wu and Spohn (2009), these mixed findings of age are not theoretically 
inconsistent.  In the case of the focal concerns notion of blameworthiness, Wu and Spohn 
contend that if judges stereotype the crime of the youngest offenders as most harmful, then 
sentencing decisions will produce a linear effect.  Moreover, if judges stereotype the crime of the 
oldest and youngest offenders as less harmful than those in their twenties and thirties, sentencing 
decisions will produce a curvilinear effect.  With regard to protection of the community, Wu and 
Spohn (2009) note that if judges view younger offenders as more likely to recidivate, they may 
receive a harsher punishment.  But they also point out that if younger offenders are considered 
more amenable to rehabilitation than offenders in the crime prone years, they may receive more 
lenient sentences than similarly situated offenders in their twenties and thirties, and another 
curvilinear effect would result.  Likewise, they note that judges’ concerns about practical 
constraints and consequences such as the offender’s ability to do time could produce either 
longer or shorter sentences for young and old offenders. 
Wu and Spohn (2009) conducted a meta-analysis to assess the magnitude of the effect of 
age on sentence length.  Their findings revealed that the age of the offender has no effect on the 
length of the prison term and that the strength of the association between the two variables is 
extremely weak.  Kaiser and Spohn’s (2014) study of the likelihood of downward departures for 
child pornography offenders also found that age was not statistically significant. In comparison, 
Patrick and Marsh’s (2011) study of sentencing outcomes for child sex offenders found increases 
in age of the offender increased the odds of being sentenced to prison.   
Notwithstanding the above, we still do not know how age influences supervised release 
sentences and in particular the supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders.  It 
seems likely that age may be a focal concern of judges as they consider the sentence of 
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supervised release.  For instance, age may speak to the focal concern of blameworthiness as 
judges consider the discrepancy in age between the depicted minor in the child pornography 
images and the age of the offender.28  Federal data for fiscal year 2010 found that child 
pornography offenders ranged in age from 19 to 82 years of age with an average age of 42.26 
years.  So if judges stereotype the child pornography offenses of the youngest as being less 
harmful because they are closer in age to the depicted minor, they may receive a shorter term of 
supervised release than older offenders.  Likewise, if judges stereotype the child pornography 
crimes of the youngest as being less harmful because “they are ignorant of the law,” they may 
receive a shorter term of supervised release than older offenders.  And given that judges impose 
the post-conviction supervised release sentence at the time sentence of imprisonment is imposed, 
age may speak to the focal concern of practical constraints consequences.  The average sentence 
of imprisonment in FY 2010 for non-production offenses was 63 months and 160 months for 
production offenses (USSC, 2012).  Judges’ concerns about an offender’s ability to complete 
supervised release may be a focal concern as the offender will be much older upon his release 
from prison.29 
Education effects. 
 While the guidelines cite the defendant’s education as generally irrelevant in determining 
a sentence, some studies have nevertheless found that those offenders who are poorly educated 
are sanctioned more harshly (Clarke & Koch, 1976; Kruttschnitt, 1980/1981).  Mustard (2001) 
found offenders who did not graduate from high school received longer sentences (having no 
                                                          
28According to the USSC Sourcebook 2010, virtually all child pornography offenders (96.3%) possessed images of 
minors who were prepubescent or under the age of twelve. 
 
29 In my experiences in conducting presentence investigations of child pornography offenders in the Eastern District 
of Missouri and observing the sentencing hearings of these cases, there was one judge who did consider the age of 
the offender when determining the length of the supervised release sentence and would mention that he did not feel 
that an offender should be elderly and still on supervised release.  Thus, he rarely imposed lifetime supervised 
release no matter the offense seriousness. 
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high school diploma resulted in an additional 1.2 months).  Offenders with college degrees 
received shorter sentences than high school graduates.  College graduates were more likely to 
receive downward departures, less likely to receive upward departures, and more frequently 
received large downward departures.  Likewise, Albonetti’s (1997) study of 14,189 drug 
offenders sentenced in federal court in 1991-92 found that offenders with higher levels of 
educational attainment received shorter sentences.  More recent research using federal data 
reported similar findings.  Specifically, Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson (2010) noted reductions in 
sentence lengths for offenders with greater levels of education.  Franklin (2015) found that 
offenders who graduated from high school were less likely to be incarcerated than offenders who 
did not graduate high school.   
   Franklin (2015) ties previous research findings of the effects of education and sentencing 
outcomes to the focal concerns perspective.  He surmises that offenders with higher levels of 
education may be viewed as less risky or possessing the necessary skill set to meaningfully 
contribute to society and remain crime free.  In other words, it is possible that offenders’ 
education levels directly influence court actors’ perception of dangerousness and threat of future 
offending.   
 Notwithstanding the above, studies focused specifically on child pornography offenders 
found no effect of education on sentencing outcomes.  For instance, Kaiser and Spohn (2014) 
examined the effect of education on the likelihood of downward departures for child 
pornography offenders.  They found that education was not statistically significant.  Patrick and 
Marsh (2011) included education in their study of convicted child sex offenders and also found 
that education was not related to sentencing outcomes.  Given the findings of these two studies, 
education may or may not be a factor that judges likely consider when imposing a sentence of 
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imprisonment for child pornography offenders.  However, this factor has not specifically been 
posed to the sentence of supervised release.  
Socioeconomic effects. 
 Few studies examine the impact of socioeconomic status on sentencing outcomes because 
there are few good indicators of this in most sentencing data (Zatz, 2000).  This is true for USSC 
datasets.  In one of the few federal sentencing studies that examined socioeconomic status, 
Mustard (2001) found that offenders with incomes less than $5,000 were sentenced most harshly.  
This group received sentences 6.2 months longer than offenders who had incomes between 
$25,000 and $35,000.  Mustard also found that offenders with annual incomes of less than 
$25,000 were less likely to have their sentences reduced, and offenders with annual incomes of 
more than $35,000 were more likely to have their sentences reduced.  Low-income offenders 
were also more likely to receive upward departures.   
Given the shortage of empirical literature examining socioeconomic status on federal 
sentencing outcomes, I also reviewed research examining state-level data and socioeconomic 
status.  For example, Nobiling, Spohn and DeLone (1998) examined the effect of unemployment 
on sentence severity using data for offenders sentenced in state courts in Chicago, Illinois and 
Kansas City, Missouri.  While unemployment was not considered a proxy for socioeconomic 
status in their study, we know that employment status is often related to an individual’s income.  
Nobiling et al. (1998) concluded that unemployment had a direct effect on the decision to 
incarcerate in Kansas City and also had a direct effect on the sentence length in Chicago.  They 
also found that in Chicago, unemployment increased the odds of incarceration for young males 
and for young Hispanic males and increased the sentence length for males, young males, and 
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black males.  In Kansas City, unemployment had no effect on sentence length for any subgroup 
but influenced the decision to incarcerate for black males.   
Family ties. 
Under the previous mandatory federal guidelines, family support was generally irrelevant 
in determining departures from the guidelines.  In fact, one of the main provisions of the Protect 
Act of 2003 was to amend the then-mandatory guidelines to prohibit judges from considering 
family and community ties in cases involving a minor victim (Krohel, 2011).  Now that the 
guidelines are advisory in nature, these statuses may have become relevant for some judges 
(Hamilton, 2011; Krohel, 2011).  Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s (2011) review of sentencing 
decisions of child pornography offenders found that in cases where defendants received 
sentencing reductions, it was common for judges to express that they were impressed by the 
defendant’s family support.  One judge was quoted as saying “aside from the offense, the 
defendant has led a law abiding life, and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout, he 
has raised a good family and been a mainstay in his community.” (Hamilton, 2011, p.562).  
Work by Daly (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b) appear to parallel Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s 
(2011) assertion.  Specifically, she indicates that family ties constitute social bonds that decrease 
the likelihood of recidivism.  In other words, the greater the stake in conformity judges believe 
the offender to have, the more positively judges view the offender’s rehabilitative potential 
(Logue, 2011).    
Federal sentencing literature that examines family ties is sparse because the USSC no 
longer collects data on marital status (USSC stopped collecting after FY 2003).  Some studies 
using federal data have included family ties – either marriage and/or number of dependents as 
non-primary independent variables using data from the presentence report or data prior to FY 
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2003 (Stacey & Spohn 2006; Wu & Spohn, 2010; Logue, 2011).  Stacey and Spohn (2006) 
examined the relationship between family ties and sentencing disparities in three U.S. district 
courts.  Specifically, they examined the interaction effects of gender and parental status.  They 
found that white females received more lenient sentences and that neither the defendants’ marital 
status nor parental status had an effect on sentencing outcomes.  Likewise, Wu and Spohn (2010) 
found marriage did not have an effect on sentence length.  Logue (2011) examined the influence 
of family ties (marriage/dependents) on the likelihood of downward departures for drug 
offenders.  Like other studies, Logue found offenders with family ties were no more likely to 
receive a downward departure than offenders without family ties. 
  Notwithstanding the above, we still do not know how family ties influence supervised 
release sentences of child pornography offenders.  As a rough proxy for family status, the 
number of dependents a defendant has may be a factor judges consider when considering 
supervised release decisions, including the impact the sentence and conditions may have on the 
defendant’s dependents.  This can be seen in one of two ways – detrimental impact or safety 
concerns.  In terms of having a detrimental impact, if a judge perceives the offender as having a 
stable family life, a long supervised release sentence may inhibit the family from moving on and 
cause instability.  With regard to community protection, a judge may consider the defendant’s 
dependents and whether the defendant’s instant offense poses any future risk or harm to the 
defendant’s own children or society’s children.  Kaiser and Spohn (2014) found the number of 
dependents a defendant has had no effect on downward departures for child pornography 
offenses.   
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Citizenship.  
Most sentencing studies that consider citizenship status treat it as a control variable.  
Studies including citizenship status in analyses of sentencing decisions observed lengthier 
sentences for noncitizens than for U.S. citizens (Albonetti, 1997; Hartley and Armendariz, 2011; 
Mustard, 2001; Johnson and Betsinger, 2009; Wu, 2011; Wu & D’Angelo, 2014).  Data from the 
USSC reveal that noncitizens receive lengthier sentences and that these differences have 
increased since the 2005 Booker decision (USSC, 2010).  Other researchers found shorter 
sentence lengths for noncitizens (Wolfe, Pyrooz & Spohn, 2011; Wu and Spohn, 2010), while 
other studies find no effect (Demuth, 2002; Everett & Wojtkiewics, 2002; Kautt and Spohn, 
2002).  Again, with no prior studies using both the sentence of supervised release and the offense 
of child pornography, it is unknown how citizenship may or may not influence supervised 
release outcomes. 
Summary of Extralegal Factors 
In summary, both state and federal sentencing research conducted to date reveal that 
sentencing outcomes are influenced by extralegal factors and supports the conclusion that legally 
irrelevant factors appear to be a source of unwarranted sentencing disparity.  We do not know 
yet, if and how extralegal factors influence supervised release sentences of child pornography 
offenders.  As such, these extralegal variables known to influence federal sentencing outcomes 
may influence supervised release decisions.  Socioeconomic status which has been studied less in 
the sentencing literature, is included in this study because of theoretical grounds.  That is, there 
are reasons to believe that socioeconomically advantaged child pornography offenders may be 
treated more leniently than their disadvantaged counterparts.  For the same reasons education, 
citizenship and family ties are also included in this study.  As the USSC does not collect data on 
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mental health, substance abuse or employment, these factors will not be considered for study, 
although these factors may have important implications for child pornography offenders and 
supervised release sentences. 
One of the biggest limitations of individual-level federal research is that it usually 
combines data from multiple districts and does not consider if sentencing outcomes vary 
depending on court context or if case-level factors operate differently across courts. Because of 
this, this study also looks at whether court contextual factors have an influence on supervised 
release sentencing outcomes.  In the sections that follow, I review the court communities 
perspective and the social/group threat perspective, followed by the empirical literature on court 
level influences on sentencing outcomes. 
Sentencing Disparities: Theoretical Explanations at the Court-Level 
Court communities perspective. 
The court communities perspective views courts as individual communities (Eisentein et 
al., 1988) or distinctive social worlds (Ulmer, 1997) and is based on participants’ shared 
workplace, interdependent working relations between key sponsoring agencies and distinctive 
legal and organizational cultures (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  Put another way, courts function 
like separate individual communities with their own working norms, organizational relationships, 
political climates.  According to the court communities perspective, decision-making is 
determined within the organizational structure of the court and broader cultural, political, 
economic, and social context in which the court operates (Eisentein et al., 1988; Dixon, 1995).  
In other words, judges do not make decisions in a social vacuum, but are influenced by their 
social, political and organizational environment (Johnson, 2005).  This environment includes the 
ongoing working relationship with other court actors including the government, defense counsel, 
and probation officers as well as the surrounding social and political environment. 
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Court communities are said to have locally distinctive, informal and ever-evolving case 
processing and sentencing norms or “going rates” (Eisentein et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997).  This 
reflects the attitudes, values, and norms that develop in an individual court community 
concerning criminal behavior and “going rates” (Hester and Sevigny, 2016).  Such “going rates” 
provide courtroom work groups with “templates” for case processing strategies, including 
adjudications and sentencing (Eisentein et al., 1988).  The “going rates” of individual courts may 
produce variation in case processing and sentence outcomes.  
Based upon the description above, the 94 individual federal district courts comprising the 
federal court system appear to fit within Eisentein et al.’s (1988) definition of court communities.  
Kautt (2002) reached a similar conclusion explaining the court community concept within the 
federal courts this way: The federal criminal justice system is comprised of 94 individual district 
courts.  The district courts are the federal systems primary trial courts.  Each state has at least one 
district court with some states having as many as four.  There are 12 circuit courts which make 
up the federal appellate courts and the de facto governing body for the district courts within 
them.  Each circuit court is comprised of three or more states with the exception of the District of 
Columbia circuit.  The district courts and the circuit courts make up what Kautt (2002) calls the 
“Nested Model of Federal Sentencing.”  This means for any case that enters the federal court, 
that particular case is nested within an individual district court, operating within its own local 
rules, case processing norms, “going rates” and sentencing norms.  Finally, each district court is 
nested within a circuit.  Kautt (2002) illustrates this in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 about here 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates how individual cases are at the base, the district courts are in the middle and 
the circuit court is at the top.  This shows how cases are “nested” or “clustered” within the 
contextual unit of analysis (district).  Although not shown, the Supreme Court would be the apex. 
Most importantly though, this model shows how variation in sentencing practices based on court 
context is plausible based upon the structure of the federal courts and the court communities 
perspective. 
The concept of the court communities perspective operating in the federal judiciary is 
more than just a notion.  There is evidence suggestive of its existence.  According to the Third 
Branch (2001), the federal judiciary’s monthly print newsletter, the day to day operations and 
responsibility for judicial administration lies with each individual district court.  Specifically, the 
chief judge of each district court plays a key leadership role in overseeing and coordinating the 
efficient operations, practices, and policies of the court.  Some of these practices and policies 
include ensuring that the laws, regulations and court policies are followed.  This includes 
monitoring court caseloads; overseeing local rule making; establishing procedures for setting 
trials; scheduling pretrial conferences; admitting attorneys to practice in the specific district; and 
establishing the term of the court (Kautt, 2002; The Third Branch, 2001).  This illustrates the 
normative practices and “going rates” described by Eisentein et al., 1988. 
Ulmer’s (2005) qualitative study of four U.S. District Courts also supports the court 
communities perspective in terms of the existence of normative practices in federal courts.  
Ulmer’s study was premised on the fact that the federal system provides a single set of federal 
statutes and identical rules of procedures that are supposed to ensure uniformity and 
predictability in sentencing.  Ulmer found that each of the courts used key provisions of the 
guidelines such as substantial assistance, acceptance of responsibility, and presentence 
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investigation reports differently, which resulted in variations in punishment between the four 
courts.  He explained: “there are many ‘windows’ of localized discretion” and that “local court 
community actors interpret guidelines and other federal justice policies differently, and use and 
transform these in a variety of ways.” (p.272). Thus, the court communities perspective expects 
there will be variation in district practices. Court contextual factors which may accounts for these 
differences are discussed in greater detail toward the end of this chapter.    
Based upon Ulmer’s (2005) study and the court communities perspective, differences in 
district courts by way of court communities may translate not only into differences across courts, 
but differences in the effects of individual-level factors across courts (Johnson et. al, 2008).  
Indeed, the question of whether the effects of individual-level factors vary across courts was 
asked by Kautt (2002) and Johnson (2006) in their respective multilevel sentencing studies.  In 
Kautt’s (2002) study of federal drug offenders, she found the effects of virtually all of the legal 
and extralegal case-level factors with the exception of ethnicity, varied between districts.  In 
other words, the individual-level factors influenced sentencing outcomes differently from one 
district to the next.  Johnson (2006) reported similar findings in his study of the effects of judicial 
characteristics and county court contexts using Pennsylvania sentencing data, suggesting that 
different judges weigh the importance of individual offense and offender characteristics 
differently, and the influence of these factors also varies across county contexts.  The issue of 
how much weight different courts give individual and case-level factors is also important for this 
study.  For example, border district courts like those in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Texas may apply more weight to citizenship status than courts like District of Iowa because these 
districts have larger noncitizen populations.  Accordingly, citizenship may carry more weight in 
certain districts, leading the effect of citizenship to vary across district courts.  
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In addition to the court communities perspective, other theoretical perspectives such as 
the social group threat perspective (Blalock, 1967) indicate that the surrounding social 
environment is key to explaining macro level sentencing outcomes.     
Social/Group threat perspective. 
The social/group threat perspective comes from Blalock’s (1967) research that says that 
as a subordinate group increases in size, the dominant group will feel threatened and in turn in-
part methods of social control to maintain their superior status.  In other words, criminal law and 
punishment are used as tools for containing groups identified as threatening by those in power 
(Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  The dominant group aims to control the perceived threat of the 
subordinate group because an increase in size is thought to precipitate an increase in power of the 
subordinate group (Wu and D’Angelo, 2014). 
Historically, blacks and Hispanics are regarded as persons/groups to be feared or groups 
considered a threat to the status quo.  Consequently, the social/group threat perspective is 
frequently used in examination of racial/ethnic group threat to explain variations in criminal 
punishment; however, much of the research has shown little to no support (Britt, 2000; Bridges, 
Crutchfield & Simpson, 1987; Johnson, Ulmer & Kramer, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; 
Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011).  Although this may be true, social/group threat is a broad concept 
that is not limited to analysis of race.  Recent work on criminal sentencing extends to the 
perceived threat posed by Hispanics and noncitizens (Johnson, Stewart, Pickett & Gertz, 2011; 
Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Wu and D’Angelo, 2014). For example, Wu and D’Angelo (2014) 
examined noncitizen group as a potential social/group threat in criminal punishment and 
sentencing to explain aggregate level group outcomes at the federal level.  They found support 
for the social/group threat perspective in that judges in districts with a large noncitizen 
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population imposed longer sentences on noncitizen offenders than those districts with a small 
noncitizen population.  Despite research on social/group threat and sentencing outcomes, no 
research has extended threat conceptualized as a court contextual factor such as the child 
pornography caseload rate and its effect on sentencing outcomes.   
I assert the social/group threat perspective may be particularly relevant in explaining 
sentencing variations across courts for child pornography cases.  This is because of the 
analogous features to moral panic and punitive legislation of child pornography offenses.  To 
illustrate, as panic rises, child pornography offenders are perceived as more threatening and 
dangerous, calling for increased prosecution, severe sentences, and social control.  Take for 
example the Protect Act of 2003 and its specific provisions for supervised release.  This act 
lengthened the supervised release term from a maximum of three years to a minimum of five 
years to life.  Congress’s basis for the increase was belief that child pornography offenders have 
deep-seated disorders that are not likely to disappear after release from imprisonment (Shockley, 
2010).  This rationale employed by Congress suggests that child pornography offenders are a 
threat to society and children in particular.  It also suggests the only way to minimize or mitigate 
this threat is through long-term or lifelong monitoring of these offenders.  Thus, the size of a 
child pornography caseload in a particular district may affect sentencing decisions, such that 
districts with large child pornography caseloads may be perceived as threatening to the status 
quo. 
To summarize, the court communities perspective and the social/group threat perspective 
provide a theoretical basis for my inclusion of district-level court contextual and environmental 
factors to explain supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders and why these 
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sentences may vary across courts.  The next section reviews the empirical literature on the 
impact of court contextual factors on sentencing outcomes. 
Empirical Literature Court Context 
Sentencing research considering court contexts has been spurred in large part by the court 
communities perspective and its recognition that judicial decision-making is determined within 
the organizational structure of the court and larger court environment (Eisentein et al., 1988; 
Dixon, 1995).  Examples of organizational contextual factors include court size, region, 
guidelines compliance, and caseload pressure. Examples of the surrounding social environment 
of the court include the crime rate, unemployment rate, political ideology, racial composition, 
and socioeconomic disadvantage.  These organizational and environmental contextual factors are 
theorized to influence sentencing outcomes.   
 Sentencing research examining court context has done so in three ways (1) the cross 
jurisdictional approach; (2) pooled statewide data; and (3) multilevel modeling.  The cross 
jurisdictional approach as described by Britt (2000), assumes the effect of social context is 
indirect.  This approach examines sentencing decisions across a small number of jurisdictions 
and compares the results of separate regression models for each jurisdiction or includes 
jurisdiction as a dummy variable (Eisentein, Fleming and Nardulli, 1988; Ulmer and Kramer, 
1996; Albonetti, 1997). Some studies using the cross jurisdictional approach have examined the 
impact of the size of the jurisdiction (Eisentein et al., 1988; Eisentein and Jacob, 1977), while 
others have examined urban, suburban, or rural jurisdiction (Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Ulmer, 
1997).   The drawbacks of the cross jurisdictional approach are that they focus on a small number 
of jurisdictions and preclude large scale generalizations to other courts (Britt, 2000; Ulmer and 
Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase, and Schulz, 2005).  Moreover, comparing the effects of 
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jurisdictional dummy variables fails to show what contextual features condition variation in 
sentencing (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).   
The second way court context has been examined is via sentencing decisions that pool 
statewide sentencing data to allow for the simultaneous study of numerous jurisdictions 
(Weidner et al., 2005).  For instance, Dixon (1995) studied sentencing outcomes in 73 counties 
in Minnesota and found a direct contextual effect for level of bureaucratization.  In the same 
way, Steffensmeier, Kramer and Streifel (1993) examined sentencing outcomes of 67 counties in 
Pennsylvania and found direct contextual effects for racial composition and political 
conservatism.  Myers and Talarico’s (1987) study used data from all the counties in Georgia.  
They also found contextual effects for racial composition and urbanization.  The main drawback 
of these studies is that they used ordinary least squares regression and/or logistic regression to 
study sentence length and/or the decision to incarcerate.   
The third way that contextual factors have been studied in the literature is through 
multilevel models which remedy the single-level statistical approach mentioned above.  Britt 
(2000) and Kautt (2002) were among the first researchers to use multilevel models to consider 
context.  For example, Britt (2000) examined the simultaneous relationship between court 
context and racial disparities in sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania courts using data from 
1991 to 1994.  He found that the mean likelihood of incarceration and the mean sentence length 
varies by the county in which the court is located.  Additionally, Britt found that racial disparities 
vary by court jurisdiction even after controlling for other offender and case characteristics. 
Kautt (2002) used federal data to examine the influence of individual-level legal and 
extralegal factors and district-level contextual factors on sentencing decisions for drug 
trafficking cases.  She used several court contextual factors she theorized as being related to 
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sentence length including drug crime caseload, size of population, appeal rate, substantial 
assistance rate, guidelines compliance rate, percentage of Hispanics in the population, percentage 
of blacks in the population and the unemployment rate.  She included drug-crime caseload and 
size of the population as indicators of the impact that a district’s workload may have on 
sentencing outcomes.  Likewise, district appeal rate served as an indicator of lower work-group 
cooperation.  Both guidelines compliance rate and substantial assistance rate gauge the influence 
of the guidelines on sentencing outcomes.  Finally, the district unemployment rate and 
percentage of black and Hispanics were included to test if demographics of the district affected 
sentence length.  Few of the contextual measures Kautt examined had a direct effect on sentence 
length.  Specifically, she found no effect for population size, drug caseload, district-level 
minority composition or unemployment rate.  She did find that the departure rate of the district 
was significantly related to sentence length. 
Following Kautt (2002), Ulmer and Johnson (2004) utilized Pennsylvania data and 
examined a wide variety of direct contextual effects and cross-level interactions on sentencing 
decisions from 1997 to 1999.  They used more extensive court characteristics and jurisdiction, 
including crime rate, poverty rate, unemployment rate, trial rate, judicial caseload, jurisdiction 
size, racial/ethnic composition, jail space, and local politics.  They found that most of the 
variation in sentencing existed at the individual case-level, and most of the variance in 
sentencing outcomes was explained by individual case-level factors.  They did find significant 
between-county variation in sentencing that was not explained by individual case-level factors 
and that the effects of individual case-level predictors themselves varied significantly across 
counties.  Ulmer and Johnson (2004) found that court caseload pressure and racial/ethnic 
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composition of jurisdictions affect sentencing outcomes both directly and/or in interaction with 
individual case-level factors.  
Weider et al. (2005) used a combination of individual-level and county-level contextual 
data from a national sample of criminal trial court cases in large urban jurisdictions.  They 
examined several contextual factors including sentencing guidelines, the availability of 
alternative sanctions, crime rate, political conservatism, racial composition, and economic 
disadvantage.  Results from hierarchical logistic regression analyses that control for the effects of 
individual-level factors found that use of sentencing guidelines, crime rate, and racial 
composition influenced the decision to incarcerate.   
While many studies on court contextual influences on sentencing outcomes use state level 
data (Britt, 2000; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), Kautt (2002) explains that it is not unreasonable to 
expect similar differences across federal courts despite its uniform appearance of structured 
sentences.  Anderson and Spohn (2009) further explain:  
Although decision-makers in the federal criminal justice system are guided by a more 
uniform set of statutes and policies than those in the states, it does not necessarily follow 
that this will eliminate inter-district disparity or produce consistent sentencing across 
similarly situated offenders.  Like courts at the state level, U.S. District Courts differ on a 
number of dimensions, such as different caseloads and different policies and practices 
regarding upward and downward departures, and these differences may influence case 
processing procedures and case outcomes (p. 367). 
Still, research on federal guideline sentencing has focused almost exclusively on case-level 
influences (Kautt, 2002).  Many studies that did consider court context, did so cursorily in that 
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dummy variables were used for geographic regions, districts and circuits (Steffensmeier and 
Demuth, 2000; Everett and Wojtkiewics, 2002; Kautt and Spohn, 2002).  According to Johnson, 
Ulmer and Kramer (2008), the focus of this work is on controlling for jurisdictional variation 
rather than on investigating it.   
Recent multilevel federal sentencing research continues to emphasize the importance of 
contextual influences on sentencing outcomes.  For example, Johnson et al. (2008) examined 
interdistrict variations in the applications of downward departures from the federal sentencing 
guidelines.  They found that substantial variation exists in the probability of prosecutor-initiated 
substantial assistance departures and judge-initiated downward departures.  This variation is 
accounted for in part by organizational court contexts, such as caseload pressures, and by 
environmental considerations such as racial composition of the district.   
In short, the literature finds that court context is an important consideration in judicial 
decision-making.  While I discussed many of these contextual factors generally, in the following 
section, I review some of these contextual factors in-depth, particularly ones that will be used in 
this dissertation.   
Theorized Impact of Court Contextual Factors on Supervised Release Sentencing Decisions 
In addition to individual-level legal and extralegal factors, this dissertation assesses the 
impact of district-level court contextual and environmental factors that have found to be 
influential in prior multilevel studies, as well as court contextual factors theorized to specifically 
influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography cases.  The impact of 
seven contextual factors is assessed: court size, caseload pressure, guidelines compliance rate, 
the Supreme Court decision in Kimbrough v. U.S., mandatory minimum state-level penalties for 
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possession of child pornography, political conservatism, and region. In addition to examining the 
direct effects of these district-level court contextual factors, this dissertation also examines if the 
effects of individual-level variables on sentence length can be explained by characteristics of the 
court and district.   
Court size (district size). 
Eisenstein et al. (1988) maintain that the size of a court community shapes crucial aspects 
of its operations.  They note that size can be defined in several ways – the number of people 
living within its jurisdiction, the number of judges, or the number of people at the core of the 
court community.  They further maintain that increasing size of a court jurisdiction leads to 
greater diversity of interests and greater obstacles to forging a narrow consensus.  In other words, 
a smaller court jurisdiction would likely have a more narrow interest which in turn would 
dominate leading to a greater likelihood of consensus.  In contrast, larger court communities are 
said to have more diversified interests, reduced media visibility in routine case processing, 
greater bureaucratization of sponsoring agencies such as the U.S. Attorney’s office and the 
Federal Public Defender’s office, greater use of plea bargaining, and a normative tolerance or 
desensitization of deviant/criminal behavior (Eisentein et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997; Johnson et. al, 
2008). 
Court size is salient in the federal system as the 94 judicial districts vary in size.  The 
image in Figure 3.2 shows the 94 judicial districts, including at least one in each state, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.  The three territories of the U.S. including the Virgin 
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, have district courts that hear federal cases.  
The federal circuits are labeled with number one through eleven, with the District of Columbia 
representing the twelfth circuit. 
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Figure 3.2 about here 
 
 
Court size is determined by the congressionally authorized number of judges in a district 
(Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).  This number is based on shifting population 
numbers or a changing workload in that district.  From time to time Congress will increase or, 
less frequently, decrease the number of federal judgeships in a particular judicial district.  The 
authorized judgeship number does not include senior judges or magistrate judges.30 
Several federal districts have only 1 or 2 authorized judgeships, whereas others like the 
Central District of California have as many as 28.  Based upon Eisenstein et al.’s (1988) 
hypothesis as well as the court communities perspective, larger size districts like the Central 
District of California would likely yield less severe sentences.  Johnson et al., 2008 looked at the 
effects of district-level factors, including court size, on interdistrict variation in the application of 
downward departures from the federal sentencing guidelines.  They used the number of 
authorized judges as their measure of court size and found no evidence that larger districts were 
more likely to grant downward departures.  Even so, other research using the court community 
framework finds that sentence severity is inversely related to court community size (Ulmer, 
1997; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  For example, Ulmer and Johnson 
(2004), using Pennsylvania sentencing data, found that larger courts were least likely to 
incarcerate offenders and smaller courts had more severe sentences. 
                                                          
30 Magistrate judges are referred to as federal judges, but are neither appointed by the President nor confirmed by 
the Senate.  A senior judge is a federal judge who has met the age and service requirement.  Senior judges, who 
essentially provide volunteer service to the courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts’ workload 
annually. 
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Despite these inconsistent findings, court size is included in this study because we do not 
know how this factor influences supervised release outcomes and it seems likely that larger 
courts may get less attention and less scrutiny for sentences they impose.  This may be 
particularly important for child pornography offenses because these are often high profile cases.     
Caseload pressure. 
 Varying child pornography caseload rates between districts could affect supervised 
release sentences.  A few empirical studies have examined caseload as a correlate of sentencing 
outcomes.  For example, Myers and Talarico (1987) found that caseload pressure reduced the 
severity of split sentences and resulted in slightly shorter sentence lengths.  Results from Ulmer 
and Johnson’s (2004) study of sentencing outcomes for county trial courts in Pennsylvania 
indicate that caseload pressure affects sentencing outcomes either directly, or in interaction with 
individual factors.  Johnson et al., (2008) found that caseload pressure was significantly 
associated with an increased probability of both downward departures from judges and 
substantial assistance from the prosecutor.  Still other studies found no influence of caseload 
pressure on sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002).  Johnson et al. (2008) surmise that it is possible 
that it may be the particular type of caseload that matters for sentencing decisions.  As an 
example, they noted that a high violent caseload may exert a different effect than a high property 
caseload.  This may be true of a child pornography caseload.  According to the USSC fiscal year 
2010 data, non-production child pornography cases were prosecuted in every circuit and district, 
but the number of cases in each circuit and district varied substantially (USSC, 2012).31 
                                                          
31 With respect to the 94 districts, non-production cases occurred most frequently in the Eastern District of Missouri 
(72, 3.7% of all such cases), the Central District of California (70, 3.6% of all such cases), the Middle District of 
Florida (60, 3.1% of all such cases), the Eastern District of Virginia (54, 2.8% of all such cases), the Western 
District of Texas (49, 2.5% of all such case), the Southern District of Florida (45, 2.3% of all such cases), and the 
Eastern District of California (41, 2.1% of all such cases).  These seven districts accounted for 20.3 percent of all 
non-production cases in 2010.   
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Variation in scope and volume of child pornography cases is vastly different from one district to 
the next.  It may be possible that this variation in caseload volume may influence and shape 
supervised release sentencing practices.  Specifically, districts with a higher volume of child 
pornography cases may conclude that these offenses are problematic or large scale problems.  
This may influence supervised release sentence outcomes in that judges may sentence more 
harshly if they are routinely sentencing these types of cases, particularly if community protection 
is of concern.  This may then lead to “going rates” or a normative practice of how such cases are 
sentenced in districts witnessing high volume.  But judges could also sentence more leniently if 
these cases become viewed as common. 
 
Guidelines compliance rate. 
 
Some research on court level contextual factors also suggests that guideline compliance 
rates may influence sentencing outcomes beyond the impact of individual-level factors.  For 
instance, Kautt (2002) found that both the guidelines compliance rate and the rate of substantial 
assistance departures influenced sentence length outcomes for federal drug trafficking offenders.  
It appears appropriate that this contextual factor is included in the data analyses because districts 
that generally comply with the guidelines may also comply with any policy statements contained 
therein.  Therefore, districts that generally comply with the guidelines may be more likely to 
impose lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.    
Kimbrough-based policy disagreement. 
Another district-level factor theorized to influence supervised release sentence length is 
the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Kimbrough (2007) and the resulting circuit courts split on 
whether its application can be applied to child pornography sentencing.  Recall, the Kimbrough 
decision held that judicial departures based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines (i.e, 
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crack cocaine guideline) are permissible.  There is a circuit split among the circuit courts on 
whether district courts can apply the decision in Kimbrough to child pornography offenses.  
According to Kaiser and Spohn (2014), appellate decisions in circuits that have rejected the 
application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements for non-production child pornography 
offenses include the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 11th circuits.  Federal circuits that have allowed 
policy disagreements for non-production offenses include the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th circuits.   
It appears appropriate to consider and include this contextual factor in the current 
dissertation because at the heart of child pornography supervised release sentencing schemata is 
the policy statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervised release.  Likewise, the heart of 
Kimbrough is the latitude for judicial downward departures based on a policy disagreement with 
the guidelines. As such, circuit courts that authorize their lower district courts to depart from the 
guidelines in child pornography cases based on such policy disagreements may impose 
supervised release sentences other than life because they disagree with the policy statement of 
the supervised release guidelines for child pornography offenders.  Kaiser and Spohn (2014) 
looked at this variable in their study of downward departures among non-production child 
pornography offenders.  They found statistical significance of a case receiving a downward 
departure if the case was sentenced in a circuit that rejected policy disagreements for child 
pornography offenders.   
Mandatory minimum state-level penalties. 
One of the main assumptions of the court communities perspectives is that the broader 
social environment in which a court is located may influence sentencing outcomes.  This means 
that judges are likely sensitive or cognizant of the broader social environment including the 
social/legal environment.  As such, while this dissertation is concerned with federal child 
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pornography offenses, a district-level contextual factor seemingly relevant to test is the influence 
of state-level penalties for possession of child pornography on supervised release sentencing 
outcomes. This contextual factor considers the influence of the broader social/legal environment 
of the district court as it specifically relates to child pornography.  This may be important 
because child pornography is also criminalized at the state level and vary by state.  According to 
Hessick (2010):  
States have...significantly increased their penalties [for child pornography offenses during 
the same time period that Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission have 
done so at the federal level].  All 50 states have specific provisions criminalizing the 
possession of child pornography, and thirty states have increased penalties available for 
possession of child pornography since criminalizing it.  The pattern of increasing 
penalties appears to be getting stronger, as twenty-eight of those increases have occurred 
since 2000, nineteen have occurred since 2005, and four states have increased penalties 
associated with possession of child pornography multiple times in the past twenty years 
(p.5). 
For example, Louisiana has a mandatory minimum of five to twenty years for possession 
of child pornography and Missouri has a mandatory minimum of five to fifteen years for 
possession of more than 20 images of child pornography.  Mandatory minimum state-level 
penalties may speak to how serious child pornography offenses are considered and/or the level of 
moral panic in a state.  Therefore, it is theorized that a district court located in a state with 
mandatory minimum state-level penalties for child pornography may perceive child pornography 
as a large scale moral problem or social group threat and thus yield more severe supervised 
release sentences.   
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Political conservatism. 
According to research by Eisentein et al. (1988), political contexts shape sentencing 
practices.  They explain that judges, who are typically selected from the local community, are 
likely to share the community’s values.  Research on political influence and sentencing outcomes 
are mixed.  Some studies using a single-level analysis to assess contextual factors on individual-
level sentence length have found that political ideology, defined as the percent who voted 
Republican in presidential election, has a positive influence on sentence length (Nardulli, 
Fleming and Eisentein, 1988; Huang, Finn Ruback and Friedmann, 1996).  For instance, 
Nardulli, Fleming & Eisentein (1988), in their examination of political conservatism, used the 
percentage of residents who voted for Republican candidates in local and presidential elections 
as their measure of political ideology.  They found that political conservatism was positively 
related to sentence length for repeat offenders.  Huang et. al (1996) found that political 
conservatism had a positive effect on sentence length for violent crime, robbery, and assault.   
In contrast, some studies using multilevel analyses have not found that the percentage 
voting Republican has a significant effect on either the odds of incarceration or sentence length 
(Johnson, 2005; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase & Schultz, 2005).  One explanation 
that has been espoused is that toughness on crime has become a universal campaign theme for 
both Democrats and Republicans (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Another explanation is that federal 
judges are insulated from political influences due to lifetime appointment to the bench. 
All the same, findings from previous studies lead me to hypothesize that the political 
community in which the district court is situated may influence judges to reflect the values of the 
local community context in their decision-making.  For instance, a district court situated in a 
state dominated by conservatism, may feel pressure to reflect the community’s value in their 
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decision-making.  Accordingly, a more punitive political milieu may result in lengthier terms of 
supervised release. 
Region. 
Prior to the passage of the SRA, Congress recognized differences among judges in 
sentencing philosophy and differences among regions in sentencing practices as sources of 
unwarranted extralegal disparity (Rigsby, 2010).  Sentencing research in the 1970’s sponsored by 
the Department of Justice showed that judicial officers placed differing importance on various 
factors depending on the region in which they practiced (Sutton, 1978; Rhodes & Conly, 1981).  
Later sentencing research also showed differences in sentencing outcomes by region.  For 
instance, Albonetti (1997) reported that the probability and length of imprisonment for drug 
offenses sentenced in the early years of the guidelines was affected by region in about half of the 
circuits, after controlling for offense level, criminal history points, and a number of other legally 
relevant factors. Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) grouped the circuits into five regions and 
reported harsher sentencing in the southern circuits and more lenient sentencing in the 
northeastern and western circuits.   
Summary of Court Context 
In sum, the importance of considering court context cannot be overstated in sentencing 
research.  This is because characteristics of the court may also influence sentencing decisions.  
Moreover, various aspects of the community in which a court is situated may indirectly affect 
judicial decisions as judges are likely drawn from the community they represent and are not 
immune to social or legal influences of the community (Eisentein et. al, 1988; Huang et. al, 
1996).  Accordingly, both the court communities perspective and the social group threat 
perspective are well-suited for organizing many of the familiar court contextual factors theorized 
to affect supervised release sentences at the aggregate level.   
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Current Study 
This dissertation hopes to extend sentencing literature by presenting a multilevel analysis 
of supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenses using individual-level 
offender and district-level data.  My aim is to uncover the circumstances under which variability 
and disparity in supervised release sentences emerge.  This includes an examination of the 
effects of legal and extralegal individual-level factors as well as district-level factors on 
supervised release outcomes. 
Research questions. 
My research questions, which are guided by theory and previous empirical research on 
sentencing disparities, are as follows: 
1. What proportion of the variability in supervised release sentences is at the 
individual-level versus the district-level?   
 
2. What individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables account for variability in 
supervised release sentences? 
 
2A. Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of supervised release 
sentences differ across offense type (nonproduction versus production)?  
 
3. Above and beyond individual-level variables, are district-level factors related to 
supervised release sentencing outcomes?  
 
4. Do the effects of individual-level variables on sentence length differ across 
courts? If so, can these differences be explained by characteristics of the court 
and district?   
 
Hypotheses. 
 Using the focal concerns perspective, the court communities perspective, social/group 
threat, and prior sentencing research as background, the following hypotheses frame this 
dissertation: 
 Hypothesis 1: Sentence severity will vary significantly across courts. 
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Hypothesis 2: Legally relevant factors will explain the majority of variation in supervised  
  release outcomes, but extra-legal factors will also matter.  
Hypothesis 3: The seriousness of the offense will moderate the effect of legal and extra- 
legal variables such that these factors will have less of an effect when the 
offense charge is more serious. 
 Hypothesis 4: The effects of individual-level sentencing factors will vary across courts. 
  
Hypotheses 5: Above and beyond individual-level variables, district-level factors will  
   have an effect on supervised release sentences. 
 
As there is no research on the sentence of supervised release, not enough is known to 
hypothesize the direction of all effects. 
In this chapter, I have reviewed theoretical frameworks and the empirical research from 
which I have speculated about the relationship between individual-level variables and district-
level variables and supervised release sentencing outcomes.  In the next chapter, I describe the 
data, methods, and analytical strategy to answer the research questions. 
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The Nested Model of Federal Sentencing 
 
Source: Kautt (2002) 
Figure 3.1  The Nested Model of Federal Sentencing 
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Geographic Boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeal and U.S. District Courts 
Source: USSC’s 2012 report to Congress on Federal Child Pornography Offenses 
 Figure 3.2 Geographic Boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data 
I address my research questions using a combination of individual-level sentencing data 
and district-level contextual data.  The individual-level data come from the USSC dataset for 
fiscal year 2012, which includes information on all federal offenders sentenced between October 
1, 2011 and September 30, 2012.  This fiscal year was selected because it marks a significant 
statutory change to the maximum sentence of imprisonment for possession of child pornography, 
raising the penalties from 10 years to 20 years (see Table 2.1).  The USSC datasets for individual 
offenders contain measures of (1) legal or court-related case processing information (e.g., 
criminal history variables, departures/variances, guideline enhancements/reductions); (2) 
extralegal characteristics (e.g., gender, race, educational level, age); and (3) case and sentence 
outcomes.  I supplemented these individual-level data with district-level contextual factors 
tabulated and compiled from USSC 2012 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Statistics; 
2012 Federal Court Management Statistics (FCMS); the Federal Election Commission’s 2013 
report on the 2012 Federal Elections; and the USSC’s 2012 study of child pornography 
offenses.32   
Following the methodology employed by Kautt (2002), who also conducted a multilevel 
analysis of federal sentencing data, this dissertation only includes those federal districts that fall 
within states.  Kautt (2002) explained that since states have additional authorities and privileges 
than territories, treating territories as comparable may introduce nonrandom bias.  Thus, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not included.  
Additionally, since I am examining a district-level contextual factor that includes whether a 
                                                          
32 FCMS provide information about the judicial caseload profile of each federal district on an annual basis. 
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mandatory minimum state-level penalty for child pornography is in effect in the state in which 
the district court is situated, Washington DC is also excluded.  After omitting these district 
courts, 89 district courts remain (see Table 4.1 for a list). 
The final individual-level data set for the analyses includes 1,900 males convicted of 
child pornography.  This final number excludes cases where a term of supervised release was not 
imposed (n=29).33  Women offenders were also excluded as they made up such a small 
percentage of the total sample (n=24).  Likewise, all cases wherein the child pornography 
guideline (Sections 2G2.2 or 2G2.1) was not used in the guidelines sentencing computation were 
excluded (n=30).  This can happen in one of two ways.  The first way is when there is a cross 
reference to another guideline.  For example, Section 2G2.1 (production guideline) has a cross 
reference to apply the guideline for murder (Section 2A1.1) if the victim was killed (USSC 
Guidelines Manual, 2012).  The second way is when an individual is convicted of multiple 
counts involving different offenses.  The guideline in Section 3D1.3 provides that in instances of 
multiple counts, courts are to group the offenses and apply the guideline comprising the more 
serious offense (USSC Guidelines Manual, 2012).  For example, if an individual is convicted of 
possession of child pornography and distribution of cocaine, the guideline for drug distribution 
(Section 2D1.1) would be used because this charge is more serious in terms of the range of 
punishment for the sentence of imprisonment.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Supervised Release.  For this study, supervised release sentencing decisions can be 
conceptualized in two ways: the decision to impose lifetime supervision; or, if life is not 
                                                          
33 If a case is sentenced to probation instead of a term of imprisonment, supervised release is not imposed. 
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imposed, the length of the supervised release term.  It is important to look at both these 
dependent variables because the guidelines policy statement in Section 5D1.2(b)(2) prescribes 
lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.  But we know that judges give 
out lifetime supervised release in over a third of cases (Vinyard, 2016).  I therefore model these 
two sentencing decisions as follows: (1) The decision to impose lifetime supervised release was 
coded 1 if the offender was sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 0 if the offender was not 
sentenced to lifetime supervised release; (2) Supervised release length is defined as a continuous 
variable measured in months.  Because of the skewness in the sentence length data, I use the log 
transformation of supervised release length.34  The log transformation normalizes the skewed 
distribution.  While scholars have taken a variety of approaches to coding life sentences, I 
followed the USSC in top-coding lifetime supervised release at 470 months.  I therefore use 470 
months to represent the maximum supervised release sentence.35  
In addition to the skewness revealed by histogram, the shape of the distribution of 
supervised release sentence length is not normal (Kologorov-Smirnov significance value is .000 
suggesting violation of the assumption of normality; kurtosis value is -1.584).  A preliminary 
view of the data revealed a lot of clumping.  For example, 19% of cases received five years 
supervised release, 25% received ten years, 8.9% received fifteen years, 5.6% received twenty 
years, 1.9% received twenty-five years, 1.5% received thirty years, and 33.2% received lifetime 
supervised release.  The remainder of the cases received sentences other than those just 
described.  Based upon the distribution of the data, I found it appropriate to create and include an 
ordinal dependent variable based upon meaningful categories of the data.  Specifically, I created 
                                                          
34 Skewness = .425; Standard error of skewness = .056 
35 There were 11 cases in this dataset that received supervised release sentences greater than 470 months.  These 
cases were recoded to represent lifetime supervised release. 
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four categories: short-term supervised release (cases that received sentences of 60 months or 
less); intermediate term supervised release (sentences ranging between 72 and 120 months of 
supervised release); long-term supervised release (sentences ranging between 121 months and 
420 months)36; and lifelong supervised release (cases sentenced to 470 months). 
Individual-Level Independent Variables.  The independent variables used in the analyses are 
legal variables and extralegal variables hypothesized to affect sentencing outcomes (Albonetti, 
1997; Mustard, 2001; Spohn, 2006). 
Legal Measures     
Mode of Conviction (Plea).  Plea bargaining is a common practice in the federal criminal justice 
system.  Approximately 97 percent of convictions in federal courts (FY 2012) were the result of 
plea bargaining (USSC Sourcebook, 2012).  Research has found that plea bargaining can reduce 
sentence severity (Kautt, 2002).  This variable was dichotomized so that a value of 1 represents 
the defendant pled guilty either through a guilty plea or nolo contendere.37  A value of 0 indicates 
that the defendant had a trial (bench or jury).   
Departure.  Courts can sentence an individual within the specified guideline range or impose an 
upward departure/variance or a downward departure/variance.38  Departure is measured with a 
categorical variable (e.g., within guideline sentence, upward departure/variance, downward 
                                                          
36 There were no cases with a supervised release sentence ranging between 121 to 143 months.   
37 Nolo contendere is a plea wherein the defendant neither admits nor disputes a charge, serving as an alternative to a 
pleading of guilty or not guilty. 
 
38 An upward or downward departure is a sentence that is greater or less than the advisory guideline range based 
upon the application of departure policy statements in the guidelines.  An upward or downward variance refers to a 
sentence above or below the advisory guideline range based upon the court’s weighing of one or more sentencing 
factors of 18 U.S.C 3553(a).   
 
100 
departure/variance [inclusive of all possible categories of downward departures and variances  
including substantial assistance]), with within guideline sentence as the reference category.39   
Criminal History.  This continuous variable is the final criminal history score as determined by 
the sentencing court.  The criminal history score, which ranges from 1 to 6, is calculated based 
upon the total criminal history points calculated from Section 4A1.1 of the federal sentencing 
guidelines. The higher the score, the greater the criminal history.  A higher criminal history score 
generally results in greater sentence severity.   
Sex Offender Enhancement.  This variable indicates whether an enhancement of Repeat and 
Dangerous Sex Offender (see Chapter Four, Section 4B1.5 of the 2012 USSC Guidelines Manual 
2012) was applied at sentencing.  This enhancement is applied if the court finds that the offender 
committed the current federal offense subsequent to sustaining at least one sex offense 
conviction.  This variable is coded as 0 if the enhancement was not applied and 1 if it was 
applied.    
Offense Severity Score.  This continuous variable indicates the final offense level as determined 
by the court (which ranges from 1 to 43).  Higher offense levels result in greater sentence 
severity. 
Number of Counts of Conviction.  This variable indicates the number of counts of conviction.  
For example, an individual convicted of three counts of child pornography is subject to three 
terms of supervised release whereas an individual convicted of a single-count of child 
                                                          
39 Substantial assistance refers to information proffered by the defendant to the government that leads to the 
prosecution and conviction of another offender(s).  I selected to keep this measure a three-category measure rather 
than a four-category measure (separating out substantial assistance and treating it as a separate category).  This is 
because child pornography offenses are unique in that a computer is used nearly 100% of the time. As such, law 
enforcement can obtain computer IP address information to investigate any involvement of others. Therefore, the 
assistance of the defendant is not as necessary as is more common for drug conspiracies (Stacey and Spohn, 2006).  
In the current data, offenders receiving substantial assistance accounted for only 72 cases or 3.8%.   
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pornography is subject to a single term of supervised release.  It should be noted that regardless 
of the number of terms of supervised release, all terms run concurrently.  This variable is 
included because it may speak to blameworthiness or community protection.  For example, a 
sentencing court may believe that an offender convicted of multiple counts of child pornography 
is more culpable and thus warrants longer community supervision as opposed to an individual 
convicted of a single-count.   
Detention Status.  This binary variable indicates the offender’s presentence detention status.  
This variable is scored 1 if the offender is detained and a 0 if the offender is on bond.  Detention 
status may speak to risk and/or community protection.  Generally, for offenders to be detained 
prior to sentencing, there are risk factors present in the defendant’s background such as failing to 
appear or violence.  A defendant may also be detained before trial or sentencing if the statute 
mandates detention based on the seriousness of the charge.40 
Offense Type.  The USSC categorizes all child pornography offenses, including possession, 
receipt, transportation, distribution and production, into one offense group.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, the data will be disaggregated into two groups – non-production offenses and 
production offenses.  Non-production offenses include possession, receipt, transportation and 
distribution.  Offenders convicted for these offenses are sentenced under 18 USC 2252 or 2252A 
of the U.S. Code for Crime and Criminal Procedures.  The applicable federal sentencing 
guideline for non-production offenses fall under Section 2G2.2.  Non-production offenses 
involve child pornography images in which offenders had no actual contact with minors.  
Production offenses, which involve the actual physical abuse of minors in making or attempting 
                                                          
40 Mandatory detention at arrest applies to all child pornography offenses except for possession of child 
pornography.  Mandatory detention at the plea and sentencing hearings apply to all child pornography offenses. 
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to make child pornography images, are sentenced under 18 USC 2251 or 2260 of the U.S. Code 
for Crime and Criminal Procedures.  The applicable federal sentencing guideline for production 
offenses fall under Section 2G2.1.  The legal literature typically divides child pornography 
offenses into these two types because most of the disparity in sentences generally arises from 
non-production offenses (Rigsby, 2010, Krohel, 2011).  This variable is scored 1 for non-
production cases and 0 for production cases.   
Extralegal Measures   
Age.  This variable is defined as the age of the defendant at the time of sentencing.  Consistent 
with research that delineates age into two subgroups “young offenders” and “old offenders” 
(Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000), as well as the fact that the average age of my sample is 41.41, 
I coded defendant age as a dichotomous variable, where 0 represents offenders ages 19-49 and a 
1 represents offenders ages 50 and over.  I did not code age as a continuous variable because 
preliminary modeling showed that the effect of age was not linear.  I also conducted a 
preliminary analysis of the age variable using a three category measure (19-21; 22-49; and 50 
and over), as suggested by Steffensmeier et al. (1998).  There was no significant difference in the 
likelihood of lifetime supervised between those ages 19 to 21 and 22 to 49, which suggests that 
my two-category measure of age is appropriate.   
Race.  This variable indicates the defendant’s race self-reported to the probation officer at the 
time the presentence report was prepared.  Because the sample is mostly white (86.5%), this 
variable was dichotomized such that a value of 1 represents whites and a 0 value represents 
nonwhites.  The nonwhite category is inclusive of defendants identified as black (3.5%), 
Hispanic (8.9%) and other (1.1%).   
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Education.  This variable indicates the highest level of education completed by the defendant.  
Education is a categorical variable (e.g., less than high school, high school graduate, some 
college, and college graduate), with high school graduate as the reference category.  This 
measure is similar to the one used by Mustard (2001), who found differences in sentence length 
based on levels of education.  According to Franklin (2015), these four categories are 
meaningfully distinct from one another and have pronounced implication for future success that 
might weigh on the minds of court actors. 
Fine.  A variable representing socioeconomic status such as income is not available in the 
current dataset.  The best proxy is the imposition of a fine at sentencing.  An offender’s ability to 
pay a fine is based upon the offender’s net worth and net monthly cash flow documented in the 
presentence report.  This continuous variable indicates the fine amount imposed by the court. 
Citizenship.  This variable indicates whether an offender is or is not a U.S. citizen (non-citizens 
include legal and illegal aliens).  It is binary such that a 0 indicates the defendant is a non-U.S. 
citizen and 1 indicates the defendant is a U.S. citizen. 
Dependents.  The only measure of family circumstances collected by the USSC is whether the 
defendant has any financial dependents he is supporting, excluding himself.  This variable is 
measured as a binary indicator wherein a 1 indicates the defendant has financial dependents and 
a 0 indicates the defendant has no financial dependents.  Data on marriage and other extralegal 
factors such as substance abuse history and mental health status are unavailable in the dataset. 
District-Level Independent Variables 
 To investigate whether court contextual factors influence supervised release sentence 
outcomes, I supplemented the USSC dataset with seven aggregate district-level variables 
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including district size, child pornography caseload rate, guidelines compliance rate, mandatory 
minimum state-level penalties for possession of child pornography, Kimbrough-based policy 
decision, political conservatism, and region.  These court contextual factors are included because 
they are theoretically linked to supervised release sentencing decisions.   
District Court Size.  Following the same methodology employed by Johnson et al. (2008) to 
measure district size, this variable represents the number of authorized judgeships in a federal 
district for fiscal year 2012. 
Caseload Pressure (Child Pornography Caseload Rate).  This continuous variable indicates a 
district’s child pornography caseload rate.  It was calculated by taking the number of child 
pornography cases emanating from a district divided by the total number cases in that district.  
This quotient is multiplied by 100 to make the caseload rate a percentage.  This variable is an 
indicator of the impact that a district’s child pornography workload may have on sentencing 
outcomes for child pornography offenders. 
Guidelines Compliance Rate.  This continuous variable indicates a district’s overall within 
guideline sentence compliance rate for all offenses.  This variable is calculated by taking the 
number of cases that were sentenced within the guidelines range of a district divided by the total 
number of cases that were sentenced in the district.  Multiplying by 100 makes the guidelines 
compliance rate a percentage.  This variable gauges whether within guidelines sentence 
compliance rates is indicative of districts being more likely to follow the policy statement for 
lifetime supervised release. 
Mandatory Minimum State-Level Penalties.  This tabulated variable indicates whether a district 
is situated in a state where there are mandatory minimum state-level penalties for possession of 
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child pornography (State Child Pornography Statues – see Appendix F in the USSC’s 2012 
Report to Congress on Child Pornography Offenses).  This binary variable is coded such that a 1 
indicates a district is situated in a state where there are state-level child pornography statutes 
with a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child pornography and a 0 indicates 
otherwise. 
Kimbrough-based policy disagreement.  In Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) the issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether a policy disagreement with the guidelines was permissible to 
impose a below-guideline sentence.  The Supreme Court ruled that as long as a sentencing court 
appropriately considers the factors in 18 USC 3553(a) when imposing a sentence, the sentence is 
reasonable even if it does not fall within the prescribed sentencing guideline range (Rigsby, 
2010).  In other words, the Kimbrough decision allows sentencing courts to reject a sentencing 
guideline and impose a departure/variance based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines.  
In essence, this would mean that judges are allowed to impose supervised release sentences other 
than the guideline recommendation for life if they categorically disagree with the guideline 
recommendation for lifetime supervised release.  Thus, a dichotomous variable was created to 
represent whether a district court was situated in a circuit that has rejected the application of 
Kimbrough-based policy disagreements regarding sentences for non-production child 
pornography offenses.  According to Kaiser and Spohn (2014), appellate decisions in circuits 
that have rejected the application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements for child 
pornography offenses include the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 11th circuits.  Federal circuits that have 
allowed policy disagreements for non-production offenses include the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th 
circuits.  This dummy variable is measured such that at 1 indicates a district is located within a 
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circuit that has rejected the Kimbrough application and a 0 indicates a district is situated within a 
circuit that has not specifically rejected this application.  
Political Conservatism (percent Republican).  Following the lead of Johnson (2005), political 
conservatism is delineated as percent Republican.  Percent Republican was measured as the 
percent of the total votes cast in the state in which the district court is located for the Republican 
candidate in the 2012 presidential election.   
Region.  This is a four-category nominal variable that indicates whether a district is situated in 
the West, South, East or Midwest.  East is the reference category.  East was selected as the 
reference category due to this region having the fewest number of district courts classified as 
being in the Eastern region of the U.S. (See Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter). 
Methods 
Analytical Approach – Multilevel Modeling 
The use of hierarchical modeling or multilevel modeling to analyze nested data is well 
established in the literature (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Fearn, 2005; Weidner, Frase 
& Schultz, 2005; Johnson, 2005, 2006; Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson, 2010).  Essentially, 
multilevel models allow researchers to estimate the regression coefficient, while simultaneously 
modeling separate individual-level factors nested within district courts (Ulmer and Johnson, 
2004).  Multilevel models also allow for the partitioning of the overall variance into components 
for each level –  individual-level and district-level.  This partitioning of the variance allows for 
the calculation of the intraclass correlation coefficient, which measures the amount of variability 
between district courts, and coincidentally is the first test to determine if a study merits 
multilevel modeling (Garson, 2013).   
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Given that individual offenders are nested within district courts, similarities among cases 
at the district-level are likely to occur (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  This means residual errors are 
correlated within districts, violating the ordinary least squares regression assumption of 
independent errors, risking misspecification of standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; 
Garson, 2013).  To remedy this, multilevel modeling incorporates a unique error term into the 
equation for each county or district-level unit of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  
Multilevel models also provide significance tests based on the proper degrees of freedom for the 
district-level variables (Johnson, 2005).  Further, multilevel models also allow for the modeling 
of variations in the effects of individual-level data across court contexts (Ulmer and Johnson, 
2004).  Finally, these procedures allow one to properly assess theoretically important cross-level 
interactions between individual-level predictors and aggregate county-level or district-level 
characteristics (Johnson, 2005). 
 Following, the initial test of variability between districts, multilevel modeling procedures 
involves the sequential estimation of several models.  So far example, if an unconditional model 
indicates a significant county-level or district court level variation, then a systematic sequence of 
random intercept models is estimated.  According to Garson (2013), the major types of random 
intercept models include: random intercept model with only level 1 predictors; random intercept 
model with only level 2 predictors; random intercept model with level 1 and level 2 predictors; 
random coefficient model; and fully specified multilevel model with random intercept and 
coefficients.   
Thus, in the current dissertation, as individual cases are nested within federal district 
courts, two levels of analysis are needed.41  I estimated a two-level multilevel model.  Given my 
                                                          
41 Following the lead of Kautt (2002) no circuit-level predictors can be included because there are so few circuits (11 
circuits).   
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three different outcomes measures, I use hierarchical linear regression and hierarchical 
generalized linear models (HGLM) with all variables centered around their grand means to 
analyze the data in this dissertation.42 
Analytical Strategy 
My first research question asks what proportion of variability in supervised release 
sentences is at the case level versus the district-level?  This question was answered using a null 
model for logged supervised release length, that is, a model with no predictors at any level of 
analysis.  The null model, also call the unconditional model or one-way ANOVA with random 
effects, is a type of random intercept model that predicts the level 1 intercept of the dependent 
variable as a random effect of the level 2 grouping variable, with no other predictors at level 1 or 
2 in a two-level model (Garson, 2013).  This model is used to calculate the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) which is a test of the need for mixed modeling (Garson, 2013).  As a 
preliminary analysis, I did this using a one way between groups ANOVA to determine the 
magnitude of between district court variation in supervised release sentence length.  I found a 
statistically significant difference at the p<.001 level and amount of variability between district 
courts is 28.8% with the remainder of the variability in sentence lengths within courts.   
My second research question asks what individual-level legal and extralegal factors 
account for variability in supervised release sentences?  This question was answered with a 
random-intercept model that included only level-1 predictors centered on their grand means, but 
no district-level variables.43  This enabled me to determine how much of the variance in 
                                                          
42 Grand mean centering facilitates model estimation and provides meaningful interpretation of the intercepts 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 20002; Garland, 2013).  
43 Supervised release length is not normally distributed.  As such, I will use the natural log of supervised release 
length. 
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supervised release sentence length is accounted for by characteristics of the case and the 
individual.   
As part of this analysis I also addressed an additional research question: “Do the 
individual-level correlates of supervised release sentences differ for production versus non-
production cases?”  The most straightforward way to answer to this questions is to partition the 
data by offense type and compare the magnitude of the coefficients for the independent variables 
for the two offense types. However, preliminary analyses revealed that offense type and offense 
severity score are highly correlated.  There is a moderate to strong correlation between total 
offense severity score and offense type, r=.-.491, r2= .24, n=1,900, p=.001. The interquartile 
range score for offense severity for non-production cases is 6. The interquartile range score for 
offense severity for production cases is 7. For these reasons including both offense-level severity 
score and offense type in the same model is problematic. 
To remedy this, I examined whether a model with offense severity score or offense type 
best fit the data.  I checked the model fit statistics by running two separate HLM models - one 
with offense type, but not offense severity score and the other with offense severity score but not 
offense type.  I computed the variance for each.  The non-production model explains 13.8% 
(.47705-.41086/.47705) of individual-level variation in sentencing and 10.5% (.17940-
.16047/.17940) of the district-level variation.  In comparison, the model containing offense 
severity score explains 22.7% (.47705-.36867/.47705) of the individual variation in sentencing 
and the explained variance at the district-level is 11.8% (.17940-.15822/.17940).  Thus, offense 
severity had a better model fit and I used offense severity score to represent offense seriousness 
rather than offense type when conducting data analyses. Notwithstanding, I conducted 
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supplemental analyses partitioning the data by offense type.  These models are presented as a 
robustness check to my findings and are presented in Appendix A. 
My third research question asks “Above and beyond individual-level case characteristics, 
are district-level contextual variables related to supervised release sentencing outcomes?”  In 
other words, I am examining whether the characteristics and/or context of the district court affect 
supervised release sentencing once the composition of the cases in the courts have been taken 
into account.  To answer this question, I ran a random intercept model with level-2 predictors 
only. This variant of the random intercept model predicts the level-1 intercept on the basis of the 
level-2 grouping variable and one or more level-2 random effect predictors (Garson, 2013).  
Next, I re-ran the model introducing level-1 variables.  This model estimated the joint influence 
of level-1 and level-2 predictors.   
My fourth question asks “Do the effects of level 1 factors on sentence length differ across 
courts?”  To answer this question, I estimated a random coefficient model in which I allowed the 
effects of level 1 variables of interest including criminal history, offense seriousness, and 
departure/variance to vary across courts.44  These models assessed whether the impact of specific 
case/individual-level factors changed varied between districts.  For the variables whose effect did 
vary across courts, I explored whether these differential effects could be accounted for by any of 
the district-level variables.   
                                                          
44 These variables were of interest due to their known effects across courts found in other studies (Kautt, 2002) as 
well as for theorized reasons.  Johnson (2010) explains “Regarding federal sentencing data, it might make 
theoretical sense to investigate variations in the effect of offense severity across courts because some literature 
suggests perceptions of crime seriousness involve relative evaluation by court actors (Emerson, 1983).”  In terms of 
theoretical reasons for the current dissertation, some presentence reports for some district courts include all known 
arrests and convictions whereas presentence reports in other district court only include information for convictions 
only.  It is possible that differences in the content of the criminal history section in presentence reports across courts 
may lead to variations in these effects across courts. 
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The analyses described above were first completed using the continuous measure of 
sentence length.  They were then replicated using hierarchical generalized linear models for the 
binary measure of supervised release sentence (life/no life) and the ordinal measure of the 
supervised release sentence. 
Strengths and Limitations 
Before presenting the results of the analyses, a review of the strengths and limitations of 
the methodology is necessary.  As the strengths of the methodology guide the analytic plan, I 
discuss the strengths first followed by a discussion of the study’s limitations.  One of the more 
important methodological strengths is the use of federal data.  The strength of utilizing federal 
sentencing data as opposed to sentencing data collected by state courts is that state courts operate 
under various different sentencing guidelines which make generalizability of the findings an 
issue.  The federal system eliminates this issue with its national guidelines system.  In addition, 
the data includes a wide range of information for a large number of defendants across 89 judicial 
district courts and all 50 states.  It includes information on demographic characteristics and 
sentencing details. 
A second strength is the inclusion of multiple outcome measures of the supervised release 
sentence.  Extant sentencing literature focuses on one or two sentencing outcomes – the decision 
to incarcerate and/or sentence length.  The present study not only looks at the decision to impose 
lifetime supervised release and supervised sentence length, but also an ordinal outcome measure 
of supervised release length.  This provides a more comprehensive exploration and evaluation of 
supervised release sentencing outcomes because it takes into account that even when log-
transformed, supervised release sentence length is not normally distributed. 
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Despite these methodological strengths, my analytic strategy is not without limitations.  
One limitation is that I do not consider judge-level influences in sentences.  This is significant 
given that individual offenders are nested within judges. The focal concerns perspective supports 
the notion that supervised release sentences could vary among judges.  Specifically, judges may 
have different views on culpability, dangerousness, and practical consequences of their 
sentences, which may result in inter-judge sentencing disparities (Anderson and Spohn, 2010; 
Johnson, Ulmer and Kramer, 2008).  Another way that supervised release sentences could vary 
among judges, concerns judicial characteristics including including age, gender, race, length of 
term on the bench, previous experiences as a prosecutor or defense counsel.  Indeed, Johnson 
(2006) utilized tri-level hierarchical models to examine individual-level, judge-level, and county-
level factors on sentencing outcomes using Pennsylvania sentencing data.  He found sentence 
length and the likelihood of incarceration varied significantly between judges and counties.  He 
also found that after controlling for individual case and offender characteristics, judge-level 
variables such as minority judge, age, prior military experience and judicial caseload 
composition exerted direct effects on the likelihood of incarceration and length of incarceration.  
The current dissertation does not consider judge-level influences on supervised release outcomes.  
This is because the publicly available USSC dataset does not identify the judge who imposed the 
sentence (Kautt, 2002; Anderson and Spohn, 2009).    
  There could be additional district-level factors that I may have failed to consider that 
may influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders.  As a 
result, this could potentially undermine the conclusions drawn about district-level contextual 
factors.  I do attempt to mitigate this limitation, by exploring many of the district-level 
contextual factors used in the extant sentencing literature.  But of course, these factors are 
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theoretically linked to sentence of imprisonment for the overall offender, not specifically child 
pornography offenders or the sentence of supervised release. 
Even with these limitations, this dissertation contributes to the broader sentencing 
literature by providing an initial multilevel examination of the influence of individual-level legal, 
extralegal, and district-level factors on supervised release sentencing outcomes of child 
pornography offenders.   
Chapter Five presents the findings of the multilevel models (hierarchical linear and 
generalized models – HLMs and HGLMs) estimated to address the research questions of this 
dissertation, followed by Chapter Six and Seven which discuss the results and the implications of 
the findings, respectively. 
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Table 4.1  
List of the 89 Federal Districts Included in the Analyses by Geographic Region 
 
South West Midwest East
Oklahoma East Washington East North Dakota Maine
Oklahoma North Washington West South Dakota New Hampshire
Oklahoma West Idaho Nebraska Vermont
Texas East Montana Kansas Massachusetts
Texas North Wyoming Missouri East New York East
Texas West Colorado Missouri West New York North
Texas South New Mexico Iowa North New York South
Arkansas East Arizona Iowa South New York West
Arkansas West Utah Illinois Central Pennsylvania East
Louisiana East Nevada Illinois North Pennsylvania Middle
Louisiana Middle Oregon Illinois South Pennsylvania West
Louisiana West California Central Wisconsin East New Jersey
Mississippi North California East Wisconsin West Connecticut
Mississippi South California North Michigan East Rhode Island
Kentucky East California South Michigan West
Kentucky West Alaska Indiana North
Tennessee East Hawaii Indian South
Tennessee Middle Ohio North
Tennessee West Ohio South
Alabama Middle Minnesota
Alabama North
Alabama South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Virginia East
Virginia West
Maryland
Delaware
*Regions based upon U.S. Census Bureau States Region Map
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
Introduction 
 This chapter reports the results from the analyses of the effects of individual-level legal 
and extralegal factors, as well as district-level contextual factors on supervised release sentences 
for child pornography offenders.  Presentation of the results is organized into four sections.  
Section I includes the descriptive statistics for the full sample and then by offense type (non-
production and production).  I present separate descriptive statistics by offense type because I am 
interested in exploring differences in sentencing based upon offense seriousness, which is highly 
dependent on whether the case involved production or non-production.45  Also included in this 
section are the results of bivariate analyses of the relationships between the dependent variables 
(supervised release length and the decision to impose lifetime supervised release) and the 
individual-level legal and extralegal variables.  Next, I report the results of the bivariate analyses 
of the relationships among my district-level independent variables.  Section I concludes with the 
results of preliminary data analyses of the linearity of the relationships between the continuous 
individual-level independent variables and supervised release sentences. 
Section II present results that correspond to each of my four research questions for my 
first dependent variable, sentence length measured in months (logged).  This section begins with 
the results from the null model.  This model provides estimates of the relative amount of 
sentencing variation that occurs at the individual and district level.  The next part of this section 
includes results from hierarchical linear regression models that examine the influence of 
individual-level legal and extralegal factors on supervised release length.  This section also 
                                                          
45 As noted in Chapter 4, data analyses for all models in this study use the variable offense severity score rather than 
the offense type variable.  This is due to the collinearity between offense type and the offense severity score 
variable.  There is a moderate to strong correlation between offense type and offense level severity, r=.-.491, r2= .24, 
n=1,900, p=.001.  I selected offense severity score for use in my data analyses because model estimates reveal it is a 
better fit than the offense type variable.   
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includes results from cross-product interaction terms between offense severity score and each of 
the legal and extralegal factors.  The results of these two-way interactions address the second 
part of my second research question: Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of 
supervised release sentences differ by severity of the offense?  Next, I present findings from my 
random coefficient models.  The results of these models answer my third research question: Do 
the effects of individual-level factors vary across courts?  Following this, I examine whether 
district-level contextual variables are related to supervised release sentencing outcomes above 
and beyond individual-level factors.  I conclude this section with findings from my final model – 
a mixed multilevel model including random intercepts, random coefficients, and cross-level 
interactions.  The results from this model provide information on how individual-level and 
district-level factors operate together to impact supervised release sentencing outcomes.   
In Section III, I present the results of my four research questions, but with the binary 
dependent variable – the decision to impose lifetime supervised release.  Finally, in Section IV I 
present the results of my research questions using a four-category ordinal measure of supervised 
release length because a preliminary view of the data shows sentence length is non-normal even 
when logged.46  This chapter closes with a summary section that summarizes the main results of 
the analyses.  All tables and figures referenced in this chapter are located at the end.  In 
Appendix A, located at the end of this dissertation, I include supplemental analyses that assess 
the robustness of my earlier results. Specifically, I use ordinary least squares regression (OLS), 
logistic regression, and ordinal regression models to determine if the correlates of supervised 
release sentences differ by offense type (non-production versus production).  Even though this 
                                                          
46 Recall from Chapter 4 that a preliminary view of the data shows clumping.  That is, 19% of cases received five 
years supervised release, 25% received ten years, 8.9% received fifteen years, 5.6% received twenty years, 1.9% 
received twenty-five years, 1.5% received thirty years, and 33.2% received lifetime supervised release.  The 
remainder of the cases received sentences other than those just described. 
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step is completed as part of research question 2A using hierarchical linear modeling, this 
additional step assesses whether the decision to use offense seriousness instead of offense type as 
a moderator influences the results.  This is necessary because of the collinearity between offense 
severity score and offense type. 
SECTION I: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses 
Individual-Level Factors 
Descriptive Statistics – Full Sample 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses.47  The 
sample is comprised of 1,900 male offenders convicted of child pornography offenses and 
sentenced to a term of supervised release.  The shortest term imposed is 12 months and the 
longest term is life (470 months).  The average term is 242 months (SD=170.78).  Nearly half the 
sample (48.3%) was sentenced to either a short-term (20.1%) or an intermediate (28.2%) term of 
supervised release, while the other half (51.8%) received either long-term supervised release 
(18.6%) or lifetime supervised release (33.2%).   
An overwhelming majority (95.7%) of the sample pled guilty.  More offenders received a 
downward departure/variance (63.3%) than were sentenced within the guidelines range (34.5%).  
Only 2.2% received an upward departure/variance.  The average criminal history score is 1.37 
(SD=.902).  This means they have no criminal history or only one criminal history point.48  Only 
about 5% of the sample received an enhancement for having a previous sex offense.  The offense 
severity score ranges from 16 to 43, with an average offense severity score of 32.  The number of 
                                                          
47 Included in these descriptive statistics are two district-level factors: (1) district average supervised release 
sentence length; and (2) district average percent of cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release.  These factors are 
not included in the data analyses, but provide additional descriptive statistics of the 89 district courts. 
48 Recall, the criminal history score, which ranges from 1 to 6, is calculated based upon the total criminal history 
points calculated from Section 4A1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines.  The USSC codes this variable as 1 
through 6.  The higher the score, the greater the criminal history.   
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counts of conviction for the sample ranges from 1 to 26, averaging 1.49 counts per offender.  Just 
under two-thirds (61.3%) of the sample was detained prior to sentencing.   
The sample is comprised mostly (86.5%) of whites.  Almost three-quarters (72.7%) of the 
offenders are younger than age 50.  Although not shown in the table, the average age is 41.41 
years (SD=13.23).  This is an educated group of offenders.  Just over 90% have at least a high 
school education.  The average fine imposed was $808, with 87.4% of offenders not incurring a 
fine, and one offender receiving a fine totaling $100,000.  The court generally waives fines based 
upon the inability to pay.  The fact that most of the offenders did not receive a fine indicates that 
there was an inability to pay or the fine would have been a burden on the defendant’s 
dependents.  The sample is comprised mostly of U.S. citizens (96.7%).  Finally, 29.6% of the 
sample claimed dependents. 
Table 5.1 about here 
Descriptive Statistics by Offense Type – Non-production & Production 
Table 5.2 present descriptive statistics by offense type to visualize how legal and extra-
legal characteristics differ between more serious (production) and less serious (non-production) 
cases.  Starting with non-production, approximately 87.5% (n =1,663) of child pornography 
offenders were convicted for this offense type.  The average supervised release sentence for this 
group is 229.09 months.  The shortest term imposed is 12 months and the longest is 470 months 
(life).  Approximately 29.7% of non-producers received the most severe term of life.  Regarding 
individual-level legal factors, many of these descriptive statistics for non-producer’s mimic those 
found in the full sample.  There are, however a few exceptions.  For instance, very few non-
producers received the enhancement for having a prior sex offense (.7%) and at 30.9 points, the 
average offense severity score was almost two points lower than in the full sample. 
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Production cases (n=237) differ from non-production cases in many important ways.  
First, producers were sentenced to more severe terms of supervised release than non-producers.  
The minimum supervised release sentence for a producer is 36 months compared to 12 months 
for non-producers.  The average supervised sentence length for production cases is 332.79 
months (SD=167.39) versus 229.09 months (SD=167.35) for non-producers, a difference of over 
8 years.  An independent samples t-test indicates this difference is statistically significant (t 
(1898) =-8.922. p<.001).  In addition, there is a significant difference in the likelihood of being 
sentenced to lifetime supervised release for production versus non-production offenders (x2(1) = 
71.70, p<.001, phi=.194).  More than half (57.4%) of the producers were sentenced to the most 
severe term (life) in contrast to 29.7% of non-producers.   
Regarding individual-level legal factors, almost 10% of offenders convicted of 
production were disposed by trial compared to 3.5% of non-producers, which is a significant 
difference (X2(1) = 19.64, p<.001, phi=.102).  Interestingly, 36.4% of production cases received 
the enhancement for having a prior sex offense compared to .7% of non-production cases (X2(1) 
= 538.75, p<.001, phi=.533).  For producers, offense severity scores range from 24-43, and for 
non-producers scores range from 16-43.  The average offense severity score for producers 
(M=39.13; SD=3.84) was 9 levels higher than for non-producers (M=30.98; SD=4.90), a 
significant difference (t(1898)=-24.537, p<.001, two-tailed). Likewise, production cases 
(M=2.28; SD=2.5) averaged 1 more count of conviction than non-production cases (M=1.38; 
SD=1.4) (t(1898)=-7.95, p<.001, two-tailed).  Finally, over 90% of producers were detained 
prior to sentencing compared to 57.6% of non-producers ( X2(1) = 119.66, p<.001, phi=.251). 
Production cases also differed from non-production cases with regard to the extralegal factor of 
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claiming dependents.  Unexpectedly, 41% of producers claimed dependents compared to 27.9% 
of non-producers (X2(1) = 16.91, p<.001, phi=.096). 
Table 5.2 about here 
Bivariate Analyses 
Pearson and Point Biserial Correlations. 
 To examine the bivariate relationships among measures of sentence length and the 
independent variables, I computed Pearson and point biserial correlations for continuous and 
dichotomous variables, ANOVAs for continuous and categorical variables with more than two 
categories, and chi-square tests of independence for categorical variables. Table 5.3 presents the 
correlations for individual-level factors.  Several of the legal independent predictors are 
significantly correlated with the dependent variables.  Positive correlations include number of 
counts, sex offender enhancement, criminal history score, offense severity score, and detention.  
To illustrate one of these correlations, there is a weak to moderate relationship between 
supervised release length and detention, r=.276, r2=.07, p<.001.  This means that those who are 
detained prior to sentencing have longer sentences.  In addition, non-production cases receive 
shorter sentences and are less likely to receive lifetime supervised release.  There are also several 
significant correlations among the legal and extralegal variables.  Among the strongest 
correlations is the relationship between offense severity score and offense type.  There is a 
moderate to strong correlation between the two variables, r=.-.491, r2= .24, p<.001.  Another 
strong correlation is between offense type and the enhancement for having a prior sex offense, 
r=-.533, r2=.28, p=.001.  Moderate and positive relationships also exist among offense severity 
score and each of the dependent variables (supervised release length and the decision to impose 
life), r=.338, r2=.11 p<.001; r=.302, r2=.09, p<.001.  This means that as offense severity score 
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increases, supervised release length also increases as does the likelihood of being sentenced to 
lifetime supervised release. 
Table 5.3 about here 
  ANOVA. 
A one-way anova was utilized to explore the relationship between supervised release 
length and education.  Education is categorized into four groups: less than high school, high 
school graduate, some college, and college graduate.  There is a statistically significant 
difference in supervised release length and education level (F (3, 1874) =3.453, p<.01.), although 
the actual difference in mean sentence lengths between the groups is quite small (eta squared = 
.005).  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean sentence for 
offenders with less than a high school degree (M=255.26, SD=171.94) is significantly longer 
than for those with some college (M=230.27, SD=167.50).  There are no differences in sentence 
length between any of the other education groups. 
While region is not an individual-level variable, I also used ANOVA to explore sentence 
length by region.  This was done to further explore supervised release sentences in greater detail.  
There is a statistically significant but small difference in supervised release sentence length by 
region, F (3, 1896) =11.462, p<.001, eta squared = .01.  Cases in the East have the shortest 
average sentence length, 192.14 months (SD=153.64), while those in the West have the longest 
average supervise release lengths at 264.30 months (SD=169.63).  Those in the South 
(SD=167.58) and Midwest (SD=180.25) are in between with average supervised release lengths 
of 251.22 and 242.54 months, respectively.  Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test 
indicate that the mean supervised release length for those sentenced in the East is significantly 
different from those in the South, West, and Midwest. 
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Chi-square tests. 
 I conducted chi-square tests to explore the relationships between lifetime supervised 
release and each of my binary and categorical legal and extralegal variables.  These variables 
include – the enhancement for having a prior sex offense, plea, detained, guidelines departure, 
race, citizenship, education, dependents, and age over 50.  Chi-square tests revealed only 
statistically significant relationships between lifetime supervised release and two of the legal 
variables – detention and the enhancement for having a prior sex offense. Offenders who were 
detained are significantly more likely to receive lifetime supervised release (x2 (1) =107.660, 
p<.001, phi=.240) as are those who received the enhancement for having a prior sex offense (x2 
(1) =52.814, p<.001, phi=.169).   
While region is not an individual-level variable, I also used chi-square tests to explore the 
relationship between lifetime supervised release and region.  A chi-square test indicated a 
significant association between region (West, East, South and Midwest) and the decision to 
impose lifetime supervised release, x2(3) = 27.288, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.120.  Cases in the 
South are most likely to receive lifetime supervised release followed by the Midwest, West, and 
East.  Likewise, there is also a significant association between region and the four-category 
ordinal measure of supervised release, x2(9) = 92.66, p<.001, Cramer’s V = .128.   
District-Level Factors 
 Descriptive Statistics 
The characteristics of the 89 federal district courts are also presented in Table 5.1.  
Districts vary widely in size with several federal districts having only 1 or 2 authorized 
judgeships, whereas others have as many as 28.  The average number of judgeships for all 
districts is 7 (SD=5.60).  The percentage of all cases in the district that are child pornography 
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cases (i.e., the child pornography caseload rate) ranges from 0.2% to 13.1%, with an average 
child pornography caseload rate of 3.7% (SD=2.4%).  On average, the guideline compliance rate 
is 51.1% for all federal districts, with some districts having guidelines compliance rates as low as 
22.8% and some as high as 81%.  Just under half (49.4%) of district courts are situated within 
states that have a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography.  
A little over three-quarters of the districts are located within circuits that rejected the application 
of Kimbrough to non-production offenses.  Of those who voted in the 2012 presidential election, 
the average percent who voted Republican for all the districts was 50.4% (SD=9.6%) with a low 
of 28% and a high of 73%.  Finally, the federal districts are split across the four regions of the 
United States with 19.1% of districts in the West, 42.7% in the South, 15.7% in the East, and 
22.5% in the Midwest.  
I also looked at the district average for the supervised release sentence length as well as 
the district average percentage of cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release.  The shortest 
average supervised release term is 60 months and the longest average term is life (470).  The 
average term for the mean of the 89 districts is 240.11 months (SD=101.40).   The range of the 
percent distribution of districts that sentenced their cases to lifetime supervised release is 0% to 
100%, with a mean of 33.2% (SD=26.1%).   
Bivariate Analyses  
 Pearson and Point Biserial Correlations. 
To examine the bivariate relationships among measures of mean supervised release 
length and the percent sentenced to lifetime supervised release for each of the 89 districts and the 
district-level independent variables, I computed Pearson and point-biserial correlations for 
continuous and dichotomous variables (see Table 5.4).  District size is negatively related to child 
124 
pornography caseload rate, guidelines compliance rate, and percent of voters who voted 
Republican in the 2012 presidential election.  These negative correlations are relatively weak.  In 
districts situated within states with mandatory minimum state-level penalties, the mean 
supervised release length and percent sentenced to lifetime supervised release is higher.  These 
correlations are also weak.  The guidelines compliance rate is positively correlated with percent 
Republican.  In addition, districts that reject Kimbrough have higher compliance rates than those 
that have not rejected Kimbrough, as do districts situated within states with mandatory minimum 
state-level penalties.  But the correlation between Kimbrough and percent Republican is 
remarkably strong (rpb=.518).  Districts that reject the application of Kimbrough to non-
production child pornography cases have greater percentages of voters that voted Republican. 
Table 5.4 about here   
Supervised Release Sentences in Context – Individual District Supervised Release 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
To display the differences in supervised release sentences across districts, I created a 
separate table (see Table 5.5) displaying the percent distribution of districts that sentenced their 
cases to short-term supervised release (60 months or less), intermediate supervised release 
(sentences ranging between 72 months and 120 months), long-term supervised release (sentences 
ranging between 121 months to 420 months), and lifetime supervised release (cases sentenced to 
470 months).49 I also created a table showing the percentage of the total sample of child 
pornography cases sentenced in each district for all cases (see Table 5.6).50  As shown in Table 
5.5, twenty-two districts did not sentence any cases to a short-term period of supervised release 
and one district, Oklahoma East, sentenced 100% of its cases to short-term supervised release.  
                                                          
49 There were no cases with a supervised release sentence ranging between 121 to 143 months. 
50 The table displaying the percentage of child pornography sentenced in each district is not the same as the child 
pornography caseload rate variable. 
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As far as intermediate terms of supervised release, twelve districts did not impose this term to 
any of their cases, while only Louisiana Middle sentenced 100% of its cases to an intermediate 
term.  Regarding long-term supervised release, twenty-one districts did not sentence any of their 
cases to long-term supervised release, and no district sentenced all their cases to long-term 
supervised release.  Finally, eleven districts including Maine, Massachusetts, New York South, 
Louisiana Middle, Tennessee Middle, Tennessee West, Iowa South, South Dakota, Kansas, 
Oklahoma East, and Oklahoma North did not impose lifetime supervised release on any of their 
cases.51  Three districts, North Carolina East, Alabama Middle, and Alabama South, sentenced 
100% of their cases to lifetime supervised.52  Other districts including New Hampshire, 
Mississippi South, Indiana South, Wisconsin West, Missouri East and Arizona sentenced more 
than 75% of their cases to lifetime supervised release.53   
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 about here 
I also created separate tables that display descriptive statistics of how each district 
sentenced their cases to short-term, intermediate, long-term, and lifetime supervised release by 
offense type as well as the percentage of child pornography cases sentenced in each district by 
offense type (see Tables 5.7 through 5.10).  Starting with non-production offenses, only three 
districts sentenced 100% of their cases to lifetime supervised release, in contrast to 22 districts 
that sentenced 100% of their production cases to lifetime supervised release.  Oklahoma East 
was the only district to sentence 100% of its non-production cases to short-term supervised 
release, while only one district, Oklahoma West sentenced 100% of its production cases to short-
term supervised release.  
                                                          
51 All of these districts except for Iowa South and Kansas, sentenced less than 1% child pornography cases. 
52 Each of these districts sentenced less than 1% of child pornography cases. 
53 With the exception, of Missouri East, Nevada, and Indiana South, these districts sentenced less than 1% of child 
pornography cases in 2012. 
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Tables 5.7 through 5.10 about here 
Preliminary Data Analyses 
Prior to beginning my analyses, I explored the possibility that the relationships between 
my continuous independent variables (offense severity score, criminal history score, fine, and 
number of counts) and the supervised release term are non-linear.54  This was done in two ways.  
First, I looked at the scatterplot between each of these variables.  An examination of the 
scatterplots based on a visual inspection, suggests a non-linear relationship between supervised 
release length and all the continuous variables. 
Second, I created squared terms for each of these variables.  I regressed supervised 
release length on the linear and quadratic term for each of these variables, one at time and then 
all together.  The squared terms of age, fine, and criminal history score were not statistically 
significant predictors of the logged supervised release sentence length.  The squared terms for 
offense severity score and number of counts were significant, indicating that these variables have 
a curvilinear relationship with logged sentence length. 
To obtain a visual picture of the curvilinear relationships of offense severity score and 
number of counts, I graphed each of these variables with the predicted unlogged measures of 
supervised release length.  The unlogged outcome was graphed because it is easier to interpret 
months of supervised release than logged months. I also graphed offense severity score and 
number of counts with the binary dependent variable – the decision to impose lifetime supervised 
release.  The graph for offense severity score show the first score of 16 yields a slightly longer 
sentence than a score of 17 through 23 (see Figure 5.1).  But at score 24, the predicted value of 
the supervised release sentence length increases as offense severity increases.  Likewise, the 
                                                          
54 Although I calculate age as a dichotomous variable in my data analyses, as a preliminary strategy I examined the 
linearity of age. 
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graph for the predicted probability of lifetime supervised release showed a similar curve, except 
that the curve was more dramatic for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release (see 
Figures 5.2).  Here, offenders with the lowest offense severity scores (15-23) have a greater 
predicted probability of lifetime supervised release than those with scores between 24 through 
28.  At approximately score 29, the predicted probability of life increases dramatically as the 
offense severity score increases.   
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 about here 
The graphs for the number of counts of conviction appear quite different from the graphs 
for offense severity.  Here, the graphs for both the predicted value of supervised release length 
and the predicted probability of lifetime supervised release look like arches (see Figures 5.3 and 
5.4).  Specifically, the graphs for both supervised release length and decision to impose lifetime 
supervised release indicate that as the number of counts of conviction increase through 14, the 
supervised release sentence length increases steadily.  From about 15 counts of conviction 
onward, sentence length decreases.  
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 about here 
Now that I have described the data used in these analyses and discussed the preliminary 
analyses and bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables, Section II 
presents results of multilevel models for supervised sentence length measured in months 
(logged). 
SECTION II: Supervised Release Length 
This section presents the results of multilevel models examining the correlates of 
supervised release length, beginning with the null model and culminating into a final mixed 
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multilevel model that explores the individual-level and district-level factors associated with 
supervised release sentence length.  
Partitioning of Variability in Supervised Release Sentence Length at Individual and 
District-Level: The Null or Unconditional Model    
The multilevel analysis begins with an unconditional hierarchical model, which includes 
supervised release sentence length as the dependent variable, and no covariates at either level-1 
(individual-level) or level-2 (district-level).  Table 5.11 presents the results from the 
unconditional model examining supervised release sentence length for child pornography 
offenders nested within U.S. district courts.  The results are broken into two parts, one for the 
fixed effects, which reports the unstandardized regression coefficients, and one for the random 
effects, which reports the variance components for the model.  The overall intercept is 5.17 
logged months or 175.91 unlogged months.  The level 1 variance provides a measure of within-
district variation in sentence lengths and the level 2 variance captures between-district variation.  
The significance tests associated with the level 2 variance component indicates there is 
significant between district variations in sentences – supervised sentence lengths vary 
significantly across federal district courts.  In other words, the significance test provides 
preliminary evidence that districts matter in federal punishment. 
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated to determine the magnitude of 
the inter-district variation in supervised release length.55  The ICC indicates that 27.3% of the 
variance in supervised release sentence length is at the federal district-level and the remaining 
72.7% is at the individual-level.56  The standard deviation for the between group variance 
component can be added and subtracted to the model intercept to provide a range of plausible 
                                                          
55 ICC = .17940/(.17940 +.47705) = 0.273 or 27.3%. 
56 I also calculated the ICC for the sentence of imprisonment to gauge the level of interdistrict variability that would 
appear normal for child pornography offenses.  The ICC for the sentence of imprisonment length is 21.3%.  
Accordingly, while the 27.3% interdistrict variability discovered for sentence of supervised release appears large, 
this figure is consistent with the level of interdistrict variability found generally for this offense type. 
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values for average supervised release sentences among districts.  Accordingly, adding and 
subtracting .42 gives a range between 4.74 logged months (111.76 unlogged months) and 5.59 
logged months (268.69 unlogged months).  To conclude, there is a great deal of variability of 
supervised releases sentences of child pornography offenders.  The following sections report 
which individual-level and district-level contextual factors account for this variability. 
Table 5.11 about here 
 
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors and Supervised Release Sentence Length 
 
 To identify the individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables that account for 
variability in supervised release sentences hierarchical linear regression was used.  First, 
supervised release length was regressed on individual-level legal variables.  Next, I added 
individual-level extralegal variables to the model to see if they explain supervised release 
sentence length above and beyond the effect of the legally relevant variables.   
 With the natural log of supervised release length as the outcome and level-2 representing 
federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only level-1 legal variables [see 
Table 5.12 (Model 1)].  Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity score were 
included in the model because exploratory analyses (described earlier) indicated the relationship 
between these variables and supervised release sentence length is non-linear.  The level-2 error 
term represents the random effect of federal district court on the natural log of supervised release 
length.   
 As indicated in Table 5.12 (Model 1), several legal variables have statistically significant 
coefficients, controlling for all other variables included in the model.  There is a non-linear 
relationship between number of counts and length of supervised release as indicated by the 
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significant quadratic term for this variable (see Figure 5.5). The criminal history score is also 
statistically significant, indicating that a one unit increase in the criminal history score results in 
a 7.2% increase in months of supervised release.  Offenders who received a downward 
departure/variance received sentences that were 19.9% shorter than those who were sentenced 
within the guidelines range.  Compared to those who were released on bond, child pornography 
offenders who were detained had supervised release sentences that were 19.1% longer.  Those 
who pled guilty also had supervised release sentences that were 24.7% longer than offenders 
who went to trial.   
The deviance statistic is reduced from the unconditional model (deviance= 4014.78) to 
the conditional model (deviance = 3618.61), indicating increased model fit.  To better quantify 
the model fit, I calculated the approximate R2 statistics at each level of the analysis.  The 
explained variance at level 1 is computed as the reduction in level 1 variance relative to the total 
variance from the unconditional model reported in Table 5.11.57  Legal factors explain 22.4% of 
the variance across cases in supervised release length (logged) among child pornography 
offenders.   The inclusion of level-1 predictors can also explain between-district variation at 
level-2 of the analysis.  Explained variance at level-2 is calculated by examining the reduction in 
level-2 variance from the unconditional to the conditional model.58  Thus, 12.3% of inter-district 
variation in sentences is due to compositional differences in individual-level legal factors among 
district courts.   
Table 5.12 (Model 1) and Figure 5.5 about here 
                                                          
57 Computed as (unconditional estimate of level 1 variance - the conditional estimate)/total unconditional variance = 
Explained level 1 variance = (.47705 - .37020. )/(.47705) = .2239. 
58 The unconditional estimate for between district variation was .17940 and the conditional estimate is .15729.  The 
difference (.02211) divided by the total (.1794) provides an estimate of explained variance at level 2 equal to .1232.   
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Next, I added level-1 extralegal factors to the random intercept model to see if these 
variables have an effect on supervised release sentence length above and beyond legal 
characteristics [see Table 5.12 (Model 2)].  As shown in Table 5.12 (Model 2), legal variables 
including number of counts, criminal history score, plea, detained, and downward 
departure/variance remain statistically significant predictors of sentence length when extralegal 
factors are included.  Extralegal factors including race, citizenship status, dependents, and 
education are significantly associated with the length of supervised release.  Specifically, whites 
receive supervised release terms that are 8.2% shorter than non-whites, while U.S. citizens 
receive supervised release terms that are 19.7% longer than non-citizens.  Those with dependents 
receive supervised release terms that are 6.6% shorter than those without dependents.  Offenders 
with less than a high school education receive supervised release sentences that are 13.1% longer 
than the reference category of high school graduate.  Surprisingly, compared to the reference 
group of high school diploma, those with a college degree received a term that is 10.6% longer.59 
Combined, extralegal factors and legally relevant case characteristics explain 23.1% of 
individual variation in supervised release length and 12.4% of district-level variation in 
supervised release length. 60  With less than a 1% change in explained individual variation in 
supervised release length compared to the preceding model only containing legal variables, this 
indicates that supervised release sentence length is primarily driven by legal factors.  
Table 5.12 (Model 2) about here 
 
                                                          
59 I also estimated regression models using alternate measures of age including age squared and age as a continuous 
measure.  Neither of these age measures were statistically significant predictors of supervised release length. 
60 Level 1 variance computed as (.47705-. 36648)/.47705=.2317 or 23.1%.  Level 2 variance is computed as 
(.17940-.15712)/.17940=.1241 or 12.4%. 
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Relationship between Case-Level Factors and Cross Product Interaction Terms 
To assess whether the effects of legal and extralegal variables differ depending on the 
severity of the offense, I created a series of multiplicative interaction terms between the offense 
severity score and each of the legal and extralegal variables.  These two-way interaction terms 
were added one at a time into the model containing legal and extralegal variables.  None of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant indicating that the effects of legal and extralegal 
factors on supervised release sentence length are similar regardless of the seriousness of the 
offense.   
Variability in the Effects of Case-Level Variables on Sentence Length across Courts 
 To determine whether the effects of legal and extralegal predictors on supervised release 
sentence length vary across district courts, a random coefficient model was estimated.  To begin, 
one at a time the coefficient for each level-1 variable was allowed to vary across courts.   The 
results indicate that the effects of offense severity score (linear and quadratic terms), upward 
departure/variance, and downward departure/variance (although weak at p=.08) on supervised 
release sentence length differ across district courts [see Table 5.13 (Models 1 through 4, 
respectively)].  The statistical significance of both offense severity and offense severity squared 
means that the main effect and the shape of the relationship between the two variables vary 
across courts.  To quantify this effect for downward departure/variance, the standard deviation 
for the random effect (.16) can be added or subtracted from the coefficient for downward 
departure/variance.  This suggests that compared to the reference category of within guideline 
sentence, a downward departure/variance decreases the logged supervised release sentence 
months between -0.354011 (.70 month unlogged) and -0.036711 (.96 month unlogged).  In 
comparison, child pornography offenders with upward departure/variance have sentences that are 
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between -.59926 (.54 month unlogged) and .81428 (2.25 months unlogged) longer than 
comparable offenders who did not receive departures.  
Table 5.13 (Models 1-4) about here 
Next, the effects of offense severity, upward departure/variance and downward 
departure/variance were all allowed to vary in the same model.61  Only the error term for offense 
severity score and upward departure/variance remained statistically significant (see Table 5.14).  
None of the error terms for the extralegal variables was statistically significant.  Thus, extralegal 
predictors of supervised release length have similar effects across all districts.   
Table 5.14 about here 
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on Supervised Release Sentence Length  
To further investigate the variation in supervised release sentencing severity across 
federal districts, I next add level-2 explanatory variables as predictors of mean sentencing 
differences across federal district courts.  I first modeled only the district-level covariates without 
any of the level-1 factors.  Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level 
covariates with t values less than 1 from the model, leaving court size, districts situated within 
states with mandatory minimum state-level penalties for possession of child pornography, 
percent Republican, and region.  In this model (see Table 5.15), court size, state mandatory 
minimums for possession of child pornography, and region are statistically associated with 
supervised release length.62  A one unit increase in the number of authorized judgeships results in 
a 1.6% reduction in average months of logged supervised release length.  Mean sentences in 
districts situated within states with a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of 
                                                          
61 The model cannot be estimated when both offense level severity and offense level severity squared are included.  
Accordingly, I removed offense severity squared. 
62 East was used as the reference category as this region had the shortest average supervised release sentence 
lengths.  The eastern region also had the smallest percentage of supervised release sentences compared to the other 
three regions. 
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child pornography are on average 27.5% longer than those without a minimum state level 
penalty.  Likewise, supervised release sentences in districts situated in the western region of the 
United States are on average 37.3% longer than those in the eastern region (reference category). 
When only district-level variables are in the model, they explain 14.4% of the between-court 
variance in supervised release sentences.63 
Table 5.15 about here 
Individual and District-Level Effects on Supervised Release Length - Best Fitting Model  
Next, I modeled the fully conditional hierarchical model including all of the individual 
level covariates from the previous version of the model.  Following Raudenbush and Bryk 
(2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from the model, leaving only 
state mandatory minimum and region at level 2.  In this model (see Table 5.16), all the previous 
legal and extralegal factors that were significant in the initial model without the level 2 factors 
remain significant except race.  The magnitude of the coefficient drops from -.08 to -.07 and the 
effect is significant only using alpha = .10.  
Of the level-2 factors, only West remains statistically significant at the alpha=.05 level.  
The coefficient for state-level mandatory minimums is significant using a less restrictive criteria 
of alpha=.10 and the magnitude of this coefficient changes from .28 to .18   The level-2 
predictors reduce the level-2 variance from .16 to .15.  This is a reduction in variance of 7.4%.64  
Thus, region and state-level mandatory minimums for possession of child pornography account 
for just over 7.4% of the residual level-2 variance, after controlling for legal and extralegal 
factors. 
                                                          
63 (.17940-.15343)/.17940=0.1447 
64 .14552-.15712/.15712 * 100 = 7.38 
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Comparing the random effects in the Null and Random Intercepts Models indicates that 65  
when legal, extralegal factors, and district-level contextual factors are added to the model they 
explain 23.1% of individual variation and 18.8% of district-level variation in supervised release 
length.   
Table 5.16 about here 
Next, the effects of offense severity, upward departure/variance and downward 
departure/variance were all allowed to vary in the same model (see Table 5.17).66  Only the error 
term for offense severity score and upward departure/variance remained statistically significant.  
None of the error terms for the extralegal variables was statistically significant.  Thus, extralegal 
predictors of supervised release length have similar effects across all districts.   
Table 5.17 about here 
Individual, District-Level, and Cross-Level Effects on Supervised Release Length - Best 
Fitting Final Model  
 
Finally, I assessed whether there are significant cross-level interactions between the 
district-level variables and the two individual-level variables with significant random effects.  
First, district-level contextual factors were added one at a time to the random coefficient for 
offense severity. None of the district-level factors individually are significantly associated with 
the effects of offense severity varying across courts.  However, when all of the district-level 
factors with t-values greater than 1 are added together with the random coefficients for offense 
severity, the results show that caseload (p=.07), West (p=.08) and Midwest (p=.002) are 
significantly associated with these effects varying across courts (see Table 5.18). Offense 
                                                          
65 Level 1 explained variance computed as (.47705-. 36656)/.47705=.2316 or 23.1%.  Level 2 explained variance is 
computed as (.17940-.14552)/.17940= .1888 or 18.8%. 
66 The model cannot be estimated when both offense level severity and offense level severity squared are included.  
Accordingly, I removed offense severity squared. 
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severity has a stronger effect on sentence length in districts with larger child pornography 
caseloads and a weaker effect on sentence lengths in districts situated in the Midwest than in the 
East.  Likewise, offense severity has a weaker effect on sentence lengths in districts situated in 
the West than in the East.  None of the district-level variables had a significant interaction with 
upward departure/variance. 
The results of this final “mixed model” further indicate that districts situated in the 
western region of the United States have average supervised release sentences that are 28.7% 
longer than those in the east.  Legal factors including number of counts, criminal history score, 
plea, detained, downward departure/variance, and offense severity are significantly associated 
with supervised release length.  Extralegal factors are less relevant for this outcome.  
Table 5.18 about here 
In sum, results indicate that both individual-level legal and extralegal factors as well as 
district-level contextual factors are significantly associated with supervised sentence length, but 
legally relevant factors are far more important than extra-legal factors.  In addition, this section 
showed that the effects of offense severity and upward departure vary across courts. Finally, 
district location and child pornography caseload condition the effects of offense severity across 
courts.   
SECTION III: The Decision to Impose Lifetime Supervised Release 
This section examines the factors that are related to the binary outcome of the supervised 
release sentence – the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. I explore this binary 
outcome because I am interested in discovering factors associated with this most severe outcome.  
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There are important ramifications for those who receive the life term including never being 
discharged from supervision and the possibility of life incarceration if revoked.  
First, I present the results from generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLM) that 
examine the influence of individual-level legal and extralegal factors, followed by results from 
district-level and full two-level models.  An unconditional model was not run because there is no 
level-1 variance component included in the multilevel logistic model.  According to Johnson 
(2010), this is because the level 1 variance is heteroskedastic and completely determined by the 
value of p where p is the predicted probability for the level-1 model.  Johnson (2010) notes that 
the standard formulas for the intraclass correlation and explained variance at level-1 cannot be 
directly applied to the case of a binary dependent variable. 
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors and the Decision to Impose Lifetime 
Supervised Release 
With the decision to impose lifetime supervised release (yes/no) as the outcome variable, 
and level-2 representing federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only 
level-1 legal predictors [see Table 5.19 (Model 1)].  When individual-level covariates 
corresponding to legal factors are added to the model, several variables have statistically 
significant coefficients.  Criminal history score, downward departure/variance, plea, and 
detention, are statistically significant predictors of the decision to impose lifetime supervised 
release sentence for child pornography offenders.  Offenders who accept a guilty plea are over 
two times more likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised release compared to those offenders 
who go to trial (OR = 2.1), as are those offenders who are in custody at the time of sentencing 
compared to those on bond (OR = 1.97).  As anticipated, receiving a downward 
departure/variance decreased the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release by a factor of .41.  
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Upward departure/variance was not statistically significant. In addition, there is a non-linear 
relationship between offense severity and the decision to impose lifetime supervised release as 
indicated by the significant quadratic term for this variable (see Figure 5.6).  There is also a non-
linear relationship for number of counts as indicated by the significant quadratic term (see Figure 
5.7). 
Table 5.19 (Model 1) and Figures 5.6 and 5.7 about here 
Next, extralegal variables were added to the model to see if they explain lifetime 
supervised release above and beyond the effects of legally relevant variables [see Table 5.19 
(Model 2)].  Of the extralegal factors, only age is significant at alpha =.05.  Offenders age 50 and 
older are 1.45 times more likely than those under age 50 to be sentenced to lifetime supervised 
release.67  Recall, age is not a significant predictor of supervised release length.     
Table 5.19 (Model 2) about here 
To assess whether the effects of legal and extralegal variables differed depending on the 
severity of the offense, I created a series of multiplicative interaction terms between the offense 
severity score and each of the legal and extralegal variables.  These two-way interaction terms 
were added one at a time into the model containing legal and extralegal variables.  The 
interaction term of offense severity and upward departure is the only two-way interaction that is 
statistically significant; however, there are very few cases with less serious offenses that received 
an upward departure.  Using offense type as a proxy for seriousness, of the ten offenders with 
production offenses who received an upward departure/variance, seven (70.0%) received lifetime 
                                                          
67 Alternate measure of age including age squared and age as a continuous measure were not statistically significant 
predictors of the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. 
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supervised release.  By comparison, of the thirty offenders convicted of non-production offenses 
and who received and upward departure/variance, only ten (33.3%) were sentenced to lifetime 
supervised release.   
Variability in the Effects of Individual-Level Variables on the Decision to Impose Lifetime 
Supervised Release across Courts 
To determine whether the effects of legal and extralegal factors on the decision to impose 
lifetime supervised release vary significantly across district courts, I estimated a random 
coefficient model allowing one at a time, the coefficients for each of my variables to vary across 
courts.   The results indicate that none of the effects of legal and extralegal factors vary 
significantly across courts.   
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on the Decision to Impose Lifetime 
Supervised Release  
Next, I investigated whether the decision to impose lifetime supervised release is related 
to court context.  First, district-level factors were added one at a time to the model without any of 
the level-1 factors (see Table 5.20).  As in the models for length of supervised release, the 
likelihood of receiving lifetime supervised release is related to whether the state in which the 
district is located has a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child pornography and 
whether the district is located in the West versus the East. These variables remain statistically 
significant predictors of lifetime supervised release when all the contextual measures were added 
to the model at once.  Again, only region and state are retained in the final model because the 
other contextual factors have t-values less than 1 (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Offenders 
sentenced in districts situated in states with a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for 
possession of child pornography are two times (OR=2.00) more likely to receive lifetime 
supervised release than those districts situated within states without a state-level mandatory 
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minimum.  Similarly, districts situated in West were two times more likely than those in the East 
to sentence offenders to lifetime supervised release. 
Table 5.20 about here 
Individual and District-Level Effects on the Decision to Impose Lifetime Supervised 
Release - Best Fitting Model  
 
Next, I modeled the fully conditional hierarchical logistic model including all of the 
individual-level covariates from the previous version of the model (see Table 5.21).  Following 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from 
the model and therefore, state and region were the only district-level factors included at level-2.  
In this model, all of the previous legal factors that were found in the initial model for the 
decision to impose lifetime supervised release without the level-2 factors remain significant.  
Similarly, the previous extralegal factor of age found to be statistically significant when only 
level-1 factors are included in the model continues to be statistically significant.  Only the 
district-level contextual factor for West was found to be statistically significant. Using this full 
random intercept model, I employed random coefficient model to ascertain if the predictors in 
this full random intercept model differed across courts.  None of the predictors differed across 
courts.   
Table 5.21 about here 
SECTION IV: Four-Category Ordinal Measure of the Supervised Release Sentence 
Here, I present the results of my research questions using my four-category ordinal 
measure of the supervised release sentence.  In this section, I estimated my models using 
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hierarchical ordinal regression.  Again, a null model was not estimated because there is no level 
1 variance component included in the multilevel ordinal model. 
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors on the Four-Category Measure of the 
Supervised Release Sentence 
With the four categories representing my ordinal outcome variable, and level-2 
representing federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only level-1 legal 
and extralegal predictors.  Several level-1 legal predictors have statistically significant 
coefficients.  From this model [see Table 5.22 (Model 1)], I can conclude that criminal history 
score, method of conviction (plea vs, trial), being held in pretrial detention and downward 
departure/variance are significantly related to the log odds of being sentenced to a higher 
supervised release term category.  A one unit increase in the criminal history score increases the 
odds of being sentenced to the higher supervised release category by a factor of 1.3, controlling 
for all other factors in the model.  Offenders who receive an upward departure/variance are 2.4 
times more likely to receive a sentence in the higher supervised release category than those 
sentenced within the guidelines.  Offenders who are detained are 1.57 times more likely to be 
sentenced to the higher supervised release category compared to those released before 
sentencing. There are non-linear relationships between the ordinal measure of supervised release 
and number of counts as well as the offense severity.  As a side note, the legal factors that are 
related to this ordinal measure of supervised release length are the same as those associated with 
the continuous measure.    
Table 5.22 (Model 1) about here 
Next, extralegal variables were added to the model along with legal variables [see Table 
5.22 (Model 2)].  Of the extralegal factors, citizenship, race (white) and dependents are 
statistically significant predictors of supervised release category.  U.S. citizens are almost two 
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times more likely (OR= 1.87) than non-citizens to be sentenced in the higher supervised release 
category, controlling for all other factors in the model.  Non-whites are 1.3 times more likely 
than whites to be sentenced to a higher supervised release category, while not having dependent 
increases the log odds of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category by a factor of 
1.25.68   The effects of legal variables remain relatively unchanged by the addition of extralegal 
variables.   
Table 5.22 (Model 2) about here 
Variability in the Effects of Individual-Level Variables on the Four-Category Measure of 
the Supervised Release Sentence 
 
Next, I assessed whether the effects of legal and extralegal predictors on the four-
category measure of supervised release vary significantly across district courts using a random 
coefficient model.  The coefficients for each of the independent variables were allowed to vary 
across courts one at a time.  The results showed that none of the effects of the legal and 
extralegal factors varied significantly across courts.   
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on the Four-Category Measure of the 
Supervised Release Sentence 
With the term of supervised release divided into four categories: short-term, intermediate, 
long-term, and lifetime as the outcome variable, I first modeled only the district-level covariates 
without any of the level-1 factors (see Table 5.23).  In this model, only the contextual factors of 
state and region (West) was statistically significant in predicting the category of supervised 
                                                          
68 To aid in interpretation, since the odds ratio of dependents was less than 1, I chose to invert the value.  For 
example, for the odds ratio for dependents, 1 divided by .795 equals 1.257. 
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release.69  District courts situated within states with a mandatory minimum state level penalty for 
possession of child pornography are 2.03 times more likely to sentence offenders to the higher 
supervised release category compared to districts situated in states without a mandatory 
minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography.  Districts situated in the 
Western region of the U.S., are 2.45 times more likely than those in the East to sentence 
offenders to the higher supervised release category. 
Table 5.23 about here 
Individual and District-Level Effects on the Four-Category Ordinal Measure of the 
Supervised Release Sentence - Best Fitting Final Model  
 
Next, both level-1 and level-2 factors are entered into the model using the four-category 
ordinal measure of supervised release and contextual factors with t values greater than 1 are 
retained in the model (see Table 5.24). 70  Region (west) is the only district-level contextual 
factor that is significant at alpha =.05.  The variable measuring whether the district court is 
situated within a state that has a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child 
pornography is marginally significant (alpha = .10).  The effects of legal and extra-legal 
individual level factors are relatively unchanged except race (white) is only marginally 
significant (alpha = .10).   
Table 5.24 about here 
                                                          
69  I also modeled each district-level factor one at a time without any level 1 factors and only the variable state was 
statistically significant. 
70 Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from the 
model and therefore state and region were the only district-level factors included at level 2. 
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Using this full random intercept model, I employed a random coefficient model to 
ascertain if the effects of the predictors in this full random intercept model differed across courts.  
None of them indicated that legal and extralegal factors matter the same across courts. 
Summary 
 In sum, most of the variation of supervised release sentences for child pornography 
offenses exists at the individual-level, and most of variance in sentencing outcomes is explained 
by individual-level factors.  Specifically, examination of the fixed effects reveal results that are 
largely consistent with prior research on individual-level legal sentencing factors (see Spohn, 
2000).  Across all models, individual-level legal factors exhibit stronger influences on supervised 
release sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and a four-category 
measure of supervised release.  For example, criminal history score and offense severity both 
increase supervised release sentence length, the likelihood of lifetime supervised release, and the 
likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category.  But some extralegal 
individual-level factors also explain some of the variance in supervised release sentences, albeit a 
very small portion.  For instance, being white and having dependents both decreased supervised 
release length and the likelihood of being sentenced to the higher supervised release category.   
These extralegal findings are consistent with federal sentencing literature, which generally finds 
that, despite the advent of the federal guidelines, extralegal factors in sentencing outcomes have 
not been eliminated. 
  Consistent with other multilevel sentencing studies, some of the effects of individual-
level factors varied significantly across district courts, but only for the sentence of supervised 
release sentence length.  Finally, there is significant between-district variation in sentencing that 
was not explained by individual-level case factors, but rather by district-level contextual factors. 
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Across most of the models court location (region) and the existence of state-level mandatory 
minimum penalties for the state offense of possession of child pornography are related to the 
supervised release sentence.  Finally, the effects offense severity across courts was conditioned 
by district location and child pornography caseload.   
 The main overarching finding of the data analyses is that the effects of many individual-
level legal and extralegal factors as well as district-level contextual factors of the sentence of 
supervised release mirror those found generally for the sentence of imprisonment.  There are, 
however, a few exceptions such as the effect of plea and the effect of education (i.e., those with 
high level education are in some cases sentenced more harshly). Table 5.25 summarizes my 
hypotheses and how they fared in this investigation. 
Table 5.25 about here 
The next chapter which is the discussion chapter of this dissertation explains these results 
in detail in light of moral panic, the focal concerns and the court communities’ perspectives as 
well as the social/group threat perspective. 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics (Mean or Percentages) for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variables Mean/Percent SD Min Max
Supervised Release Sentence length (capped at 470 months) 242.03 170.78 12 470
Lifetime Supervised Release Yes 33.2%
No 66.8%
Four-Category Ordinal Measure Short-term 20.1%
Intermediate 28.2%
Long-term 18.6%
Lifetime 33.2%
Guilty Plea/Nolo Contendere 95.7%
Trial 4.3%
Within guidelines 34.5%
Upward depart/variance 2.2%
Downward depart/variance 63.3%
1.37 0.902 1 6
Yes 5.2%
No 94.8%
32 5.49 16 43
1.49 1.66 1 26
Yes 61.3%
No 38.7%
Nonproduction 87.5%
Production 12.5%
Age (19-49) 72.7%
Age (50 and over) 27.3%
White 86.5%
Nonwhite 13.5%
Less than HS 9.2%
HS Graduate 36.2%
Some College 36.7%
College Graduate 17.9%
808.0 4589 0 100000
US Citizen 96.9%
Non US Citizen 3.1%
Yes 29.6%
No 70.4%
7 5.60 1 28
3.7% 2.4% 0.2% 13.1%
51.1% 13.4% 22.8% 81.0%
No 50.6%
Yes 49.4%
Reject 75.3%
Do not reject 24.7%
West 19.1%
South 42.7%
East 15.7%
Midwest 22.5%
50.4% 9.6% 28% 73%
District Mean Supervised Release Sentence Length 240.11 101.4 60 470
District Mean Percent Lifetime Supervised Release 33.2% 26.03% 0% 100%
Fine
Dependent variables
Offense Type
Detained
Number of Counts of Conviction
Offense Severity Score
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History Score
Departure
Plea
Region
Percent Republican
Legal Factors
Extralegal Factors
Independent variables:  Case / Inidvidual (N=1900)
Guidelines Compliance Rate
Mandatory Minimum State-level Penalty
Kimbrough -based Policy Disagreement
District Size
District Level variables (N=89)
Child Porn Caseload Rate
Dependents
Age 
Education
Citizenship
Race
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics by Offense Type 
 
 
  
Variables
Mean /
Percentage SD Min Max
Mean /
Percentage SD Min Max
Dependent variables
Supervised Release Sentence length (capped at 470 months) 229.09 167.35 12 470 332.79 167.37 36 470
Lifetime Supervised Release Yes 29.7% 57.4%
No 70.3% 42.6%
Four-category Ordinal Measure Short-term 20.6% 9.3%
Intermediate 29.8% 16.9%
Long-term 18.9% 16.5%
Lifetime 29.7% 57.4%
Independent variables:  Case / Individual (N=1900)
Legal Factors
Guilty Plea/Nolo Contendere 96.5% 90.3%
Trial 3.5% 9.7%
Within guideline 34.5% 48.5%
Upward departure/variance 2.1% 4.2%
Downward departure/variance 63.4% 47.3%
1.33 0.831 1 6 1.67 1.263 1 6
Yes 0.7% 36.4%
No 99.3% 63.6%
30.90 4.90 16 43 39.13 3.8 24 43
1.30 1.40 1 26 2.28 2.5 1 21
Yes 56.7% 93.7%
No 43.3% 6.3%
Extralegal Factors
Age (19-49) 72.2% 76.4%
Age (50 and over) 27.8% 23.6%
White 87.3% 81.0%
Nonwhite 12.7% 19.0%
Less than HS 8.6% 13.2%
HS Graduate 36.1% 36.3%
Some College 37.1% 33.8%
College Graduate 18.1% 16.7%
817.07 4665.0 0 100000 745.99 4027.0 0 50000
US Citizen 97.1% 95.8%
Non US Citizen 2.9% 4.2%
Yes 27.9% 41.0%
No 72.1% 59.0%
Fine
Citizenship
Dependents
Sex Offender Enhancement
Offense Severity Score
Number of Counts of Conviction
Detained
Nonproduction 
(N= 1663)
Production 
(N=237)
Age 
Race
Education
Plea
Departure
Criminal History Score
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Table 5.3 
Bivariate Correlation Matrix – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal Factors 
 
Fine
Supervised 
Release in 
Months
Number 
of 
Counts
Sex Offender 
Enhancement
Criminal 
History 
Score
Offense 
Severity 
Score Race
Offense 
Type
Lifetime 
Supervised 
Release Plea Detained Citizenship Dependents Age > 50
Fine Pearson 
Correlation 1
Supervised 
Release in 
Months
Pearson 
Correlation -.007 1
Number of 
Counts
Pearson 
Correlation -.005 .167** 1
Sex Offender 
Enhancement
Pearson 
Correlation .020 .178** .184** 1
Criminal 
History Score
Pearson 
Correlation -.027 .146** .022 .157** 1
Offense 
Severity Score
Pearson 
Correlation -.001 .338
** .277** .392** .065** 1
Race Pearson 
Correlation .025 -.033 -.004 -.027 -.007 -.015 1
Offense Type Pearson 
Correlation .005 -.201** -.180** -.533** -.124** -.491** .061** 1
Plea Pearson 
Correlation .008 -.007 -.155** -.092** -.086** -.194** .031 .102** -.012 1
Detained Pearson 
Correlation -.052* .276** .128** .161** .252** .310** -.015 -.251** .240** -.054* 1
Citizenship Pearson 
Correlation -.052* .010 .008 -.042 .036 -.010 .270** .026 .008 .008 -.078** 1
Dependents Pearson 
Correlation .018 -.019 -.023 .041 .052* .005 .004 -.096** -.012 .012 .023 -.022 1
Age > 50 Pearson 
Correlation .120** .012 -.025 -.020 -.056* -.078** .114** .031 .040 -.028 -.050* .026 -.031 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5.4 
Bivariate Correlation Matrix – District-Level Factors 
 
  
Mean 
Supervised 
Release Length
District 
Size
Child 
Pornography 
Caseload 
Rate
Guidelines 
Compliance Rate
Kimbrough -
based Policy 
Disagreement
Mandatory 
Minimum 
State-level 
Penalty
Percent 
Republican in 
2012  
Presidential 
Election
Percent 
Lifetime 
Supervised 
Release
Mean Supervised 
Release Length
Pearson 
Correlation 1
District Size Pearson 
Correlation -.155 1
Child Pornography 
Caseload Rate
Pearson 
Correlation .010 -.245* 1
Guidelines 
Compliance Rate
Pearson 
Correlation .117 -.267
* -.129 1
Kimbrough -based 
Policy 
Disagreement
Pearson 
Correlation .103 -.152 -.238* .288** 1
Mandatory 
Minimum State-
level Penalty
Pearson 
Correlation .282** -.084 -.090 .421** .202 1
Percent 
Republican in 
2012 Presidential 
Election
Pearson 
Correlation .052 -.312** -.078 .465** .518** .337** 1
Percent Lifetime 
Supervise Release
Pearson 
Correlation .957
** -.113 -.001 .087 .072 .272** .030 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5.5 
89 Districts with Percentage of Cases Sentence to Short-term, Intermediate, Long-term and 
Lifetime Supervised Release 
District Short-term Intermediate Long-
term 
Lifetime 
         
Maine 33.2% 33.2% 33.6% 0.0% 
Massachusetts 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Hampshire 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0% 
Rhode Island 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 
Connecticut 15.0% 50.0% 5.0% 30.0% 
New York East 32.0% 52.0% 0.0% 16.0% 
New York North 10.4% 6.9% 37.9% 44.8% 
New York South 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
New York West 24.4% 17.8% 46.7% 11.1% 
Vermont 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 14.2% 
Delaware 71.4% 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 
New Jersey 77.3% 18.2% 0.0% 4.5% 
Pennsylvania East 23.8% 57.1% 4.8% 14.3% 
Pennsylvania West 17.5% 47.5% 20.0% 15.0% 
Pennsylvania Middle 0.0% 39.4% 17.8% 42.8% 
Maryland 0.0% 23.1% 12.8% 64.1% 
North Carolina East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
North Carolina Middle 0.0% 46.4% 35.7% 17.9% 
North Carolina West 0.0% 34.7% 8.7% 56.5% 
South Carolina 52.9% 5.9% 0.0% 41.2% 
Virginia East 15.4% 30.8% 25.0% 28.8% 
Virginia West 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 37.5% 
West Virginia North 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 25.0% 
West Virginia South 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.6% 
Louisiana East 50.0% 33.3% 0.0% 16.7% 
Louisiana Middle 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Louisiana West 12.2% 19.5% 17.1% 51.2% 
Mississippi North 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 33.4% 
Mississippi South 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 
Texas East 70.8% 8.3% 12.5% 8.4% 
Texas North 12.2% 39.1% 7.3% 41.4% 
Texas South 12.8% 21.2% 21.2% 44.8% 
Texas West 20.4% 25.9% 20.4% 33.3% 
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Kentucky East 0.0% 0.0% 55.6% 44.4% 
Kentucky West 18.1% 36.4% 18.2% 27.3% 
Michigan East 81.3% 15.6% 0.0% 3.1% 
Michigan West 21.7% 21.7% 4.3% 52.2% 
Ohio North 44.4% 27.8% 5.6% 22.2% 
Ohio South 19.2% 30.8% 17.3% 32.7% 
Tennessee East 15.8% 15.8% 31.6% 36.8% 
Tennessee Middle 27.3% 36.4% 36.4% 0.0% 
Tennessee West 0.0% 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 
Illinois Central 3.1% 21.9% 12.5% 62.5% 
Illinois North 37.5% 6.3% 25.0% 31.3% 
Illinois South 19.2% 38.5% 15.4% 26.9% 
Indiana North 38.9% 11.1% 22.2% 27.8% 
Indiana South 0.0% 11.1% 8.3% 80.6% 
Wisconsin East 25.0% 43.8% 6.3% 25.0% 
Wisconsin West 0.0% 0.0% 22.2% 77.8% 
Arkansas East 17.6% 58.8% 0.0% 23.5% 
Arkansas West 27.3% 27.3% 18.2% 27.3% 
Iowa North 41.2% 41.2% 5.9% 11.8% 
Iowa South 62.9% 34.3% 2.9% 0.0% 
Minnesota 10.0% 20.0% 55.0% 15.0% 
Missouri East 0.0% 4.8% 7.1% 88.1% 
Missouri West 21.1% 34.2% 15.8% 28.9% 
Nebraska 43.3% 23.3% 10.0% 23.3% 
North Dakota 38.5% 15.4% 0.0% 46.2% 
South Dakota 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
Alaska 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Arizona 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 81.3% 
California Central 3.7% 18.5% 18.5% 59.3% 
California East 3.6% 45.5% 43.6% 7.3% 
California North 56.3% 25.0% 0.0% 18.8% 
California South 23.5% 58.8% 9.8% 7.8% 
Hawaii 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
Idaho 18.2% 9.1% 54.5% 18.2% 
Montana 5.3% 21.1% 31.6% 42.1% 
Nevada 4.2% 4.2% 16.7% 75.0% 
Oregon 30.0% 20.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Washington East 18.2% 0.0% 9.1% 72.7% 
Washington West 6.7% 13.3% 20.0% 60.0% 
Colorado 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 
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Kansas 70.0% 25.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
New Mexico 23.1% 46.2% 0.0% 30.8% 
Oklahoma East 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma North 0.0% 83.3% 16.7% 0.0% 
Oklahoma West 41.7% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 
Utah 16.7% 16.7% 36.7% 30.0% 
Wyoming 4.8% 38.1% 38.1% 19.0% 
Alabama Middle 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Alabama North 7.7% 30.8% 7.7% 53.8% 
Alabama South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Florida Middle 5.6% 39.4% 38.0% 16.9% 
Florida North 0.0% 44.4% 33.3% 22.9% 
Florida South 11.4% 27.3% 34.1% 27.3% 
Georgia Middle 0.0% 0.0% 77.8% 22.2% 
Georgia North 12.5% 43.8% 12.5% 31.3% 
Georgia South 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 
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Table 5.6 
89 Districts with Percentage of the Total sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography  
Cases in Each District 
 
 
  
Maine 0.3% Michigan East 1.7% Washington East 0.6%
Massachusetts 0.7% Michigan West 1.2% Washington West 0.8%
New Hampshire 0.3% Ohio North 0.9% Colorado 0.3%
Rhode Island 0.5% Ohio South 2.7% Kansas 1.1%
Connecticut 1.1% Tennessee East 1.0% New Mexico 0.7%
New York East 1.3% Tennessee Middle 0.6% Oklahoma East 0.2%
New York North 1.5% Tennessee West 0.7% Oklahoma North 0.3%
New York South 0.7% Illinois Central 1.7% Oklahoma West 0.6%
New York West 2.4% Illinois North 0.8% Utah 1.6%
Vermont 0.7% Illinois South 1.4% Wyoming 1.1%
Delaware 0.4% Indiana North 0.9% Alabama Middle 0.2%
New Jersey 1.2% Indiana South 1.9% Alabama North 0.7%
Pennsylvania East 1.1% Wisconsin East 0.8% Alabama South 0.1%
Pennsylvania West 1.5% Wisconsin West 0.5% Florida Middle 3.7%
Pennsylvania Middle 2.0% Arkansas East 0.9% Florida North 0.5%
Maryland 2.1% Arkansas West 0.6% Florida South 2.3%
North Carolina East 0.7% Iowa North 0.9% Georgia Middle 0.5%
North Carolina Middle 1.5% Iowa South 1.8% Georgia North 0.8%
North Carolina West 1.2% Minnesota 1.1% Georgia South 0.3%
South Carolina 0.9% Missouri East 2.2%
Virginia East 2.7% Missouri West 2.0%
Virginia West 0.4% Nebraska 1.6%
West Virginia North 0.6% North Dakota 0.7%
West Virginia South 0.3% South Dakota 0.3%
Louisiana East 0.3% Alaska 0.2%
Louisiana Middle 0.2% Arizona 0.8%
Louisiana West 2.2% California Central 2.8%
Mississippi North 0.2% California East 2.9%
Mississippi South 0.3% California North 0.8%
Texas East 1.3% California South 2.7%
Texas North 2.2% Hawaii 0.3%
Texas South 2.5% Idaho 0.6%
Texas West 2.8% Montana 1.0%
Kentucky East 0.5% Nevada 2.5%
Kentucky West 0.6% Oregon 1.1%
 154 
Table 5.7 
89 Districts with Percentage Sentenced to Short-Term, Intermediate, Long-term, Lifetime 
Supervised Release (Non-production Cases Only) 
District Short-
term 
Intermediate Long-
term 
Lifetime 
         
Maine 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
Massachusetts 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Hampshire 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 
Rhode Island 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0% 
Connecticut 16.7% 50.0% 5.5% 27.8% 
New York East 34.8% 52.2% 0.0% 13.0% 
New York North 12.5% 8.3% 41.7% 37.5% 
New York South 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
New York West 27.5% 17.5% 52.5% 2.5% 
Vermont 28.6% 42.9% 14.2% 14.3% 
Delaware 71.4% 14.6% 0.0% 14.5% 
New Jersey 77.3% 18.2% 0.0% 4.5% 
Pennsylvania East 27.7% 61.1% 5.6% 5.6% 
Pennsylvania West 18.9% 51.4% 21.6% 8.1% 
Pennsylvania Middle 0.0% 45.8% 20.8% 33.3% 
Maryland 0.0% 29.0% 16.1% 54.9% 
North Carolina East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
North Carolina 
Middle 
0.0% 50.0% 45.5% 4.5% 
North Carolina West 0.0% 38.1% 9.5% 52.4% 
South Carolina 60.0% 6.7% 0.0% 33.3% 
Virginia East 17.5% 35.0% 27.5% 20.0% 
Virginia West 28.6% 28.6% 14.3% 28.6% 
West Virginia North 27.0% 36.4% 18.2% 18.4% 
West Virginia South 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 
Louisiana East 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
Louisiana Middle 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Louisiana West 13.9% 22.2% 16.7% 47.2% 
Mississippi North 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mississippi South 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 
Texas East 80.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
Texas North 13.2% 36.8% 7.9% 42.1% 
Texas South 11.9% 23.8% 23.8% 40.5% 
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Texas West 22.0% 28.0% 20.0% 30.0% 
Kentucky East 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% 42.9% 
Kentucky West 18.2% 36.4% 18.1% 27.3% 
Michigan East 81.3% 15.6% 0.0% 3.1% 
Michigan West 22.2% 27.8% 5.6% 44.4% 
Ohio North 44.4% 27.8% 5.6% 22.2% 
Ohio South 19.6% 34.8% 17.4% 28.3% 
Tennessee East 17.7% 17.6% 35.3% 29.4% 
Tennessee Middle 37.5% 37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 
Tennessee West 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illinois Central 3.8% 26.9% 15.4% 53.9% 
Illinois North 35.7% 0.0% 28.6% 35.7% 
Illinois South 18.2% 45.5% 18.2% 18.2% 
Indiana North 43.8% 12.5% 25.0% 18.7% 
Indiana South 0.0% 12.1% 9.1% 78.8% 
Wisconsin East 30.8% 38.5% 0.0% 30.8% 
Wisconsin West 0.0% 0.0% 22.0% 77.8% 
Arkansas East 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
Arkansas West 42.9% 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% 
Iowa North 55.6% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Iowa South 66.7% 30.3% 3.0% 0.0% 
Minnesota 14.3% 28.6% 50.0% 7.1% 
Missouri East 0.0% 5.6% 8.3% 86.1% 
Missouri West 19.2% 42.3% 15.4% 23.1% 
Nebraska 50.0% 29.2% 0.0% 20.8% 
North Dakota 38.5% 15.4% 0.0% 46.2% 
South Dakota 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
Alaska 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Arizona 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 80.0% 
California Central 3.8% 18.9% 18.9% 58.5% 
California East 3.7% 46.3% 42.6% 7.4% 
California North 64.3% 28.6% 0.0% 7.1% 
California South 20.8% 62.5% 8.3% 8.3% 
Hawaii 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
Idaho 25.0% 12.5% 62.5% 0.0% 
Montana 6.7% 20.0% 40.0% 33.3% 
Nevada 4.3% 4.3% 17.0% 74.5% 
Oregon 35.3% 17.6% 0.0% 47.1% 
Washington East 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 
Washington West 7.1% 14.3% 21.4% 57.1% 
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Colorado 0.0% 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 
Kansas 78.6% 14.3% 7.1% 0.0% 
New Mexico 18.2% 45.5% 0.0% 36.4% 
Oklahoma East 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma North 0.0% 83.3% 16.7% 0.0% 
Oklahoma West 30.0% 30.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Utah 22.7% 18.2% 31.8% 27.3% 
Wyoming 4.8% 38.1% 31.8% 19.0% 
Alabama Middle 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Alabama North 11.1% 33.3% 0.0% 55.6% 
Alabama South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Florida Middle 4.4% 38.4% 41.3% 15.9% 
Florida North 0.0% 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 
Florida South 11.6% 27.9% 34.9% 25.6% 
Georgia Middle 0.0% 0.0% 87.5% 12.5% 
Georgia North 13.3% 46.7% 6.7% 33.3% 
Georgia South 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
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Table 5.8  
89 Districts with Percentage of the Total Sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography 
 Cases (Non-production Offenses) 
 
 
Maine 0.3% Michigan East 1.9% Washington East 0.5%
Massachusetts 0.8% Michigan West 1.1% Washington West 0.8%
New Hampshire 0.2% Ohio North 1.1% Colorado 0.3%
Rhode Island 0.6% Ohio South 2.8% Kansas 0.8%
Connecticut 1.1% Tennessee East 1.0% New Mexico 0.7%
New York East 1.4% Tennessee Middle 0.5% Oklahoma East 0.2%
New York North 1.4% Tennessee West 0.5% Oklahoma North 0.4%
New York South 0.8% Illinois Central 1.6% Oklahoma West 0.6%
New York West 2.4% Illinois North 0.8% Utah 1.3%
Vermont 0.8% Illinois South 1.3% Wyoming 1.3%
Delaware 0.4% Indiana North 1.0% Alabama Middle 0.2%
New Jersey 1.3% Indiana South 2.0% Alabama North 0.5%
Pennsylvania East 1.2% Wisconsin East 0.8% Alabama South 0.1%
Pennsylvania West 2.2% Wisconsin West 0.5% Florida Middle 3.8%
Pennsylvania Middle 1.4% Arkansas East 0.9% Florida North 0.4%
Maryland 1.9% Arkansas West 0.4% Florida South 2.6%
North Carolina East 0.7% Iowa North 0.5% Georgia Middle 0.5%
North Carolina Middle 1.3% Iowa South 2.0% Georgia North 0.9%
North Carolina West 1.3% Minnesota 0.8% Georgia South 0.1%
South Carolina 0.9% Missouri East 2.2%
Virginia East 2.4% Missouri West 1.6%
Virginia West 0.4% Nebraska 1.4%
West Virginia North 0.7% North Dakota 0.8%
West Virginia South 0.4% South Dakota 0.3%
Louisiana East 0.3% Alaska 0.2%
Louisiana Middle 0.1% Arizona 0.9%
Louisiana West 2.2% California Central 3.2%
Mississippi North 10.0% California East 3.2%
Mississippi South 0.3% California North 0.8%
Texas East 1.2% California South 2.9%
Texas North 2.3% Hawaii 0.2%
Texas South 2.5% Idaho 0.5%
Texas West 3.0% Montana 0.9%
Kentucky East 0.4% Nevada 2.8%
Kentucky West 0.7% Oregon 1.0%
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Table 5.9 
89 Districts with Percentage Sentenced to Short-term, Intermediate, Long-term and Lifetime 
Supervised Release (Production Offenses) 
District Short-term Intermediate Long-term Lifetime 
         
Maine 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Massachusetts 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Hampshire 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Rhode Island 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Connecticut 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
New York East 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
New York North 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 
New York South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New York West 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0% 
Vermont 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Delaware 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Jersey 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Pennsylvania East 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 
Pennsylvania West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Pennsylvania Middle 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Maryland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
North Carolina East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
North Carolina Middle 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 
North Carolina West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
South Carolina 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Virginia East 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 58.3% 
Virginia West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
West Virginia North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
West Virginia South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Louisiana East 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Louisiana Middle 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Louisiana West 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 
Mississippi North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Mississippi South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Texas East 25.0% 0.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Texas North 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 
Texas South 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 
Texas West 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 
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Kentucky East 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
Kentucky West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Michigan East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Michigan West 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 
Ohio North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ohio South 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 
Tennessee East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Tennessee Middle 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 
Tennessee West 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 0.0% 
Illinois Central 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Illinois North 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illinois South 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 
Indiana North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Indiana South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Wisconsin East 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 
Wisconsin West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Arkansas East 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Arkansas West 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Iowa North 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 
Iowa South 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Minnesota 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 
Missouri East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Missouri West 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 41.7% 
Nebraska 16.7% 0.0% 50.0% 33.2% 
North Dakota 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
South Dakota 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Alaska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Arizona 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
California Central 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
California East 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
California North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
California South 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
Hawaii 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Idaho 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 
Montana 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 
Nevada 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Oregon 1.3% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 
Washington East 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 
Washington West 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Colorado 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Kansas 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Mexico 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma West 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Utah 0.0% 12.5% 50.0% 37.5% 
Wyoming 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Alabama Middle 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Alabama North 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
Alabama South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Florida Middle 12.5% 50.0% 12.5% 25.0% 
Florida North 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
Florida South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Georgia Middle 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Georgia North 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Georgia South 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
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Table 5.10 
89 Districts with Percentage of Total Sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography Cases 
(Production Cases) 
 
 
  
Maine 0.4% Michigan East 0.0% Washington East 1.3%
Massachusetts 0.0% Michigan West 2.1% Washington West 0.4%
New Hampshire 0.8% Ohio North 0.0% Colorado 0.4%
Rhode Island 0.0% Ohio South 2.5% Kansas 2.5%
Connecticut 0.8% Tennessee East 0.8% New Mexico 0.8%
New York East 0.8% Tennessee Middle 1.3% Oklahoma East 0.0%
New York North 2.1% Tennessee West 2.1% Oklahoma North 0.0%
New York South 0.0% Illinois Central 2.5% Oklahoma West 0.8%
New York West 2.1% Illinois North 0.8% Utah 3.4%
Vermont 0.0% Illinois South 1.7% Wyoming 0.0%
Delaware 0.0% Indiana North 0.8% Alabama Middle 0.0%
New Jersey 0.0% Indiana South 1.3% Alabama North 1.7%
Pennsylvania East 1.3% Wisconsin East 1.3% Alabama South 0.0%
Pennsylvania West 1.3% Wisconsin West 0.0% Florida Middle 3.4%
Pennsylvania Middle 1.7% Arkansas East 0.8% Florida North 0.8%
Maryland 3.4% Arkansas West 1.7% Florida South 0.4%
North Carolina East 0.8% Iowa North 3.4% Georgia Middle 0.4%
North Carolina Middle 2.5% Iowa South 0.8% Georgia North 0.4%
North Carolina West 0.8% Minnesota 2.5% Georgia South 1.3%
South Carolina 0.8% Missouri East 2.5%
Virginia East 5.1% Missouri West 5.1%
Virginia West 0.4% Nebraska 2.5%
West Virginia North 0.4% North Dakota 0.0%
West Virginia South 0.4% South Dakota 0.0%
Louisiana East 0.4% Alaska 0.0%
Louisiana Middle 0.4% Arizona 0.4%
Louisiana West 2.1% California Central 0.4%
Mississippi North 0.4% California East 0.4%
Mississippi South 0.0% California North 0.8%
Texas East 1.7% California South 1.3%
Texas North 1.3% Hawaii 0.4%
Texas South 2.1% Idaho 1.3%
Texas West 1.7% Montana 1.7%
Kentucky East 0.8% Nevada 0.4%
Kentucky West 0.0% Oregon 1.3%
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Table 5.11 
Unconditional Model of Supervised Release Sentence Length (logged) 
  
 
 
  
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE df p-value
Intercept (y00) 5.17 0.04 88 <.001
Random Effects Var. Comp SD df X 2 p-value Intraclass Coeff.
Level 1 (rij) 0.47705 0.69069
Level 2 (uoj) 0.1794 0.42356 88 745.1877 <.001 0.273
Deviance= 4014.780504
Parameters = 2
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Table 5.12 
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal 
Factors 
 
 
 
  
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed Effects b SE b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.166614 0.0456*** 5.166998 0.045543***
Number of Counts 0.062707 0.023286** 0.064545 0.023080 **
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.004863 0.067152 0.007328 0.066417
Criminal History Score 0.072678 0.020072*** 0.068885  0.020618 ***
Offense Severity -0.005698 0.02955 -0.0051 0.029516
Plea 0.247289 0.080055** 0.24852  0.079246 **
Detained 0.190964 0.033532*** 0.202326 0.034275 ***
Upward Depart/Variance 0.083659 0.168175 0.101386 0.166063
Downward Depart/Variance -0.199277 0.042142*** -0.19933 0.041927 ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000813 0.000454* 0.000799  0.000451 *
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.003218 0.001121** -0.00337  0.001103 ***
Fine 0.00000 0.000002
White -0.08211 0.042731**
Citizen 0.197196 0.078998**
Dependents -0.06612 0.033867**
Less than HS 0.131794 0.048219**
Some College -0.0238 0.036533
College Grad 0.106518 0.04747**
Age > 50 0.01511 0.031491
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD X 2 df p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. SD X 2 df p-value
     Level 1 0.3702 0.60844      Level 1 0.36648 0.60538
     Level 2 0.15729 0.3966 861.00 88 <0.001      Level 2 0.15712 0.39638 864.39 88 <0.001
Deviance=3618.619741 Deviance= 3647.556054 
Number of estimated parameters = 2 Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.13 
Random Intercepts Models (Supervised Release Length) – Random Coefficients  
 
  
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed Effects b SE Fixed Effects b S.E.
Overall mean (intercept) 5.169145 0.044673*** Overall mean (intercept) 5.169772 0.044608
Number of Counts 0.066182 0.021477  ** Number of Counts 0.067254 0.021420 **
Sex Offender Enhancement -0.00488 0.057689 Sex Offender Enhancement -0.00565 0.057579
Criminal History 0.067512 0.020708  ** Criminal History Score 0.067699 0.020685 **
Offense Severity -0.005305 0.026864 Offense Severity -0.00532 0.027009
Plea 0.25114  0.077912  *** Plea 0.252164  0.078288***
Detained 0.208376  0.035154  *** Detained 0.208443  0.035098***
Upward Depart/Variance 0.090955 0.161198 Upward Depart/Variance 0.085261 0.160686
Downward Depart/Variance -0.19194 0.041625  *** Downward Depart/Variance -0.19145 0.041625 ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000821  0.000412 ** Offense Severity Sq. 0.000822  0.000413 **
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.00335 0.001012 *** Number of Counts  Sq. -0.0034 0.001004 ***
Fine 0.000001 0.000002 Fine 0.000001 0.000002
White -0.07657 0.041752 * White -0.07661 0.041527*
Citizen 0.206717 0.078060 ** Citizen 0.205251 0.078091 **
Dependents -0.05809  0.033680 * Dependents -0.05868  0.033688 *
Less than HS 0.12149 0.046879 ** Less than HS 0.122972 0.046982 **
Some College -0.02458 0.036624 Some College -0.02342 0.036723
College Grad 0.098524 0.045696 ** College Grad 0.099492 0.045838**
Age > 50 0.02435 0.030333 Age > 50 0.024302 0.030404
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. S.D. df X 2 p-value
Offense severity 0.0003 0.01719 87 120.64 0.01 Offense severity sq. 0.00000 0.00026 85 117.53 0.01
     Level 1   0.35840 0.59867      Level 1 0.3591 0.59925
     Level 2 0.15072 0.38823 87 714.72 <0.001      Level 2 0.15009 0.38741 85 702.34 <0.001 
Deviance= 3596.240545 Deviance= 3596.461386  
Number of estimated parameters = 4 Number of estimated parameters = 4
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects b SE Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.171204 0.045759*** Overall mean (intercept) 5.170887 0.045529***
Number of Counts 0.067348 0.022215** Number of Counts 0.068259 0.022301**
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.1359 0.064583 Sex Offender Enhancement -0.00599 0.065188
Criminal History 0.073128 0.019058 *** Criminal History 0.069234 0.020822 ***
Offense Severity -0.01245 0.028126 Offense Severity -0.0039 0.029109
Plea 0.260418  0.079743*** Plea 0.259201  0.079412***
Detained 0.202816  0.034140*** Detained 0.199533  0.034802***
Upward Depart/Variance 0.10751 0.16047 Upward Depart/Variance 0.098677 0.169031
Downward Depart/Variance -0.19605 0.041539*** Downward Depart/Variance -0.19536 0.041369***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000908  0.000427** Offense Severity Sq. 0.000788  0.000444*
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.00376 0.001010 ** Number of Counts  Sq. -0.00352 0.001044 ***
Fine 0.000001 0.000002 Fine 0.000001 0.000002
White -0.07193 0.043046* White -0.08383 0.041404**
Citizen 0.221043 0.078555** Citizen 0.208066 0.078848 **
Dependents -0.06945  0.035034** Dependents -0.06587  0.034174**
Less than HS 0.133851 0.048653 ** Less than HS 0.131401 0.048339**
Some College -0.01709 0.037021 Some College -0.02408 0.03601
College Grad 0.10335 0.046956 ** College Grad 0.105387 0.046577**
Age > 50 0.017964 0.03109 Age > 50 0.017213 0.031535
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value
Upward depart/variance 0.49953 0.70677 23 70.8 <0.001 Downward Depart/Variance 0.02517 0.15865 78 95.85 0.083
     Level 1 0.35709 0.59797      Level 1 0.36155 0.60129
     Level 2 0.15933 0.39916 23 422.34 <0.001      Level 2 0.15597 0.39493 78 719.98 <0.001 
Deviance=  3588.772427 Deviance= 3609.857352 
Number of estimated parameters = 4 Number of estimated parameters = 4
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.14 
Random Intercepts Models (Supervised Release Length) with Random Coefficients (Offense 
Severity Score, Upward Depart/Variance, Downward Depart/Variance) 
 
  
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.161073 0.045127***
Number of Counts 0.064721 0.022131 **
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.017308 0.058281
Criminal History 0.076992 0.019169 ***
Offense Severity -0.0074 0.026599
Plea 0.239185 0.076748 **
Detained 0.208994 0.035137 ***
Upward Depart/Variance 0.116842 0.159121
Downward Depart/Variance -0.185477 0.039595 ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000824 0.000406* *
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.003288 0.001085 **
Fine 0.00001 0.000002
White -0.076882 0.039001**
Citizen 0.227406 0.078471**
Dependents -0.057935 0.033102*
Less than HS 0.124978 0.047314**
Some College -0.01703 0.036324
College Grad 0.098922 0.046403**
Age > 50 0.017097 0.029872
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X2 p-value
Offense Severity 0.0003 0.01735 22 47.41952 0.002
Upward Depart/Variance 0.57052 0.75532 22 76.18816 <0.001
Downward Depart/Variance 0.0278 0.16672 22 28.00957 0.175
     Level 1 0.34292 0.5856
     Level 2 0.15463 0.39324 22 311.9662 <0.001
Deviance= 3594.817997
Number of estimated parameters = 11
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.15 
 
Random Intercepts Model (Supervise Release Length) – District-Level Factors 
 
  
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.178009 0.044021
Court Size -0.01639 0.008417**
State w/mandatory min. 0.27573 0.093898**
Percent Republican -0.00809 0.005351
South 0.191631 0.171789
West 0.373547  0.162108 **
Midwest 0.04871 0.16684
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value
     Level 1 0.47702 0.69067
     Level 2 0.15343 0.3917 82 617.16 <0.001 
Deviance= 4023.308187  
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.16 
 
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level and District-Level 
Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.169091 0.042685
Number of Counts 0.065207  0.023125  **
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.009573 0.06751
Criminal History 0.069323  0.020611 ***
Offense Severity -0.00454 0.029461
Plea 0.24883 0.079091  ***
Detained 0.202326 0.034275 **
Upward Depart/Variance 0.103053 0.165379
Downward Depart/Variance -0.19643  0.042045  ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000789 0.000450  *
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.0034  0.001101 **
Fine 0.00 0.000002
White -0.07934  0.042393 *
Citizen 0.195087 0.078812 **
Dependents -0.0664  0.033780 **
Less than HS 0.131436  0.048418**
Some College -0.02477 0.036518
College Grad 0.106252 0.047428 **
Age > 50 0.013428 0.031747
State w/mandatory min. 0.178955 0.100544*
South 0.050419 0.130736
West 0.287358  0.128531 **
Midwest -0.04037 0.149012
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X2 p-value
     Level 1 0.36656 0.60544
     Level 2 0.14552 0.38147 84 742.77 <0.001 
Deviance=3648.449106
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.17 
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level and District-Level 
Factors with Random Coefficients (Offense Severity, Upward Depart/Variance and Downward 
Depart/Variance) 
 
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.163487 0.042511
Number of Counts 0.06496 0.022203 **
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.018295 0.059114
Criminal History 0.07824 0.019375 ***
Offense Severity -0.007876 0.026532
Plea 0.240138 0.076561**
Detained 0.206803 0.035140***
Upward Depart/Variance 0.112204 0.165773
Downward Depart/Variance -0.182936 0.039898 ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000828 0.000405**
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.003314 0.001083 **
Fine 0.00000 0.000002
White -0.075188 0.039011**
Citizen 0.225557 0.078533**
Dependents -0.057701 0.032997*
Less than HS 0.123432 0.047494**
Some College -0.018312 0.036413
College Grad 0.099643 0.046620**
Age > 50 0.014426 0.030414
State w/mandatory min. 0.142683 0.09193
South 0.056783 0.132012
West 0.198504 0.122265*
Midwest -0.054265 0.15147
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X2 p-value
Offense Severity 0.00031 0.01761 22 47.37891 0.002
Upward Depart/Variance 0.60706 0.77914 22 76.37784 <0.001
Downward Depart/Variance 0.02853 0.1689 22 28.21638 0.168
     Level 1 0.34249 0.58523
     Level 2 0.14438 0.37997 18 280.79 <0.001
Deviance=3599.173498
Number of estimated parameters = 11
p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.18 
Fully Specified Final Mixed Model 
 
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects b SE
Overall mean (intercept) 5.165338 0.042235***
Number of Counts 0.063736 0.021843 **
Sex Offender Enhancement 0.03456 0.058619
Criminal History 0.076964  0.019256 ***
Offense Severity -0.01961 0.027078
Plea 0.254613  0.078970 ***
Detained 0.209417 0.034519 ***
Upward Depart/Variance -0.01328 0.153134
Downward Depart/Variance -0.1825 0.040919 ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.000992  0.000411**
Number of Counts  Sq. -0.00318  0.001083 **
Fine 0.00000 0.000002
White -0.06703 0.041075*
Citizen 0.215621 0.080109**
Dependents -0.05612 0.033354*
Less than HS 0.122634 0.047791**
Some College -0.019 0.038355
College Grad 0.095717 0.046272**
Age > 50 0.019945 0.031781
State w/mandatory min. 0.166827 0.100051*
South 0.058606 0.13053
West 0.286706 0.125272**
Midwest -0.03561 0.146859
Offense severity * Caseload 0.002692 0.001474*
Offense severity*West -0.02473 0.014225*
Offense severity*Midwest -0.02793 0.008650**
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X2 p-value
     Level 1 0.34838 0.59024
     Level 2 0.14442 0.38002 19 297.31 <0.001
Offense Severity 0.00029 0.0169 14 44.15 <0.001
Upward depart/variance 0.70269 0.83826 14 52.43 <0.001
Deviance= 3699.001471 
Number of estimated parameters = 7
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.19 
 
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal 
Factors 
 
 
  
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio b SE Odds Ratio
Intercept -1.09001 0.174483 0.336214 -1.10071 0.176452 0.332637
 Number of Counts 0.292001 0.100211 1.339104 ** 0.30105 0.100647 1.351277 **
Sex Enhancement -0.04857 0.303718 0.952594 -0.02724 0.310984 0.973124
 Criminal History Score 0.236221 0.067703 1.266455 *** 0.237137 0.069837 1.26715 ***
Offense Severity -0.18765 0.125876 0.828904 -0.18186 0.124733 0.833717
 Plea 1.047625 0.3357  2.850874 ** 1.071597 0.345338  2.920039 **
Detained 0.64714 0.139089 1.91007*** 0.661879 0.144278 1.983431***
Upward depart/variance 0.416416 0.414755 1.516516 0.533225 0.409604 1.704421
Downward depart/variance -0.84979 0.174797 0.427506*** -0.84892 0.175341 0.427877***
 Offense Severity Sq. 0.00547 0.001962 1.005485** 0.005431 0.001942 1.005445**
Number of Counts Sq. -0.01487 0.005168 0.985240 ** -0.01548 0.005052 0.984635 **
Fine -2.3E-05 0.000014 0.999977 *
White -0.18749 0.174942 0.829042
Citizen 0.456467 0.315215 1.578488
Dependents -0.15369 0.139297 0.857541
Less than HS 0.191291 0.217469 1.210812
Some College -0.22524 0.159928 0.798324
College Grad 0.258616 0.217384 1.191989
Age > 50 0.375938 Model 1.456357**
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value
     Level 2 1.92127 1.3861 88 550.33 <0.001      Level 2 1.96792 1.40283 88 553.72 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.20 
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – District-Level 
 
 
  
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio
    Intercept -0.85553 0.128885 0.425058***
    State w/mandatory min. 0.693842 0.279242 2.00139**
    South 0.304935 0.39368 1.356537
    West 0.864391 0.426675 2.373561**
    Midwest 0.341851 0.46135 1.407551
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df x2 p-value
     Level 2 1.5807 1.0714 84 390.77 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.21 
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – Individual-Level and District-Level 
 
 
 
  
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio
    Intercept -1.110187 0.169329 0.329497 ***
    Number of Counts 0.307216 0.102768 1.359635  **
    Sex Enhancement -0.03560 0.314982 0.965024
    Criminal History Score 0.239456 0.070137 1.270557  ***
    Offense Severity -0.182759 0.125893 0.832969
    Plea 1.085541 0.347343 2.961043  **
    Detained 0.652361 0.143867 1.920069 ***
    Upward depart/variance 0.534923 0.409049 1.707316
    Downward depart/variance -0.841068 0.177751 0.431250 ***
    Offense Severity Sq. 0.005457 0.001962  1.005472 **
    Number of Counts Sq. -0.0158 0.005134  0.984339  **
    Fine -0.00003 0.000014  0.999975  *
White -0.18078 0.17386 0.834616
    Citizenship 0.450924 0.315524 1.569762
    Dependents -0.15971 0.139722 0.852394
    Less than HS 0.193024 0.218473 1.212911
    Some College -0.232507 0.161362 0.792544
    College Graduate 0.269642 0.220201 1.309496
    Age > 50 0.368442 0.130297  1.445481 **
    State w/mandatory min. 0.567482 0.373226 1.76382
    South 0.23436 0.505579 1.2641
    West 0.986079 0.510137 2.680704**
    Midwest 0.219051 0.571548 1.244895
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df x2 p-value
     Level 2 1.92956 1.38909 84 494.38 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.22 
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – Individual Level Legal Factors and Extralegal 
Factors 
 
  
  
Four-Category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate, long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio b SE Odds Ratio
 Intercept -1.13388 0.169423 0.321782 -1.13388 0.169423 0.321782
Number of Counts 0.243829 0.091892  1.276127  ** 0.249856 0.091968 1.283841  **
Sex Enhancement 0.187025 0.26793 1.205658 0.227554 0.269938 1.255525
Criminal History Score 0.275078 0.061006 1.316633  *** 0.265078 0.062614 1.303533  ***
Offense Severity -0.10724 0.085299 0.898312 -0.09853 0.086565 0.906166
Plea 0.863811 0.279916  2.372184  ** 0.891422 0.282482   2.438596  **
Detained 0.452034 0.099234  1.571506 *** 0.504841 0.100968  1.656722 ***
Upward depart/variance 0.878246 0.501014  2.406674 * 0.952345 0.498652  2.591781  *
Downward depart/variance -0.65726 0.138507 0.518270 *** -0.66562 0.139585  0.513957  ***
Offense Severity Sq. 0.004073 0.001362  1.004081 ** 0.003935 0.001375  1.003943  **
Number of Counts Sq. -0.01218 0.004285  0.987895  ** -0.01271 0.004291 0.987367   **
Fine 0.000009 0.000008 1.000009
White -0.25034 0.132167 0.778539**
Citizenship 0.631136 0.252194  1.879744 **
Dependents -0.22878 0.104596 0.795503**
Less than HS 0.23222 0.177117 1.261397
Some College -0.11331 0.112935 0.892871
College Grad 0.259648 0.14185 1.296474 *
Age > 50 0.120766 0.109498 1.128361
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df X 2 p-value
     Level 2 1.8391 1.35614 88 782.27 <0.001      Level 2 1.87154 1.36804 88 786.23 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.23 
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – District-Level Factors 
 
  
Four-category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate, long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio
    Intercept -0.945451 0.138856 0.388504***
    State w/mandatory min. 0.718897 0.282896 2.052169**
    South 0.264673 0.390874 1.303005
    West 0.987948 0.388078 2.685718**
    Midwest 0.038535 0.456363 1.039287
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df p-value
     Level 2 1.27977 1.13127 84 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.24 
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – Individual-Level and District-Level 
 
  
Four-category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate, long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
Fixed Effects b SE Odds Ratio
    Intercept -1.14670 0.158049 0.317684
    Number of Counts 0.251026 0.092425 1.285344   **
    Sex Enhancement 0.231912 0.271882 1.261009
    Criminal History 0.266511 0.062468  1.305402  ***
    Offense Severity -0.097896 0.086814 0.906743
    Plea 0.891659 0.28098 2.439172   **
    Detained 0.497248 0.100992  1.644190  ***
    Upward depart/variance 0.958763 0.491341  2.608467  *
    Downward depart/variance -0.65850 0.140195  0.517628  ***
    Offense Severity Sq. 0.003929 0.001378  1.003936 **
    Number of Counts Sq. -0.012737 0.004303  0.987344  **
     Fine 0.00001 0.000009 1.00001
    White -0.24039 0.131207  0.786318 *
    Citizenship 0.625814 0.252179 1.869768  **
    Dependents -0.22965 0.11461  0.794810 **
    Less than HS 0.23739 0.159021 1.267935
    Some College -0.11688 0.115757 0.889691
    College Grad 0.258137 0.15449  1.294516  *
    Age > 50 0.116192 0.108533 1.123212
    State w/mandatory min. 0.57815 0.343704  1.782738 *
    South 0.131562 0.434575 1.140608
    West 0.987897 0.400683  2.685581 **
    Midwest -0.234292 0.496885 0.791131
Random Effects Var.Comp. SD df x2 p-value
     Level 2 1.74167 1.31972 84 690.48 <0.001
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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Table 5.25 
Hypothesized Predictions of Individual-Level Legal, Extralegal, and District-level Effects 
(Supported or Not Supported) 
 
 
  
Table 6.1 Results for Theoretical Predictions of Individual-Level Legal, Extalegal, and District-level Effects 
Description of Hypotheses
Length Life/No life 4-Category 
1  Sentence length will vary significantly across courts. Yes N/A N/A
2 Legally relevant factors will explain the majority of variation in supervised release outcomes, but extralegal factors will also matter. Yes Yes Yes
3 The seriousness of the offense will moderate the effect of legal and extralegal variables such that these factors will have less of No N/A N/A
an effect when the offense of the charge is more serious.
4 The effects of individual-level sentencing factors will vary across courts. Yes No No
5 Above and beyond individual-level factors, district-level factors will have an effect on supervised release sentences. Yes Yes Yes
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Graph of Predicted Value of Supervised Release Length (unlogged) and Offense Severity 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Graph of Predicted Value 
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Graph of Predicted Probability of Lifetime Supervised Release and Offense Severity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Graph of Predicted Probability 
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Graph of Predicted Value Supervised Release Length (unlogged) and Number of Counts 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Graph of Predicted Value 
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Graph of Predicted Probability of Lifetime Supervised Release and Number of Counts 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Graph of Predicted Probability 
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship Between Number of Counts Squared and 
Supervised Release Length 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Graph of HLM Equation 
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship Between Offense Severity Squared and 
Lifetime Supervised Release 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Graph of HLM Equation 
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship between Number of Counts Squared and 
Lifetime Supervised Release 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Graph of HLM Equation 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I used multilevel modeling techniques to explore the effects of 
individual-level legal and extralegal factors, as well as district-level contextual factors on 
supervised release sentence length, the decision to impose life, and a four-category measure of 
the supervised release sentence. Generally, I found that supervised release sentences vary 
significantly across courts and that legal factors are the primary determinants of the supervised 
release sentence.  Extralegal factors play a role, but minimally.  I also found disparities in 
sentences based on the region of the district court. In this chapter, I systematically review and 
discuss my findings in the context of sentencing theory, the empirical sentencing literature, and 
moral panic.  
Variation of Supervised Release Sentence Lengths across Courts  
At the heart of this dissertation, and from which all the research questions arise, is the 
policy within the guidelines for lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.  
The policy covers all child pornography offenses enumerated under 18 U.S.C 3583(k) and 
explicitly applies to every offender convicted and sentenced in each of the 94 judicial districts.  
As much as Congress intended the lifetime policy to be a uniform outcome for all child 
pornography offenders, the results from the null model indicate supervised release sentences are 
not uniform. As a matter of fact, supervised release sentence length varies significantly across 
the 89 district courts included in the analyses. 
This finding it not surprising and is consistent with prior multilevel federal sentencing 
studies that find imprisonment length differs significantly across courts (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 
2005, Ulmer, Eisentein and Johnson, 2010). What is surprising though, is the magnitude of the 
variability across courts for supervised release length for child pornography offenses.  
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Comparatively speaking, the 27% cross-court variability found in this dissertation is 
considerably larger than the typical 3% to 6% found in multilevel studies examining 
imprisonment length for the average federal offender (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer, Eisentein and 
Johnson, 2010).  To gauge whether the large percent variability was due to the difference in 
outcome measure or perhaps a function of the offense of child pornography, I ran a null model 
for imprisonment length.  This model also showed a relatively large percent (18%) of cross-court 
variability.  The relatively large cross-court variability found in both the sentence of 
imprisonment and the sentence of supervised release seems to imply what legal scholars have 
long held – that there is judicial dissonance in the sentencing of child pornography offenders and 
a lack of congruence within the federal judiciary on how to sentence these individuals (Krohel, 
2011, Rigsby, 2010).  
Beyond the lack of consensus, there may also be other issues at play that account for this 
variability.  One possible explanation may lie in the court communities perspective.  The court 
communities perspective explains that variations in sentencing outcomes could be explained by 
the fact that each court community has its own case processing and sentencing norms.  Thus, in 
the case at hand, we have 89 different district courts that conceivably have 89 different norms or 
“going rates” in how they sentence child pornography offenders within the statutory supervised 
release range.  The descriptive statistics of the district courts found in Tables 5.5 through 5.10, 
allude to these “going rates.” 
Indeed, one of the most intriguing findings to discuss are the descriptive statistics of 
districts that almost always sentence to lifetime supervised release compared to districts that 
almost never sentence their cases to lifetime supervised release.  Take for example the Eastern 
District of Missouri (ED/MO).  According to the district descriptive statistics, ED/MO sentenced 
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nearly 90% of its cases in fiscal year 2012 to lifetime supervised release.  When delineated by 
offense type, ED/MO sentenced 100% of its production cases to lifetime supervised release, and 
86.1% of non-production cases to lifetime supervised release.  In general, the judges of ED/MO 
follow the policy in the federal guidelines for lifetime supervised release.71  In other words, the 
policy for lifetime supervised release is the “going rate” or “routine sentencing norm.”  Because 
of this, defense counsel in ED/MO rarely if ever, argue for a sentence other than lifetime 
supervised release. In other words, there exists in the ED/MO a “certainty” or expectation that 
the term of supervised release for all child pornography offenders is life.   
In striking contrast, some districts do not routinely sentence all child pornography 
offenders to lifetime supervised release.  Take for instance, the Middle District of Florida which 
has a slightly higher percentage of the total sample (3.7%) than Eastern Missouri (see Table 5.6).  
Florida Middle sentenced only 16.9% of its child pornography offenders to lifetime supervision, 
sentencing the majority of their cases to intermediate and long-term supervision (see Table 5.5).   
These statistics imply that the “norm” or “going rate” in Florida Middle are intermediate and 
long-term supervised release sentences.72 
 Indeed, the USSC in their 2012 report on child pornography offenses, confirm the 
existence of variation in sentencing outcomes across district courts explaining “differences 
primarily appear to be a function of local charging and sentencing practices and policies.” 
                                                          
71 As a former employee of the ED/MO court workgroup, this statement comes from six years of experience writing 
presentence reports for child pornography offenders and attending sentencing hearings of these cases.  It is the 
policy of the ED/MO to follow the policy statement in the guidelines and recommend lifetime supervised release for 
all child pornography offenders. 
72 On March 7, 2017, the author spoke with a Supervisory U.S. Probation Officer from the Middle District of Florida 
to discuss child pornography sentencing practices in Middle Florida.  The supervisor explained that from about 2007 
onward, at the direction of the court executive, they stopped recommending lifetime supervised release for all child 
pornography offenders, reserving the life recommendation for production cases or non-production cases with serious 
risk indicators (criminal history, prior hands on offense).  This was done because of limited resources of the U.S. 
Probation Office to supervise child pornography offenders for life. The supervisor indicated that most sentencing 
recommendations for non-production cases range between 10 to 15 years, depending on specifics of the case.  
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(p.237).   And while the USSC stipulates that variation in sentencing outcomes across district 
courts is a function of local court sentencing practices, they fail to offer a tangible district-level 
variable to account for this.  One possibility I surmise is “local court rules.”  Local court rules are 
a formal written set of rules that govern/describe case processing procedures for each individual 
court (“Current Rules of Practice and Procedure,” n.d).  Each district court has a copy of their 
local rules posted on their website.  By comparing local rules from one district court to the next, 
one can see the variations in case processing.  
One example of a “local court rule” that may account for variation in sentences is the 
format and content of presentence reports.  The standard presentence report format as approved 
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) include the following components: Face 
sheet; Part A: The Offense; Part B: The Defendant’s Criminal History; Part C: Offender 
Characteristics; Part D: Sentencing Options; Part E: Factors that May Warrant Departure; and 
Part F: Factors that May Warrant a Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline System (see 
Appendix B).  However, at the direction of individual courts, some presentence reports deviate 
from the standard format. For example, presentence reports in the Southern District of California 
adds a subsection in Part F called Probation Officer’s Analysis/Justification and Sentencing 
Recommendation.  In this subsection, the probation officer summarizes the case and makes a 
sentencing recommendation within the body of the presentence report.   
Slightly different from the Southern District of California are presentence reports in the 
District of Nevada.  The District of Nevada adds a “Part G” to their presentence reports.  “Part 
G” is a section called Sentence Justification wherein the probation office analyzes the case and 
provides a sentencing recommendation.  In another example, presentence reports in the Eastern 
District of New York do not have a “Part F,” concluding instead with “Part E.”  “Part E” is a 
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section called Mitigating and Aggravating Factors wherein any mitigating or aggravating factors 
are identified which may impact the final sentencing outcome.  In addition, presentence reports 
in Eastern New York deviate from the standard presentence report with a subsection in “Part C” 
called Family Ties, Responsibilities, and Community Ties.  The point of the preceding examples 
is to demonstrate district deviations from the standard presentence report approved by the AO.  
The inclusion or exclusion of content may contribute to sentencing variations across courts.       
Another explanation for the variation could be an external event that causes a district or 
districts to alter the way they sentence.  Consider for example the following headlines taken from 
a 2014 news article, “Renz Case had Drastic Impact on Handling of Syracuse Child Porn 
Cases” (O’Brien, 2014).  This article discusses a child pornography case in New York that 
turned deadly after David Renz, who was on pretrial bond supervision for a child pornography 
offense, dismantled his electronic global positioning system (GPS) ankle bracelet and raped a 
ten-year-old girl.  He also murdered her mother who had attempted to prevent the rape.73  The 
article discusses how this case did not specifically result in new national policy for pretrial 
detention for all child pornography offenders, but it did change the way prosecutors and judges 
in the Northern District of New York consider pretrial detention in these cases.  Specifically, the 
article highlighted that in the fourteen months before the Renz attacks, eight of twelve child 
pornography offenders in the Northern District of New York were released from jail to await 
trial.  But out of the ten child pornography defendants who could have been released at the time 
the article was written in 2014, only one defendant had been released.  The point of this example 
is that a sensational case could change the way a district court sentences.     
                                                          
73 The sexual assault and murder occurred in March 2013. 
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 While there is a great deal of variability across courts in supervised release sentences, the 
majority, 73%, is at the individual-level. I turn next to a discussion of the individual-level factors 
that influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders. 
Individual-Level Legal Factors 
An examination of the individual-level legal and extralegal factors that are related to the 
supervised release sentence indicate that the best predictors of supervised release sentence 
length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and the four-category ordinal measure 
of supervised release are legal factors.  These factors include number of counts, offense severity 
score, detention, pleading guilty, criminal history score, and downward departure/variance.  All 
these legal factors exerted significant effects in the expected direction across all models, except 
for plea.  In the next section, I separately discuss these significant predictors.  
Curvilinear effect – Number of Counts. 
The results indicate that the relationship between the number of counts of conviction and 
supervised release length is curvilinear.  Specifically, there is a positive relationship between the 
number of counts and sentence length until the number of counts hits a threshold of 11 counts 
(see Figure 5.5). Thereafter, sentence length decreases as the number of counts increases such 
that a person with 20 counts of child pornography has a shorter supervised release length than 
someone convicted of 10 counts.  As mentioned in earlier chapters, legal researchers contend that 
some judges believe that non-producers are less culpable than producers, so one explanation 
could be that those cases that had more than 15 counts were predominantly counts for non-
production offenses. For example, a judge may perceive a non-producer convicted of 25 counts 
of possession of child pornography less culpable than an offender convicted of production 
regardless of the number of counts of conviction.  This line of reasoning is supported by the data. 
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Specifically, I examined separate crosstabulations of the relationship between supervised release 
length and number of counts for non-production and production.  A visual inspection of the 
crosstabulation between supervised release length and production shows that offenders with at 
least 8 or more counts of conviction all received lifetime supervised release.74   A visual 
inspection of the crosstabulation of the relationship between supervised release length and non-
production showed that some cases with greater than 15 counts received shorter supervised 
release terms than some cases with less than 15 counts.75 When you compare both 
crosstabulations, non-producers with increasing counts of conviction after 15 counts had shorter 
supervised release sentences than comparable producers. 
Curvilinear effect – Offense Severity. 
Analyses also showed that there is a curvilinear or U-shaped relationship between offense 
severity and supervised release length (see Figure 5.1). Specifically, an offense severity score 
beginning with 16 has a slightly higher supervised release length than those offenders with 
offense severity scores of 17 through 23.  Those with offense severity scores of 17 through 23 
have a similar supervised release length.  After an offense score of 23, supervise release length 
increases steadily.  
The U-shaped relationship between offense severity and supervised release length may be 
explained by judges departing or varying downward from the advisory guideline range calculated 
(the offense level plus the criminal history score) in the presentence report.  To explain, before 
imposing the sentence, the court must first properly calculate and consider the guidelines and 
make a determination if the findings of the presentence report is adopted without change.  If 
                                                          
74 There were no offenders with greater than 21 counts of conviction. 
75 The greatest number of counts of conviction was 26 counts. 
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adopted without change, the offense score calculated in presentence report is the offense score 
used in determining the sentence.  Next, the court considers any departure options outlined in the 
federal sentencing guidelines, followed by consideration of factors in 18 USC 3553(a) for a 
variance.  If the court downward departs or varies, this is how one can have a higher offense 
severity score and receive a shorter sentence than someone with a lower offense score. 
In any event, the positive parabolic relationship between offense severity and supervised 
release sentence length does not come as a surprise.  Work by Kautt (2002) also revealed a U-
shaped relationship between offense severity score and sentence length.   
Detention. 
 Of all the legal factors included in this study, detention is the closest variable to 
mimicking the dynamics of supervised release.  This is because at its foundation, pretrial 
detention in the federal system assesses risk and focuses on issues of community safety.  In 
striking similarity, public safety and risk are the same types of considerations for the sentence of 
supervised release. Prior research shows that detention is associated with increased likelihood of 
receiving a prison sentence and longer sentences (Phillips, 2012; Williams, 2003).  In the present 
study, detention is associated increased supervised release length, a greater likelihood of being 
sentenced to lifetime supervised release, and a greater likelihood of being sentenced to a higher 
supervised release category. This is consistent with the focal concerns perspective, particularly as 
it relates to blameworthiness and protection of the public.  For instance, judges may perceive a 
child pornography offender on bond as less dangerous than a detained counterpart.  Williams 
(2003) notes that a person who is on bond can use their time to demonstrate to a judge that they 
are not a danger to the community (i.e., incurring no pretrial bond violations; compliant with 
bond conditions).  Likewise, a child pornography offender on bond has time to enter sex offender 
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treatment to further demonstrate to a judge that they are somehow less dangerous, something that 
a person who is detained is not able to do.  Williams (2003) maintains that it is this rationale that 
may lead a sentencing judge to think that a person who behaved well on bond may be a good 
candidate for less post-conviction supervised release.       
Plea. 
 While research typically finds that pleading guilty results in more lenient sentences, for 
child pornography offenders pleading guilty resulted in a longer term of supervised release as 
well as a higher probability of receiving lifetime supervised release and a greater likelihood of 
being sentenced to the higher supervised release category.  While this result is counterintuitive, it 
is possible this finding may also be explained by the focal concerns notion of blameworthiness. 
At the federal level, when the court accepts a guilty plea of a child pornography offender, the 
assistant U.S. Attorney describes the evidence that would have been presented if the case had 
proceeded to trial. The evidence includes graphic descriptions of the child pornographic images 
and/or videos. In addition, the defendant also must advise the judge in his or her own words what 
he or she did and describe the images he or she possessed, distributed, received, or produced. It 
is plausible that the graphic and heinous nature of the evidence coupled with the defendant 
admitting guilt and describing his or her offense conduct may magnify the defendant’s 
culpability in the eyes of the court. Another possibility could also be how the defendant admits 
his guilt.  For example, if a defendant minimizes the seriousness of the offense this could lead 
the judge to perceive that the offender is not accepting responsibility.  In contrast, in a trial, a 
defendant is not likely to admit guilt or take the stand, perhaps minimizing culpability. It is also 
possible that this finding is just noise due to the small number of cases that had trials.  
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 Another likely scenario is the role that the impact of the plea agreement may play.  For 
instance, child pornography offenses are unique in that the offense of possession of child 
pornography is a lesser included offense in distribution, transportation, receipt and production of 
child pornography.  So, in the case of someone charged with the more onerous offense of 
distribution of child pornography, the government could theoretically stipulate to the lesser 
included offense of possession of child pornography and plea away the more serious charge.  
Consider for example the following language taken from a plea agreement of an offender 
charged with possession and distribution of child pornography:  
“In exchange for the defendant’s plea of guilty to count one of the four-count indictment, which 
charges possession of child pornography, the government agrees to dismiss counts two through 
four, each charging distribution of child pornography at the time of sentencing.” 76 
Having considered the above example, there is a section in Part D of the presentence report 
called the Impact of Plea (see Appendix B), which highlights for the sentencing court, the range 
of punishment and the guideline sentence had the defendant been found guilty or pled guilty to 
all counts charged in the indictment.  This information can be used for consideration of the final 
sentence.  Per Section 1B1.4 of the federal sentencing guidelines – Information to be Used in 
Imposing Sentence, in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether 
a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any 
information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law. 
                                                          
76 Sample excerpt taken from a plea agreement of an offender convicted of possession of child pornography in the 
Eastern District of Missouri in 2009.   
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 The commentary of Section 1B1.4 of the federal sentencing guidelines more specifically 
lays out that a court is not precluded from considering information that the guidelines do not 
consider in determining a sentence within the guideline range or from considering that 
information in determining whether and to what extent to depart from the guidelines.  For 
example, if the defendant committed two robberies, but as part of a plea negotiation entered a 
guilty plea to one count, the robbery that was not taken into account by the guidelines would 
provide a reason for sentencing at the top of the guideline range and may provide a reason for an 
upward departure (2012 USSC Federal Guidelines Manual).  Accordingly, it may be that counts 
that are dismissed as part of plea agreement may speak to the ultimate culpability of the 
defendant and/or the dangerousness which may account for longer supervised release sentences 
or the likelihood of lifetime supervised release.  Unfortunately, we cannot test this theory 
because the USSC does not collect data on dismissed counts. 
 Criminal History. 
 My finding that a child pornography offender’s criminal history significantly and 
positively effects the supervised release sentence on all three derivations of the outcome is 
consistent with theory and prior research.  Consistently, sentencing research using both state and 
federal data has found criminal history to be a statistically significant predictor of sentence 
length and/or the decision to impose imprisonment.  The federal sentencing guidelines state that 
an offender’s past criminal conduct is directly relevant to the four purposes of sentencing: (1) 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) to protect 
the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
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effective manner.  The introductory commentary in Section 4A1.1 of the guidelines state that an 
offender with a prior criminal history is more culpable than a first-time offender and thus 
deserving of greater punishment.77     
While the four goals of sentencing described above appear to be for the sentence of 
imprisonment, these goals can also be extended to the sentence of supervised release.  Consider 
for example the purposes of sentencing as described in sentencing purpose #2 (to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct) and #3 (to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant).  Some judges may perceive that an offender with a lengthy criminal history having 
not been previously deterred by past punishment may be deterred under a long period of 
supervision especially, while under the supervision of the U.S. Probation Office.  Likewise, some 
judges may consider child pornography offenders with a lengthier criminal history, a threat to 
public safety thereby warranting an extended term of supervised release.  Or perhaps judges 
perceive those child pornography offenders with longer criminal histories as needing extended 
time on supervised release to provide necessary correctional and rehabilitative treatment.   
All the foregoing possibilities I use to explain why criminal history positively affects the 
sentence of supervised release point to the theoretical underpinnings of the focal concerns 
perspective, specifically blameworthiness and protection of the community.  Most of what judges 
know about the offenders they sentence comes from the presentence report.  At present, there is 
no section of the presentence report that includes information on future risk.78  Therefore, in the 
                                                          
77 The commentary indicates that the factors included in calculating the criminal history are consistent with the 
extant research assessing correlates of recidivism and patterns of career criminal behavior. 
78 The U.S. Probation Office utilizes risk tools including the Risk Prediction Index (RPI) and the Post-Conviction 
Risk Assessment (PCRA) to assess risk for those offenders under active supervision.  This information is not 
disclosed in the presentence report. 
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absence of full information on risk to assess dangerousness to the public, judges resort to what 
information they do have – the prior criminal history.   
 Downward Departure/Variance. 
Prior sentencing research has found that downward departures/variances are significantly 
related to sentencing outcomes such that those who receive a downward departure/variance have 
shorter sentence lengths than those who do not receive a downward departure/variance.  
Consistent with prior research on the effects of downward departures on sentence length, I found 
that downward departure/variance shortens supervised release length, decreases the odds of 
being sentenced to lifetime supervised release, and decreases the probability of being sentenced 
to a supervised release term in the higher supervised release category.  Kaiser and Spohn (2014) 
contend that as it relates specifically to the offense of child pornography, judges may be more 
likely to use downward departures to mitigate what they perceive as disproportionately severe 
sentences. Legal scholars argue that now that the guidelines area advisory in nature, the basis for 
many of these departures are extralegal factors such as family and community ties (Hamilton, 
2011; Krohel, 2011).  Conversely though, one of the main provisions of the Protect Act of 2003 
was to prevent judges from granting downward departures for child pornography offenders from 
the then-mandatory guidelines based on family and community ties.   
  In the case at hand, I surmise a downward departure/variance is indicative of offenders 
being less culpable.  In a similar vein, Kaiser and Spohn (2014) make note of departures being 
used for child pornography offenders labeled salvageable or sympathetic.  This notion of 
salvageability and less culpability is consistent with the focal concerns perspective of 
blameworthiness.  In other words, child pornography offenders granted downward 
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departure/variances may be deemed less dangerous or risky on the basis of extralegal factors that 
mitigate judicial perceptions of dangerousness such as family ties.  My findings suggest that 
those with the benefit of a downward departure/variance were perceived as less dangerous, 
thereby sentenced to shorter supervised release terms. 
Effects of Individual-level Factors Across Districts 
 In the model for supervised release length, I found that the effects for offense severity 
score, offense severity score squared, upward departure/variance, and downward 
departure/variance differed across district courts (see Table 5.13 – Models 1 though 4).  This 
finding is consistent with other sentencing studies that found the effects of individual-level 
factors vary by district court (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 2006). This suggests that judicial officers in 
different districts weigh the importance of some individual-level legal factors differently.  
Johnson, Ulmer and Kramer (2008) explain this is because the focal concerns of courts vary 
because they are embedded in local court communities’ organizational and cultural milieus. 
One explanation to account for why the effect of offense severity differed across courts 
could be that some courts consider all relevant conduct when calculating the offense severity 
score.  As noted in Section 1B1.3 in the federal sentencing guidelines, relevant conduct refers to 
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully caused by the defendant.  This means that courts can consider all relevant conduct in 
establishing the offense severity score regardless of how the score is calculated in the plea 
agreement.  Thus, in some districts, courts accept and agree with the offense severity score 
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calculated in the plea agreement.  On the other hand, some courts independently calculate the 
offense severity score and include relevant conduct in their calculations.79  
 Another explanation for the effect of offense severity differing across courts could be due 
to variation in how the offense conduct is investigated in the presentence report (Bowman, 
1996).  As shown in Appendix B, there is a section in the presentence report called the “Offense 
Conduct.”  This section includes all pertinent information regarding the offense as established by 
the probation officer’s investigation.  In some districts, probation officers conduct independent 
investigations, even interviewing witnesses (i.e., case agent, victims) and examining evidence or 
laboratory reports.  In other districts, probation officers rely solely on the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
version of the offense conduct, even using the government’s written version of the offense from 
the plea agreement directly into the “Offense Conduct” section of the presentence report.  These 
types of differences in the offense conduct sections of presentence reports could directly impact 
judicial findings of some chapter two, three, and four enhancements or deductions in calculating 
the total offense severity score.    
The varying effects of upward and downward departure/variances may have a different 
explanation.  There are sections in Part F of the presentence report called “Factors That May 
Warrant Departure” and “Factors that May Warrant a Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline 
System” (see Appendix B) wherein the probation office is to identify and include factors for 
consideration for an upward departure/variance or downward departure/variance. The degree to 
which a probation office investigates opportunities for courts to vary/depart upward or 
downward is likely to differ from one district court to the next.  For example, since 
                                                          
79 In my tenure with the United States Probation system and my position as a Supervising U.S. Probation Officer, I 
have reviewed many presentence reports from different districts and have observed calculations consistent with the 
plea agreement as well as calculations based upon the independent calculations of the court. 
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approximately 2006 or 2007, it has been the practice of the presentence unit in Eastern Missouri 
to make concerted efforts to identify potential factors for downward departures/variances.80  This 
is because judges in Eastern Missouri grew weary of the probation office seemingly only able to 
identify factors to vary/depart upward.  At the behest of the then Chief Judge, the probation 
office was directed to identify and provide more ways in which the court could depart/vary 
downward.  Although this may be true in practice in Eastern Missouri, a different occurrence 
may be the case elsewhere.  Meaning, the emphasis or de-emphasis of certain factors could yield 
varying effects of these factors across courts.  Theoretically speaking, this is consistent with 
Johnson et al.’s (2008) notion that focal concerns vary across courts because they are embedded 
in the local court communities organizational and cultural milieus.  In similar fashion, my 
findings follow the tradition of the court communities perspective.  In the example given, Eastern 
Missouri appears to have its own presentencing norms afforded via “local court rules” such as 
the inclusion of certain information in the presentence report that may or may not be operating in 
other districts which may produce variation in sentencing outcomes. 
Summary of Individual-Level Legal Factors 
To summarize, all the individual-level legal factors except the variable for the 
enhancement for having a prior sex offense, demonstrated direct meaningful effects on all three 
outcome measures of the supervised release sentence, and the effects of some of these factors 
varied across courts.  In line with expectations, a series of extralegal factors also influenced 
supervised release sentences and are discussed next. 
 
                                                          
80 During approximately 2006 and 2007, the author was a Senior U.S. Probation Officer assigned to the presentence 
unit in the Eastern District of Missouri wherein the district court’s desire for the identification of downward 
departures/variances in the presentence reports was disseminated to the probation office as policy.  
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Individual-level Extralegal Effects 
While legal factors have been shown to be the primary determinants of supervised release 
sentences, extralegal factors, although minimally have also been shown to effect supervised 
release sentencing outcomes.  Before beginning the discussion of the results of extralegal factors, 
it is important to reference and address the sentencing guidelines and the policy statements 
contained therein relative to offender characteristics.  This is because the guidelines provide 
specific guidance for the consideration or relevance of these characteristics for child 
pornography offenders.  For instance, Section 5K2.22 (Specific Offender Characteristics as 
Grounds for Downward Departure in Child Crimes and Sexual Offenses) provides a policy 
statement for specific offender characteristics that, while not ordinarily relevant, may be 
considered for a downward departure for child pornography offenders under the appropriate 
mitigating circumstances.  Section 5K2.22 of the guidelines is recreated here and specifically 
states:   
In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section 
1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 110, 117 of tile 18, 
United States Code: 
(1) Age may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted by 
Section 5H1.1. 
(2) An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward only if 
and to the extent permitted in Section 5H1.4. 
(3) Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse is not a reason to depart. 
 
For a court to use either age or physical impairment as a basis for a departure, the 
guidelines require the following criteria be met: (1) affirmatively and specifically identified; and 
(2) the mitigating circumstances forming the basis for the departure must be of a kind or degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC.  
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As a precursor to Section 5K2.22, Section 5K2.0 notes that the standard for a departure 
for a child pornography offender differs from the standard for other departures in that it includes 
a requirement that any mitigating circumstance that forms the basis for such a departure be 
affirmatively and specifically identified as a ground for a departure in Chapter 5, Part K.   Age 
and physical impairment are the only offender characteristics that have been affirmatively 
identified as a ground for departure in Chapter 5, Part K. 
Notwithstanding the guidance in 5K2.22, the Protect Act of 2003 further constrains 
judicial discretion by specifying that judges are not to depart based on family or community ties.  
In spite of Section 5K2.22 and the statutory prohibition of consideration of family or community 
ties, this dissertation identified several extralegal factors including citizenship, race, education, 
and family ties (dependents) that effect supervised release sentencing outcomes and are 
discussed next. 
Citizenship.  
The findings indicate that U.S. citizenship is significantly related to supervised release 
length and the likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category.  While most 
prior research on citizenship find that non-citizens are punished more harshly, it makes intuitive 
sense for non-citizen child pornography offenders to receive more leniently supervised release 
sentences. Generally, non-citizen offenders are deported after service of the sentence of 
imprisonment.  After deportation of the offender, the supervised release term is active, but the 
offender is not being supervised.81   Instead, the case is assigned to a specialized caseload where 
it is monitored for any violations of the conditions of supervised release (i.e., illegal reentry into 
                                                          
81 Upon service of the sentence of imprisonment, deportable aliens are deported and the term of supervised release 
begins and is active.  The supervised release term is active in the event that the deported alien returns illegally into 
the U.S.  The active supervised release sentence allows the U.S. Probation Office to issue a supervised release 
warrant in the event the offender returns to the U.S. 
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the U.S.) until the term of supervised release expires.  Therefore, it would be counterproductive 
and not a good use of probation office resources to sentence non-citizen offenders to lengthy 
periods of supervised release given these factors.   
Application Note 5 of Section 5D1.1 in the federal guidelines manual indicate that in the 
case of a deportable alien, if a term of supervised release is not required by statute, then the 
Court should not ordinarily impose a term of supervised release (2012 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual).  It is plausible that judges may extend this reasoning to non-citizens 
convicted of child pornography.  The only difference is that in the case of child pornography 
offenders, judges are mandated by statute to issue a supervised release term.  It follows then, that 
judges impose more lenient supervised release sentences because ordinarily they would not have 
to impose a supervised release term on a non-citizen, but must because of statute. 
Again, these findings appear to support the focal concerns perspective – practical 
constraints and consequences.  This concern refers to the impact that sentencing decisions have 
on the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the individual defendants and their 
families and communities.  Organizational concerns include efficiency, flow of cases, 
overcrowding of correctional organizations and maintaining positive working relationships 
among courtroom actors (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Accordingly, judges may be considering 
the resources of the U.S. Probation Office and the possible misuse of resources to monitor these 
cases for any extended period of time.  
Race. 
According to Section 5H1.10 of the federal sentencing guidelines, race along with sex, 
national origin, religion, and socioeconomic status are not relevant in determination of the 
sentence.  In fact, these considerations are expressly prohibited.  The findings indicate that white 
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child pornography offenders receive supervised release sentences that are 8.2% shorter than non-
whites and non-whites 1.3 times more likely to be sentenced to the higher supervised release 
category than whites.  This finding, which is consistent with research on race and sentencing that 
finds non-whites are sentenced more harshly (Albonetti, 1997; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Everett 
& Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Mustard, 2001), is somewhat unexpected because non-whites make up a 
relatively small percentage of those convicted of child pornography offenses.  Indeed, the 
average child pornography offender is a white male.   
One explanation for this finding could be the general criminal stereotypes of non-whites 
as more dangerous and culpable (Barkan & Cohn, 2005; Beim & Fine, 2007).  More specifically 
and in accordance with the Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution and the 
focal concerns perspective, judges’ assessments of dangerousness and protection of the 
community from child pornography offenders may be influenced by racial stereotypes.  Both 
these perspectives predict that some judges perceive non-whites as particularly dangerous and 
lacking much potential for rehabilitation compared to other offenders.  Stated differently, non-
white child pornography offenders may appear more dangerous, more crime prone, and more 
likely to recidivate based on negative stereotypes attached to non-whites.  Judges may be using 
race as a proxy for culpability and recidivism. 
Nonetheless, my findings contradicts work by Kaiser and Spohn (2014), the only 
published federal study that specifically examines the offense of child pornography.  Their study 
found that race was not significantly related to the likelihood that a person convicted of a child 
pornography charge receives a downward departure.  Likewise, my finding on race is also 
contradictory with research by Patrick and Marsh (2011) who found that race does not affect the 
sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex offenders (not specifically child pornography 
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offenders).  The differences in race findings between the current dissertation and work by Kaiser 
and Spohn (2014) and Patrick and Marsh (2011) could be a function of the difference in the 
outcome variable.  Nonetheless, race is a prohibited consideration in determining the sentence.  
This finding that race matters in supervised release sentences appears to be an unwarranted 
sentencing disparity.   
Education.   
The results of this dissertation provide evidence that educational attainment (i.e., college 
graduate) or lack thereof (i.e., less than high school education), has a direct, though limited effect 
on supervised release sentence length.  Specifically, offenders with less than a high school 
education received a 13.6% increase in months of supervised release, controlling for all other 
variables in the model.  Surprisingly, those offenders with a college degree in comparison to 
those without a high school diploma face an 11.2% increase in months of supervised release.  
According to the federal sentencing guidelines, educational and vocational skills are not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted.  
However, the guidelines add that education and vocational skills might be relevant in 
determining the conditions of probation or supervised release for rehabilitative purposes or 
public protection by restricting activities that allow for the utilization of a certain skill, or in 
determining the appropriate type of community service (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual).  My 
hypothesis that those with less education would be subject to longer supervised release terms was 
supported by the analyses.  This finding was also consistent with some of the extant sentencing 
literature that finds offenders who are poorly educated are sanctioned more harshly (Clarke & 
Koch, 1976; Kruttschnitt, 1980/1981; Mustard, 2001).  Perhaps judges view poorly educated 
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child pornography offenders as more culpable, more likely to recidivate and less amenable to 
rehabilitation.   
However, contrary to my hypothesis and unlike previous research that finds offenders 
with college degrees receive shorter sentences (Albonetti, 1997), I find that a college education is 
not a buffer or protective factor for leniency.  This finding is also unexpected as several studies 
find offenders who have completed a higher level of education are less likely to recidivate once 
they return to the community (Huebner, DeJong & Cobbina, 2010; Bellair & Kowalski, 2011).   
This unexpected finding may have to do with the nature of this offense and its tie to 
educated offenders. The average federal offender has less than a high school education. But as 
shown in the descriptive statistics of this dissertation, only 9.2% of child pornography offenders 
had less than a high school education and 17.9% were college graduates.  It may follow then that 
persons holding a college degree may be more likely to hold positions of public trust (i.e., 
teacher, physician).  Thus, child pornography offenders who hold positions of public trust may 
be deemed more culpable, perhaps due to a sentiment of betrayal or broken trust.  This is because 
public trust positions are characterized by professional or managerial discretion and such persons 
ordinarily are subject to less supervision than those whose responsibilities are non-discretionary 
in nature (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual).  Per the policy statement in the guidelines manual, 
“such persons generally are viewed as more culpable.” (p.345). So, it seems offenders with 
higher levels of education are viewed as risky since they possess skills and aptitude to conceal 
their crimes.82  This notion too, is consistent with focal concerns, but in the opposite direction of 
                                                          
82 My semi-formal interview conducted with an active U.S. District judge for the Eastern District of Missouri 
supported this notion.  The judge advised he views many child pornography offenders like “white collar” offenders 
in terms of sophistication and cleverness.  He added that due to the level of sophistication required of this crime (i.e., 
computer use), those with college degrees are less sympathetic. 
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my hypothesis.  It seems court actors are concerned with potential dangerousness of educated 
offenders because they may be stereotyped as calculating or sophisticated.  I surmise that in 
addition to factors typically linked to perceptions of dangerousness such as race, ethnicity, age, 
gender, and detention status, educational status may also be linked to dangerousness.   
A different pattern emerged for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release and the 
four-category ordinal measure of the supervised release sentence.  In these models, education has 
no influence on the decision to impose life or the likelihood of being sentenced to a higher 
supervised release category.83  Since my education finding was not robust across all derivations 
of the dependent variable, this may need to be replicated.  My finding for the relationship 
between education and length of supervised release conflicts with work by Kaiser and Spohn 
(2014), who find that education was not related to the likelihood of downward departures.  My 
findings also contradict with research on sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex offenders 
by Patrick and Marsh (2011), who found a null effect for education. 
Family Ties (Dependents). 
Pursuant to Section 5H1.6 (Family Ties and Responsibility) in the federal sentencing 
guidelines, in sentencing an offender convicted of an offense involving a minor victim, family 
ties are not relevant in determining whether a sentence should be below the applicable guideline 
range (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual).  In addition, the Protect Act of 2003 prohibits the 
consideration of family ties for child pornography offenders.  Despite these explicit statements in 
the guidelines and the Protect Act of 2003, family ties appear to permeate judicial decision-
making.  Specifically, I found that those offenders with dependents received supervised release 
                                                          
83 Having a college degree was a significant predictor at alpha level p=.09 level.  Offenders with college degrees 
were just over one time more likely (OR=1.29) than high school graduates to be sentenced to a higher supervised 
release category. 
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terms that were 6.6% shorter than those without dependents.  Likewise, I found that offenders 
without children are 1.25 times more likely to be sentenced to a higher supervised release 
category.     
Indeed, family ties appears to have an insulating effect for sentence severity.  For 
example, in Hamilton’s (2011) review of judges’ consideration of family ties before they 
imposed below guideline sentences, she quoted one judge as saying: “From my experience, most 
of these men have no prior criminal history.  They usually have healthy family lives and 
productive careers” (p.561-562).  She quoted another judge who stated: “Aside from this offense, 
the defendant has led a law-abiding life, and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout, 
he raised a good family and has been a mainstay in his community” (p.562).  The line of 
reasoning displayed in these two examples appear to align with the focal concerns notion of 
practical constraints and consequences, which is based on the idea that judges consider how 
sentencing decisions impact the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the 
individual offender and their families and communities.  Judges may be concerned that a 
lengthier term of supervised release may interfere with family ties and may blemish or intrude 
upon the offender’s family life.  Indeed, long-term or lifelong supervised release may have 
collateral consequences for families – that is, a family may suffer embarrassment from having a 
probation officer in the home twice monthly.  This in turn, could lead to emotional costs, such 
that the family cannot move forward.  In short, perhaps judges are concerned with the collateral 
consequences to the family and consider shorter supervised release terms as less traumatic or 
intrusive.   
 On the other hand, judges may also consider the focal concern of blameworthiness when 
considering family ties.  Blameworthiness refers to the culpability of the offender.  If we 
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consider blameworthiness in view of the results, perhaps judges believe that offenders with 
dependents are less dangerous or are more likely to be deterred.  In other words, judges may find 
that family ties serve as informal social control to mitigate future risk of the offender.  Likewise, 
those without dependents may be perceived as riskier (i.e., sitting at home alone and tempted to 
view child pornography) in that they lack a built-in mechanism of informal social control.  Ulmer 
et al. (2010) echoed this sentiment indicating dependents might reduce defendants’ perceived 
threat.  Regardless, family ties are expressly prohibited for child pornography offenders by 
statute (see Table 2.1 – Protect Act of 2003) and the guidelines.  The fact that family ties matters 
in supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders appears to be an unwarranted 
sentencing disparity. 
Age. 
Unlike the previous extralegal variables discussed thus far, age was not a significant 
predictor for supervised release length or the four-category measure of supervised release, but it 
was for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. It is possible that this finding 
represents noise in the data since it was not observed with all specification of the dependent 
variable.  In addition, the results are contradictory to findings in recent sentencing literature, 
which finds that those offenders who are younger are more likely than those who are older to be 
punished more harshly.  One might suggest that the effect of age may be influenced by the 
criminal history of the older offender being greater than that of a younger offender (the older 
offender having had more time to offend than a younger offender).  While this seems plausible, I 
suspect that criminal history has little to no bearing on the effect of age.84  Instead, I surmise that 
it is based on the focal concerns notion of protection of the community.  Protection of the 
                                                          
84 The effect of age remained significant using the alternate measure of criminal history (criminal history points) 
provided in the dataset. 
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community draws on similar attributions as blameworthiness but is distinct in that it focuses on 
the need to incapacitate or control the offender or to deter would-be offenders (Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998).  This also includes assessments about dangerousness or recidivism.  Predictions about 
dangerousness and risk of recidivism are based on attributions predicated on the nature of the 
offense, case information, criminal history, and demographic characteristics of the offender such 
as employment, education, age or family history (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  For example, 
Kimball (2011) reviewed a sentencing opinion where the judge cited the defendant’s youthful 
age and immaturity as reason for a downward variance [see U.S. v Polito (2007)].  This 
justification for a downward variance based on youthfulness suggests that younger offenders 
may be perceived as “getting caught up” in child pornography based on their immaturity or that 
their entanglement may have more innocent origins.85  It has also been suggested that those who 
are youthful or young, do not understand the magnitude of the crime they committed.  In other 
words, younger offenders fail to appreciate the harm that viewing child pornography inflicts 
upon the victims.  Indeed, in U.S. v Polito, the court in justifying a below guideline sentence said 
Polito “was only 18” at the time of the offense.   
The flip side of this argument may be the perception that older and mature offenders 
“know better.”  That is, someone age sixty may be less likely to be perceived as accidently 
“getting caught up” and their entanglement in child pornography may have less than innocent 
origins.  In other words, “ignorance of the law” may be a tougher argument to believe for older 
offenders. 
                                                          
85 A news article highlighted nineteen year old Neil Geckle who was charged with child pornography offenses after 
he downloaded photos of high school girls he “friended” from Facebook then took pictures of his penis next to the 
photos.  He then uploaded the defiled photos to the victims’ Facebook pages.  When confronted with the charges the 
nineteen year old pleaded ignorance, telling police he “didn’t think it was a big deal.” (Moraff, 2012). 
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The notion that older age may be viewed as a greater threat may also be due to the age 
discrepancy between older offenders and the depicted minors.  According to the USSC 
Sourcebook 2010, virtually all child pornography offenders (96.3%) possessed images of minors 
who were prepubescent or under the age of twelve.  The idea of an offender over age 50 
receiving sexual gratification from images depicting the sexual assault of children under the age 
of twelve including infants and toddlers, may be unsettling for judges.  Another possible 
rationale for this finding is that the average age of child pornography offenders sentenced in 
fiscal year 2012 was age 41.41.  If judges on average are seeing this age offender in the court 
room, then it may play in their focal concerns that older child pornography offenders may be at 
more risk to re-offend.  
Fine. 
Of all the extralegal factors included in this dissertation, fine was the only variable that 
was not statistically significant in predicting supervised release length, the decision to impose 
lifetime supervised release, and/or the four-category ordinal measure of supervised release.  It is 
possible that there was no effect because this variable is not a good indicator of socioeconomic 
status.  Better measures of socioeconomic status include income or employment status. 
Information for both these factors are included in the presentence reports.  However, the USSC 
does not collect data on these measures so there is no way to examine this with these data 
without access to the presentence reports. 
Non-production vs. Production 
One of the inquiries of this dissertation was whether the effects of individual-level legal 
and extralegal factors differed by offense type.  As mentioned in Chapter Four, I had to use 
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offense severity score as my indicator of offense type due to the high correlation between offense 
type and offense severity.  Data analysis revealed that none of the effects of legal and extralegal 
factors differed by offense seriousness.  But descriptive statistics do show that production 
offenses, which by statute are more serious than non-production cases, on average receive 
harsher supervised release sentences, 332.79 months compared to 229 months for non-producers, 
a difference of 103.79 months or 8.53 years.  Likewise, a low end of 36 months supervised 
release was imposed for producers compared to 12 months for non-producers.  More than half 
(57.4%) of the sample was sentenced to the most severe term (life) in contrast to 29.7% of non-
producers who were sentenced to the most severe term.  These statistics seems to support what 
legal scholars have argued, that judges consider producers more culpable than non-producers.    
District-level Effects 
When legal, extralegal factors, and district-level contextual factors are added to the 
supervised release length model, these factors explain 18.8% of district-level variation.  Many of 
the theoretically relevant district-level factors did not have a discernable direct effect on 
supervised release sentence length, decision to impose lifetime supervised release, or the four-
category ordinal measure of supervised release in my full hierarchical models.  According to Wu 
and D’Angelo (2014), this is not unusual.  They point out that few multilevel federal sentencing 
studies find significant contextual factors or contextual effects that are strong in magnitude [see 
for example, Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer (2008) and Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011)].  Even in 
their own study, Wu and D’Angelo (2014) did not find any of their district-level contextual 
variables to be significant. 
  Notwithstanding the above, I did find two district-level contextual factors that were 
significantly related to supervised release sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime 
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supervised release and the four-category ordinal measure of supervised release – region (west) 
and mandatory minimum state-level penalty for the charge of possession of child pornography.  I 
begin my discussion of these variables first, followed by a discussion of the null district-level 
findings. 
Region. 
Results indicate that supervised release length varies across regions and more 
specifically, cases sentenced in the West versus the East received longer sentences (using a 
continuous and ordinal outcome) and were more likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised 
release. This finding that region influences sentencing outcomes is consistent with prior research; 
however, most work finds harsher sentences in the southern region of the country (Chiricos and 
Crawford, 1995).  Out of the seventeen district courts situated in the West, seven districts 
sentenced greater than 50% of cases to lifetime supervised release.86  It is possible that districts 
like Arizona and Nevada are driving these numbers: Arizona has the one of the highest child 
pornography caseloads in the federal system (DSS Report, Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, 2014).  Arizona sentenced 81.3% of its cases to lifetime supervised release (see Table 
5.9).  When Arizona’s child pornography cases are delineated by offense type (see Tables 5.14 
and 5.19), 80% of non-production cases are sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 100% of 
production cases are sentenced to lifetime supervised release.  These figures seem to suggest the 
sentence of lifetime supervised release is a “norm” or “going rate” in Arizona.  Similarly, the 
District of Nevada sentenced 75% of its cases to lifetime supervised (see Table 5.9).  Supervised 
release sentences in Nevada delineated by offense type mimicked Arizona, with 74.5% of non-
                                                          
86 The seventeen western districts include: Washington East, Washington West, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, 
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Oregon, California Central, California East, California North, California 
South, Alaska, and Hawaii.  The seven districts that sentenced over 50% of cases to lifetime supervised release 
include: Arizona, California Central, Nevada, Oregon, Washington East, Washington West, Colorado. 
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production cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 100% of production cases 
sentenced to lifetime supervised release.   
In contrast, out of fourteen district courts situated in the East, three districts did not 
sentence any of its cases to lifetime supervised release.87  In fact, only one district in the East 
(New Hampshire) sentenced more than 50% of its cases to lifetime supervised release. These 
figures suggest sentences other than lifetime supervised release are the norms in the East.  The 
only obvious difference between district courts situated in the East and district courts situated in 
the West is that eastern districts comprise the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd circuits, while the western districts 
comprise the 9th and 10th circuits.   Notwithstanding the difference in circuits, both the eastern 
and western districts were situated in circuits that allow policy disagreements for non-production 
offenses based upon the legal argument in Kimbrough.   
Looking beyond the data for an explanation, another possibility for regional differences 
between western and eastern districts may be the surrounding social environment with respect to 
funding and investigations of child exploitation offenses.  For example, each district court is 
located within a state that has an Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force (see Table 
6.1).  ICAC is tasked primarily with the investigation of child pornography offenses (U.S. 
Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress).  As shown in Table 6.1, the amount of 
funding for each ICAC task force varies across the states. In examining Table 6.1, in fiscal year 
2012, western states received in excess of 5.1 million dollars in funding, in contrast to eastern 
states that received approximately 2.1 million dollars.  It may be possible that judges in western 
districts are influenced by the amount of funding committed to the child exploitation crimes. In 
                                                          
87 The three districts that did not sentence any cases to lifetime supervised release include Maine, Massachusetts, 
and New York South.   
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other words, the court communities perspective which views courts as distinctive social worlds 
says that outlying conditions such as the current example, may influence courts and that these 
factors may exert differential influence (Ulmer, 1997). 
Table 6.1 about here 
Similarly, recent prioritization by the U.S. Department of Justice of child exploitation in 
Indian reservations (U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress) may also be a 
reason for longer sentences in the West.  Specifically, in 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice 
created the Indian Country Initiative, declaring the investigation and prosecution of child 
exploitation in Indian reservations a top priority.  A map of Indian territories shows Western 
districts having greater number of Indian territories than those in the East (see Figure 6.1).  
Drawing again from the court communities perspective, perhaps judges in Western districts are 
influenced by the surrounding prioritization of child sex exploitation offenses, such that it 
permeates their sentencing decisions and results in longer sentences.   
Figure 6.1 about here 
Mandatory Minimum State-Level Penalty. 
Mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography was also a 
significant district-level predictor of supervised release sentences of child pornography 
offenders.  It appears district courts may be cognizant of state court sentencing practices, 
particularly in the state in which the district court is located.  According to Lopez, Allenbaugh, 
and Ellis (2012), district courts are not precluded from considering state sentencing practices [see 
U.S. v. Ringgold, (2009)].  Thus, it seems plausible that a district court may be aware of the state 
penalties for child pornography and may be influenced by any mandatory minimum penalties for 
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possession of child pornography as it may speak to how serious this crime is considered in the 
state legislature.  Indeed, the court communities and social worlds perspectives says that outlying 
conditions may influence courts such as state penalties for the same type of crime and that these 
factors may exert differential influence (Nardulli, Eisentein, & Fleming, 1988; Ulmer, 1997). 
Null District-level Findings 
  Like other multilevel sentencing studies, many of my district-level contextual factors 
failed to be statistically significant in predicting supervised release sentences of child 
pornography offenders.  In this section, I try to explain why this may be the case and start with 
guidelines compliance rate.  Contrary to the statistical significance of guideline compliance rates 
found by Kautt (2002), this district-level factor did not influence supervised release sentencing 
outcomes.  This may be because the supervised release sentence is less likely to be impacted by 
the federal guidelines because there are no enhancements or adjustments upward or downward 
for the supervised release sentence other than the policy recommendation for lifetime supervised 
release. Because of this, perhaps judges are less likely to consider them.  Or perhaps as legal 
scholars have pointed out, some judges believe the child pornography guidelines in and of 
themselves are too harsh and/or congressionally manipulated and not subject to deference.    
Political context also has no influence on supervised release sentencing outcomes, which 
is consistent with many multilevel studies (Fearn 2005; Johnson 2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004; 
Weidner, Frase, and Schultz 2005).  It was hypothesized that districts situated within a state  
characterized as Republican based on the percent of people that voted Republican in the 2012 
presidential election would be more punitive and more likely to sentence more severely.  While 
empirical findings on the link between punishment and political context have been mixed, my 
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work falls alongside other researchers who found no effect for political context and sentencing 
outcomes.  Ulmer and Johnson (2004) argue the null findings regarding the direct effect of 
percent Republican could indicate that a district’s political context has very little to do with 
sentencing, once you control for other significant sentencing predictors.  Indeed, it is possible 
that district judges, who are appointed for life pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not 
feel pressure from political influences.  In addition, percent Republican may be too crude a 
measure to capture political influence or it could be a lack of a real difference between 
Republicans and Democrats regarding their stance on criminal justice issues, particularly sex 
offenses (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).   
In similar fashion, child pornography caseload rate did not have an effect on supervised 
release sentencing outcomes.  Initially, I hypothesized that districts with larger child 
pornography caseloads would sentence more severely based upon the social/group threat 
perspective.  According to the social/group threat perspective, as a subordinate group increases 
in size, the dominant group will feel threatened and, in turn, use methods of social control to 
maintain their superior status.  The child pornography caseload rate, however, was not related to 
supervised release outcomes, suggesting that judges do not feel threatened by increasing child 
pornography populations.   
Finally, the Kimbrough-based policy disagreement did not influence supervised release 
sentence length above and beyond the effects of legal and extralegal factors.  Recall from 
Kimbrough that the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a sentencing judge’s policy 
disagreement with the crack cocaine guidelines was permissible to impose a below-guideline 
sentence.  The Supreme Court upheld a district court’s decision to sentence below the guideline 
range for crack cocaine offenses based upon a policy disagreement with the crack cocaine 
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guideline.  Legal scholars argue that an increasing number of courts rely on Kimbrough when 
sentencing child pornography offenders below the recommended guideline range (Basbaum, 
2010; Hamilton, 2014).  Based upon the apparent disconnect between the Congressional policy 
for lifetime supervised release and the actual sentences imposed, I hypothesized that if some 
districts apply the rationale in Kimbrough to categorically reject child pornography guidelines 
because of a policy disagreement that they may also apply Kimbrough to reject the policy for 
lifetime supervised release.  But the data did not support this finding using the Kimbrough 
decision as a predictor of supervised release.  Perhaps the application of the rationale in 
Kimbrough does not carry over to the sentence of supervised release.  
As just described, many of my district-level contextual measures did not impact the 
supervised release sentence.  This could be attributed to the difference in outcome measures – 
supervised release as opposed to the sentence of imprisonment.  But a more plausible possibility 
may be an omitted district-level factor(s). Additional theorizing leads me to hypothesize that 
“local court rules” discussed earlier in this chapter, may be the missing district-level variable.  
As alluded earlier, differences of local rules and practices by district courts may include the 
presentence report.  While the basic structure of a presentence report is the same across districts 
[see Appendix B], emphasis on and/or the inclusion or exclusion of information may differ by 
district courts.88  For example, in the Eastern District of Missouri, Part B of the presentence 
report only includes information for juvenile and adult convictions.  In contrast, in the Southern 
District of Illinois, Part B of the presentence report not only includes juvenile and adult 
convictions, but all arrests.  Likewise, presentence reports in the Eastern District of Missouri 
                                                          
88 The basic structure of a federal presentence report includes the following parts: Part A – Charges, Stipulation of 
Facts and Offense Conduct; Part B – Criminal History; Part C – Offender History and Characteristics; and Part D – 
Sentencing Options. 
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provide additional information relative to the employment section of the presentence report that 
other districts do not.  For example, in the Eastern District of Missouri in addition to the standard 
chronological employment history, the Eastern District of Missouri also provides information on 
employment barriers, outcomes of employment assessments, and information of the offender’s 
preferred career. 
In essence, more or less information available to the court at sentencing by way of local 
court rules and practices could very well influence sentencing variation from one district to the 
next and ultimately impact the supervised release sentence imposed. Local rules appear 
indicative of the court communities perspective in that local rules reflect the culture, attitudes, 
values, traditions, and case processing procedures of a particular district court.  The difficulty is 
determining how to measure local court rules to test empirically. One way this could be done is 
by a review of sample child pornography presentence reports from each district to determine the 
extent to which the presentence report deviates in information from the standard/basic structure 
of a presentence report as outlined by the AO. This could be done by counting up the number of 
ways the district presentence report deviates from the standard report.  For example, if a district 
includes all arrests in the criminal history and includes a sentencing justification section, this 
would be equivalent to two deviations from the standard structure of a presentence report.  I 
would hypothesize that more deviations from the standard/base presentence report yields greater 
sentencing variations. 
In summary, the many null district-level contextual findings reinforce the need to study 
and fully consider district-level contextual factors that may be theoretically related to district-
level supervised release outcomes.  This is important because ICC notes that 27% of the 
variability of supervised release sentences is at the district-level.      
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Moral Panic and Supervised Release Sentences 
Before closing this discussion chapter, it is important to revisit the notion of moral panic 
in the context of my findings.  Recall from Chapter Two that legal scholarship has interpreted 
sex offender laws as the manifestation of moral panic (Adler, 2001; Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 
2011). Few if any, would argue against the policy for lifetime supervised release as a 
representation of the most severe manifestation of moral panic of child pornography offenders. 
An implied question woven throughout this dissertation is whether judicial officers respond to 
this panic by executing lifetime supervised release sentencing for all child pornography 
offenders.  While many courts are sentencing a majority of their cases to lifetime supervised 
release, there is no evidence in this dissertation to suggest that judges are responding to moral 
panic in their decision-making.  On the contrary, the fact that only 33% of all child pornography 
offenders were sentenced to lifetime supervised release in fiscal year 2012 suggest that judges 
are insulated from moral panic.  As an illustration, 57% of production cases, which by statutory 
definition are more serious, received lifetime supervised release.  So, if not moral panic, what are 
judges responding to?  
The answer to the preceding question is not easily answered, but one possibility is the 
purported disagreement of some judges with the child pornography guidelines.  Some judges 
may believe the policy for lifetime supervision is a by-product of congressional manipulation 
and perhaps too severe for some offenders (Basbaum, 2010; Rogers, 2013).  Therefore, they may 
be unwilling to abide by Congress’ directive. Another possibility is that judges have educated 
themselves on child pornography recidivism research.  Current recidivism research generally 
finds that the rate of sexual recidivism for child pornography offenders is lower than commonly 
assumed.  Because of this, judges may not think lifetime supervised release is necessarily 
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warranted in every case.  This is not to say that judges are necessarily sympathetic to child 
pornography offenders.  On the contrary, evidence from this dissertation shows average 
supervised release sentences of approximately 242 months, an average term more than fifteen 
years above the mandatory minimum of 5 years.  These longer average sentences imply that 
judges are likely considering risk and public protection.     
A more likely scenario though, is proportionality in sentencing.  According to Hamilton 
(2011), the culpability continuum for child pornography offenses portrays possessors as least 
culpable, followed by distributors and then producers.  Hamilton (2011) goes on to add that 
many judges place offenders before them on this continuum and sentence accordingly.  Findings 
from this dissertation corroborate this statement.  Specifically, average supervised release 
sentences for non-production offenses (possession, receipt, transportation and distribution) were 
almost eight years less than for production offenses.89   
Summary 
This dissertation explored several theoretical hypotheses regarding the influence of legal, 
extralegal, and district-level contextual factors on supervised release sentences.  Overall, the 
findings demonstrate that sentence length varies significantly across courts and supervised 
release decision-making process is jointly influenced by individual-level legal and extralegal 
factors as well as district-level contextual factors.  Findings show that legal factors are the 
strongest predictors of criminal sentencing.  Results from this study also suggest the wide 
discretion “built into” the statute, coupled with the advisory nature of the guidelines appears to 
                                                          
89 This was confirmed by a judge in Eastern Missouri. The judge indicated that he does in fact distinguish amongst 
offense types, finding producers more culpable than non-producers.  He added that because producers are more 
culpable, they thus deserve longer supervised release terms than their counterparts. 
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have opened the door, ever so slightly to extralegal considerations.  Indeed, race and family ties, 
both of which are expressly irrelevant are significant predictors of supervised release outcomes, 
suggesting unwarranted disparities.  Age, citizenship, and education while not ordinarily 
relevant, are also significant extralegal predictors of either supervised release length, the decision 
to impose lifetime supervised release, and/or the four-category measure of supervised release.  
This demonstrates that the sentence of supervised release is not immune to sentencing disparities.   
  Turning to district-level contextual factors, some district-level variation was explained 
by two of my district-level factors when the full model was specified.  These include region and 
district courts situated within states with mandatory minimum penalties for possession of child 
pornography.  Presumably, there is much more involved in district-level jurisdictional 
differences than these two variables.  As I noted, other contextual factors such as local court 
rules may be at work.   
The final chapter is presented next wherein I discuss implications, limitations of my 
study, and avenues for future research. 
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Table 6.1 
ICAC TASK FORCE FUNDING AMOUNTS 
 
 
State 
 
Task Force Agency 
 
2010 
 
2011 
Fiscal Years 
2012       2013 
AK Anchorage Police Department 219,103 222,663 227,522 241,641 
AL Alabama Department of Public Safety 295,777 317,848 310,090 327,407 
AL Alabama Law Enforcement Agency     
AR Arkansas State Police 292,419 297,127 305,086 339,477 
AZ Phoenix Police Department 357,900 362,527 350,122 392,207 
CA Fresno County Sheriff's Office 268,353 293,890 296,329 312,159 
CA Los Angeles Police Department 575,051 622,829 582,812 614,561 
CA Sacramento County Sheriff's Office 315,925 340,511 326,979 347,736 
CA San Diego Police Department 320,403 354,109 356,378 368,066 
CA San Jose Police Department 355,102 392,960 360,756 399,655 
CO Colorado Springs Police Department 317,604 328,856 345,744 371,877 
CT Connecticut State Police 268,353 278,997 274,436 301,359 
DE Delaware Department of Justice 214,625 224,606 221,893 241,006 
FL Broward County Sheriff's Office 379,168 391,665 388,279 414,442 
FL Gainesville Police Department 318,164 330,799 357,751 353,454 
FL Polk County Sheriff's Office 380,287 393,608 366,386 412,537 
GA Georgia Bureau of Investigation 409,390 447,352 450,830 476,066 
HI Hawaii Department of Attorney General 223,580 233,023 238,156 256,253 
IA Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation 279,547 284,177 299,456 330,583 
ID Idaho Office of Attorney General 226,378 233,671 235,654 254,983 
IL Cook County State's Attorney's Office 296,897 319,143 311,341 343,924 
IL Illinois Office of Attorney General 388,682 386,485 378,896 414,442 
IN Indiana State Police 341,670 359,289 369,513 410,631 
KS Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office 255,481 271,874 273,810 298,183 
KY Kentucky State Police 305,292 317,848 325,102 362,348 
LA Louisiana Department of Justice 292,979 310,078 333,859 360,442 
MA Massachusetts State Police 341,670 362,527 353,875 390,936 
MD Maryland State Police 301,374 318,496 302,584 342,654 
ME Maine State Police 231,415 233,023 227,522 246,724 
MI Michigan State Police 459,200 494,621 471,471 482,419 
MN Minnesota Department of Public Safety 320,000 326,913 320,098 347,101 
MO Glendale Police Department 332,715    
MO St. Charles County Sherrif's Department  335,000 372,015 404,913 
MS Mississippi Office of Attorney General 247,646 267,989 278,814 296,277 
MT Billings Police Department 220,782 255,253 230,650 256,253 
NC North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation 388,682 403,968 405,793 447,478 
NC North Carolina Department of Public Safety     
ND North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation 204,551 216,188 241,909 247,359 
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Table 6.1 continued 
ICAC TASK FORCE FUNDING AMOUNTS 
 
 
 
State 
 
Task Force Agency 
 
2010 
 
2011 
Fiscal Years 
2012       2013 
NE Nebraska State Patrol 244,288 249,858 250,041 276,583 
NH Portsmouth Police Department 226,938 234,318 237,531 256,253 
NJ New Jersey State Police 379,727 396,197 382,649 425,242 
NM New Mexico Attorney General's Office 256,041 254,391 272,559 298,183 
NV Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 261,078 273,817 276,938 312,795 
NY New York State Police 431,217 458,360 435,817 494,490 
NY New York City Police Department 371,332 381,305 363,884 422,066 
OH Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office 446,887 477,138 477,101 508,467 
OK Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation 286,823 293,243 296,329 314,065 
OR Oregon Department of Justice 301,374 319,190 312,592 349,577 
PA Delaware County District Attorney's Office 450,805 466,130 587,718 645,761 
RI Rhode Island State Police 216,304 224,606 233,152 247,359 
SC South Carolina Attorney General's Office 305,851 315,258 318,847 339,477 
SD South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation 215,185 218,130 219,391 239,100 
TN Knoxville Police Department 341,670 361,879 364,509 402,372 
TX Pasadena Independent School District Police Dept. 364,616 405,911   
TX Houston Metro Police Department   349,719 394,113 
TX Dallas Police Department 390,921 433,106 427,686 477,337 
TX Office of Attorney General of Texas 351,184 387,780 428,311 491,313 
UT Utah Office of Attorney General 263,316 271,874 303,209 328,677 
VA Bedford County Sheriff's Office 305,292 325,618 333,859 350,913 
VA Virginia State Police 277,868 296,480 290,699 317,242 
VT Burlington Police Department 214,061 222,016 224,395 242,912 
     VT     Vermont Office of Attorney General                                                                                                                                  
WA Seattle Police Department 355,662 384,543 375,143 429,690 
WI Wisconsin Department of Justice 342,230 373,535 355,752 383,313 
WV West Virginia State Police 238,691 251,154 275,687 386,747 
WY Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 212,387 222,016 234,291 258,159 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress.   
  
 224 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress   
Figure 6.1 Indian Reservations 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RSEARCH, AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation adds to the body of federal sentencing research by focusing on a 
sentencing outcome not previously studied, coupled with an offense type that is arguably one of 
the most serious in the federal criminal justice system.  This dissertation discovered variation in 
supervised release sentences across district courts and sentencing disparities at both the 
individual and district levels.  More importantly, the dissertation demonstrates that the 
supervised release sentencing schemata for child pornography offenses is as equally problematic 
as legal scholars have argued the guidelines are for the sentence of imprisonment.  
This chapter closes the dissertation with a discussion of the implications for various 
stakeholders involved in federal sentencing including defense counsel, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, the U.S. Probation Office, the USSC, Congress, child pornography offenders, and federal 
judges.  I also include a discussion of the potential for evidenced-based sentencing in the federal 
judiciary.  Afterwards, I highlight limitations of the dissertation, followed a brief discussion of 
avenues for future research as well as consideration for where the current study sits within the 
broader sentencing literature. 
Implications 
 Defense counsel. 
 One of the primary objectives of defense counsel is to argue for the best possible 
sentences for their clients.  Arguably, the best possible sentence is one that is at the low end of 
the guideline range (Etienne, 2004).  In the case of child pornography offenders, the low end of 
the supervised release statutory range is the mandatory minimum of five years.  It is in the 
interests of the offender for counsel to argue for the low end of the range considering the 
implications for longer sentences.  The longer the sentence of supervised release, the longer the 
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offender is subject to formal social control and the restrictive conditions of supervised release.  
Moreover, there is also greater opportunity for revocation the longer an individual remains on 
supervised release.  And revocations sentences carry their own implications (Shockley, 2010).  
For example, if a child pornography offender serving lifetime supervised release for possession 
of child pornography commits another possession of child pornography offense, they would face 
a revocation sentence of life.  The revocation sentence would entail an even greater punishment 
than if the offender were prosecuted for committing a second offense for possession of child 
pornography, which carries a sentence of imprisonment of ten to twenty years.   
In consideration of these implications, as well as the supervised release sentencing 
disparities revealed in this dissertation, we may begin to see defense counsel arguing at 
allocation for supervised release sentences at the low end of the range.  Defense counsel may use 
findings from this dissertation to inform sentencing courts of the implications of a life term 
including life imprisonment if revoked.  Defense counsel may also disclose to sentencing courts 
the sentencing disparities or differences in supervised release sentences by region, to sway the 
court in imposing the low end of the statute. 
We may also begin to see more sentencing memorandums filed by defense counsel. A 
sentencing memorandum is akin to a defense counsel conducted presentence report, wherein the 
personal background and the social history of the defendant is presented in favor of the 
defendant (Weintraub, 1987).  Through this memorandum, counsel may focus on extralegal 
offender characteristics shown in this dissertation that produce shorter sentences.  For example, 
this dissertation found that offenders with dependents receive shorter sentences than those 
without children.   Accordingly, we may see counsel highlighting family ties at sentencing.  
Likewise, this dissertation found that those with a college degree received longer sentences 
 227 
compared to those with a high school diploma.  As such, we could see defense counsel 
minimizing the education of those with college degrees. 
 Another implication we may see is defense counsel focusing on mitigating perceived risk 
of their defendants.  For example, defense counsel may encourage offenders on pretrial bond 
supervision to begin the rehabilitation process, specifically directing them to engage in sex 
offender treatment.  According to Weintraub (1987), if a client, at the early stage in a case, is 
referred to and successfully completes a treatment program, they will be in better standing when 
sentencing is imposed.  This is because counsel can present evidence that the offender has 
responded well to treatment and is a low risk to re-offend.  We may also see counsel calling 
witnesses such as sex therapists to testify at sentencing hearings to the likelihood of recidivism 
post-conviction. 
U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
As shown in the results section of this dissertation, legal factors such as offense 
seriousness, detention, and criminal history are the strongest predictors of supervised release 
sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and the likelihood of being 
sentenced to a higher supervised release category.  It follows then, that if one of the sentencing 
goals for defense counsel is the shortest possible supervised release sentence, then for U.S. 
Attorneys it is the longest possible sentence.  With this being said, they may think twice about 
offenders pleading guilty to a lesser included offense, particularly if they desire a longer 
supervised release term.  For example, given what we know from this dissertation, we may find 
that U.S. Attorneys are less inclined to allow offenders to plea to the lesser included offense of 
possession of child pornography, particularly if they have evidence to convict on more serious 
charges. 
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The only alternative to the scenario above is a push by U.S. Attorneys for “real offense 
sentencing” for the supervised release sentence.  This term refers to the actual conduct in which 
the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted (2012 
USSC, p.5).  Real offense sentencing is synonymous to relevant conduct and would require the 
sentencing court to sentence on the basis of all identified conduct.  In drug offenses, for example, 
a court following relevant conduct rules must aggregate all drugs trafficked by the defendant that 
were "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction."  This means, for example, that a defendant convicted of selling drugs to an 
undercover officer on one occasion is sentenced for the amount of drugs involved in all the drug 
trafficking known to the court.  Even conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted could 
be considered, if a preponderance of the evidence established it. Thus, U.S. Attorneys can 
influence this process through the evidence they introduce as relevant conduct. 
U.S. Probation. 
U.S. Probation Offices play an integral role in the federal sentencing process via the 
preparation of the presentence reports and recommendations for sentencing.  In as much as U.S. 
Probation Officers are recognized as guidelines specialists, sentencing courts rely upon their 
expertise in their application of the guidelines, sentencing options, and recommendations 
(Campbell, McCoy, and Osigweh, 1990).  Astonishingly though, training on sentencing 
disparities is not a segment of the initial or continuing training of presentence writers.  
Sentencing disparities may be addressed at the annual USSC guidelines training or provided via 
USSC reports available online, but not all presentence writers attend this yearly training or 
review these reports.90  As one of the key players in the federal sentencing process, U.S. 
                                                          
90 Each year the USSC provides a seminar to U.S. Probation staff for training on sentencing matters including 
guideline applications, amendments, and case law, etc. 
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Probation Offices should be informed of sentencing disparities as sentencing court rely on their 
knowledge of guideline sentencing issues.   
As far as the current study is concerned, whether the findings contained herein will 
influence presentence writers to consider supervised release sentencing disparities or informing 
the court of supervised release disparities remains to be seen.  But it is the duty of the U.S. 
Probation Office to provide the sentencing court with all available information to consider when 
imposing sentencing.  This should include issues of sentencing disparities.  
In recognizing that this study is the first of its kind and has not yet been replicated 
empirically by the USSC or other scholars, the current state of child pornography supervised 
release sentencing remains status quo.  However, should subsequent studies confirm the 
existence of supervised release sentencing disparities, it may be a best practice to modify the 
components of the standard presentence report to include a section informing the court of 
supervised release sentencing disparities.  This way, U.S. Probation Offices will have done their 
due diligence in providing sentencing courts with all available information prior to the 
imposition of sentence. 
In addition to the above, if U.S. Probation Offices are better informed about supervised 
release disparities, it may result in more specific justifications for supervised release sentences.  
As it stands now, the language for the justification of the supervised release sentence for child 
pornography offenders is general.  For example, in a review of child pornography supervised 
release recommendations in Eastern Missouri, the only justification for the length of the 
supervised sentence is the reliance upon Section 5D1.2(b)(2) in the federal guidelines, which 
says if the instant offense is a sex offense, the statutory maximum term is recommended.  It is 
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possible that we may see more specific justification such as seriousness of the offense, or 
criminal history to justify the supervised release term.  
USSC. 
In their 2012 study of child pornography sentencing, the USSC included a brief section 
on supervised release sentences and acknowledged the problematic nature of the blanket policy 
statement for lifetime supervised release.  One problem in their view, is that the policy was 
promulgated before the Protect Act of 2003 raised the maximum term in child pornography cases 
from three years to lifetime supervised release. Another problem they highlight, is the 
guideline’s categorical recommendation of a life term which fails to distinguish among offenders 
with respect to their levels of risk and corresponding need for lifetime supervision (USSC, 2012).  
In 2012, USSC promised to study the supervised release guideline to determine whether the 
guideline should be amended in response to these criticisms.   
It has been nearly five years since the USSC’s promise and as of this writing, there is no 
published report addressing the issue of lifetime supervised release.  The policy for lifetime 
supervised release for all child pornography offenders remains in effect.  This dissertation 
provides notification to the USSC that there is in fact supervised release sentencing disparities, 
and reinforces the USSC’s recommendation to study supervised release sentences.  By way of 
recommendations to the USSC to mitigate the disparities created by the statute and the blanket 
policy statement, I recommend the USSC first inform Congress.  Depending on Congress’s 
position, this could involve revising Section 5D1.2(b)(2) and the policy statement in the federal 
sentencing guidelines which says if the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, the 
statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended. 
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The first step the USSC should take may be to define “sex offense.”  By their own 
admission, the USSC defined “sex offense” not by attempting to classify various types of sex 
offenders with respect to their relative risks of recidivism or their needs for ongoing supervision 
and treatment, but by adopting Congress’s definition (USSC, 2012). By classifying the term sex 
offense into the various types of sex offenders with respect to risk and recidivism, this could 
quell judicial concern that the lifetime policy fails to distinguish among offenders with respect to 
their levels of risk and corresponding need for lifetime supervision. 
  Alternatively, another recommendation involves developing guideline calculations for 
the sentence of supervised release, like those used for the sentence of imprisonment.  In this 
sense, the sentence of supervised release would be based on legal factors such as offense 
seriousness and criminal history.  While this idea may not necessarily eliminate disparities, at the 
very least it may reduce the wide spread variability of sentences.   
It may be time that the USSC make good on their vow to study the supervised release 
guideline if they have not done so already.  As shown in this dissertation, there is wide variation 
in supervised release sentences.  This issue is too important to linger unabated given the serious 
implications for those disproportionately impacted.  Action by the USSC could result in a report 
to Congress describing recommendations for modifications of substantive criminal law and 
sentencing procedures for supervised release. 
Congress. 
A salient theme presented throughout this dissertation has been Congress’ desire for 
severe sentences for all child pornography offenders.  Clearly, the courts are not universally 
abiding by this desire as only approximately 33% of child pornography offenders receive the 
most severe term.   Short of the Supreme Court repealing the decisions in Booker, Rita, Gall, and 
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Kimbrough, it appears unlikely Congress can effectuate its will regarding severe supervised 
release sentences. The only potential solution is to amend the child pornography supervised 
release statute - 18 USC 3583(k).   
   As it stands, the statute covers all child pornography offenses including the least serious 
(non-production) to the most serious (production).  The range of 5 years to life creates broad 
discretion.  For example, judges who focus on future risk may take into consideration that long-
term recidivism studies (greater than 10 years) are unavailable.  This may lead some judges to, 
out of an abundance of caution, to impose lifetime supervised release under the guise of “better 
safe than sorry.”  Or judges who focus on offense seriousness and culpability, may view non-
production as less serious by virtue of the statutory penalties in comparison to production.  
Accordingly, they may sentence these offenders to the low end of the statutory supervised 
release range.  Hence, supervised release sentencing disparities.   
 It is the argument of this dissertation that the broad range encompassed in the supervised 
release statute leads to unpredictability, non-uniformity of sentences, and sentencing disparities.  
This is contrary to the SRA of 1984 which sought to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities.  
More specifically, the SRA was created by Congress with two main objectives: uniformity and 
proportionality.  Congress aimed to narrow the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similarly 
situated offenders.  Congress also sought proportionality in sentencing - a system that imposes 
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.  But the USSC tells 
us that there is a clash between these two factors and they describe it this way:  
Simple uniformity – sentencing every offender to five years – destroys proportionality.  
Having only a few simple categories of crimes would make the guidelines uniform and 
easy to administer, but might lump together offenses that are different in important 
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aspects.  For example, a single category for robbery that included armed and unarmed 
robberies, robberies with and without injuries, robberies of a few dollars and robberies of 
millions, would be far too broad. (2012 USSC Sentencing Guidelines Manual, p.3) 
Hence, the likely problem with the policy for lifetime supervised release for all child 
pornography offenders.  Sentencing everyone to life destroys proportionality.  We know from 
this dissertation, judges are not sentencing everyone to life, suggesting two things.  First, some 
judges are interested in proportionality; and second, little deference to the policy statement.  
To this end, I suggest that Congress revisit 18 USC 3583(k).  In doing so, they must 
determine which objective is more important – uniformity or proportionality.  So, for example, if 
Congress desires lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders, then they 
should set the statutory sentence of supervised release as life.  In doing so, this will effectively 
set the guideline sentence to life because per the guidelines, the supervised release term cannot 
be less than the statutorily authorized mandatory minimum term.  This will alleviate disparity of 
supervised release sentences and promote uniformity.   
The problem if Congress amends the statute and mandates supervised release for child 
pornography offenses is that proportionality is destroyed.  Alternatively, as mentioned in the last 
chapter, the USSC could develop guideline calculations for the sentence of supervised release 
wherein offense seriousness and the criminal history score is calculated to provide the advisory 
supervised release sentencing range. This route brings back proportionality, but then effectively 
eliminates Congressional aim for lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.  
To this end, there appears no completely satisfying solution to this enigma.  
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The Child Pornography Offender. 
Based upon the findings presented in this dissertation, a child pornography offender 
pending supervised release sentencing can expect that legal factors will likely drive the length of 
the sentence, as it should.  However, the findings from this dissertation also show that where one 
is sentenced also matters.  As such, a child pornography offender pending sentencing in a 
Western district can likely expect a longer sentence than if he would have been sentenced in an 
Eastern district.  Moreover and to a lesser extent, a child pornography offender pending 
sentencing with the following characteristics can likely expect a longer sentence: nonwhite, 
poorly educated, college educated, older than age 50, a U.S. citizen, and no family ties.  
If the supervised release term was more bark than bite, perhaps these disparities in 
sentences would not matter as much.  But for those facing the longer terms, there are many 
implications.  One of the more obvious is being under a form of formal social control longer.  
Longer terms of supervised release create longer or greater opportunity to potentially violate the 
terms, risk revocation and face life imprisonment.   
The Federal Judge. 
Pursuant to 18 USC 3553(a)(6), in addition to consideration of the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant, the court is to also 
consider other factors including the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
offenders with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.  Prior to my 
previous work on this topic (Vinyard, 2016), there was no information on supervised release 
sentencing disparities for judges to consider.  This dissertation provides more information to the 
federal court regarding the nature and extent of disparate supervised release sentences for child 
pornography offenders.  This information can be used as courts deliberate on supervised release 
sentences and consider all factors before imposing sentencing.  
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Summary of Implications 
The previous section discussed the implications of this research for the offender and the 
various stakeholders involved in sentencing and identified ways in which supervised release 
sentencing disparities could be mitigated by either congressional changes or changes by the 
USSC.  Another option gaining traction for mitigating sentencing disparities is evidenced-based 
sentencing which is discussed next. 
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the use of Actuarial Risk Assessments 
In the absence of congressional changes to 18 USC 3583(k) and/or the guideline policy 
for lifetime supervised release as noted in the preceding section, evidenced-based sentencing 
could provide a solution.  Social scientists and legal scholars refer to the use of risk assessments 
in sentencing as evidence-based sentencing or informed sentencing (Hyatt, Bergstrom, and 
Chaneson, 2011; Ruback, Kempinen, Tinik and Knoth, 2016).  Currently, risk assessments are 
not used in sentencing at the federal level, but scholars are pushing the USSC to explore the 
integration of risk assessments into the guidelines (Hyatt et al., 2011).  Hyatt et al. (2011) argue 
that the use of risk assessments hardly would be a huge change as federal judges already consider 
risk, although crudely, by way of focal concerns.  They argue risk assessments could formalize 
and standardize risk consideration making it fairer across the board.  Proponents also argue the 
use of risk assessments in sentencing is not meant to replace judicial discretion, but rather inform 
judges about potential outcomes in sentencing.  More specifically, they contend that as the 
guidelines are not mandatory, the integration of risk assessments into the guidelines is consistent 
with Booker.  That is, the use of risk assessments within the guidelines will not alter the advisory 
nature of the guidelines which is to inform sentencing decisions. 
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Given the amount of variability and disparities in supervised release sentences, coupled 
with the risk-focused nature of the supervised release sentence for child pornography offenders, 
one can see the appeal of incorporating risk assessments into the supervised release guidelines.  
However, one of the primary arguments against using risk assessments to inform sentencing 
practice is the potential to punish individuals for crimes they have not committed (Hannah-
Moffat, 2013).  But when measured against the yardstick of risk assessment tools versus 
professional judgment in the form of focal concerns and the court communities perspectives, 
some argue the pros of actuarial risk assessment outweigh the cons (Skeem, 2013). 
While risk assessments are not used in federal sentencing, they are used at the onset of 
supervised release and periodically throughout the supervision term to re-assess risk. Federal 
probation uses the Post-Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) and the Risk Prediction Index 
(RPI).  These instruments use both static (i.e., criminal history) and dynamic factors--those 
factors that are changeable such as social networks, education/employment, and cognitions--to 
accurately predict and identify those at greatest risk to re-offend.  The results from the risk 
assessments are applied to formulate supervision strategies (i.e., referring an offender with a 
dynamic risk factor for cognitions to a cognitive behavioral treatment program), which when 
appropriately targeted should reduce risk.  
It remains to be seen if the USSC and the federal courts will adopt an evidence-based 
approach to sentencing and specifically integrate a risk assessment tool into the supervised 
release guidelines specific to child pornography offenders.91  If it is to work as suggested by 
                                                          
91 The author contacted the USSC on February 9, 2017 and discussed the notion of evidenced-based sentencing.  
According to the USSC, informal discussions of risk assessments have occurred within the USSC; however, at this 
time, risk assessments are not a priority.   
 237 
Ruback et al. ( 2016), this should result in improved decision-making, limited discretion, and 
increased accountability for the sentences of supervised release.  
Limitations of the Dissertation 
As with any research, this dissertation also has limitations that could have impacted the 
results of the study.  First, there is the issue of omitted individual-level extralegal factors 
including those related to the offender’s character, physical and mental condition, marital status, 
community ties, employment status, and history of drug and alcohol abuse.  Like those extralegal 
factors included in my analyses that did influence the sentence of supervised release, these other 
factors may also influence the ultimate supervised release term imposed.  Take for example 
mental health.  Research has shown that mental health conditions like schizophrenia have been 
linked to stereotypes of dangerousness (Markowitz, 2011).  Through the presentence report, the 
sentencing court is made aware of any mental health and/or emotional conditions the offender 
may suffer as well as any medications prescribed.  Accordingly, a judge may consider the mental 
health status of the offender as a focal concern in determining which individuals require 
enhanced supervision to protect the public.  In other words, it seems plausible that an offender 
with a severe mental illness may be perceived as dangerous, and thus more likely to receive 
lifetime supervised release than an offender with no mental health condition.   
  Legal scholars argue that extralegal factors such as marital status and employment 
status, have become relevant for some judges particularly now that the guidelines are advisory 
(Hamilton, 2011; Krohel, 2011).  Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s (2011) review of sentencing 
decisions found that in cases where defendants received sentencing reductions, it was common 
for judges to express that they were impressed by the defendant’s family support and/or career.  
One judge was quoted as saying “aside from the offense, the defendant has led a law-abiding life, 
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and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout, he has raised a good family and been a 
mainstay in his community.” (Hamilton, 2011, p.562).  Other judges give weight to the 
defendant’s career as a reason for non-guideline sentences.  Examples of careers receiving non-
guideline sentences include military personnel, physicians, and teachers (Hamilton, 2011).   
Unfortunately, it is not possible to empirically test the influence of marital status and 
employment because the USSC does not collect data on these variables. However, if researchers 
are given access to presentence reports, this data could be collected. 
In addition to potential individual-level omitted factors, there could be additional district-
level factors that I may have failed to consider.  As a result, this could potentially undermine the 
conclusions drawn about district-level contextual factors.  I did attempt to mitigate this 
limitation, by exploring many of the district-level contextual factors used in the extant sentencing 
literature. 
Another limitation of the dissertation is that it does not consider the effects of judge-level 
influences or judge-level characteristics on supervised release sentencing outcomes. This is 
because the publicly available USSC dataset does not identify the judge who imposed the 
sentence (Kautt, 2002). This information may have provided additional insight into supervised 
release sentences outcomes of child pornography offenders, because judges may have different 
views and opinions on child pornography offenses.  Meaning, a female judge with children may 
have a different view of the dangerousness of child pornography offenders than a male judge 
without children, potentially sentencing differently.     
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Future Research  
Drawing from the findings of the present research, the following issues are critical 
considerations for future research.  First, an important next step for understanding the supervised 
release sentences of child pornography offenders is a qualitative analysis of judges’ decision-
making for child pornography offenses.  In particular, in-depth interviews of judges from across 
the nation should be explored to ascertain what factors are most important to judges when they 
consider the sentences of supervised release.  Information about judges’ perceptions of child 
pornography offenders, public fear, recidivism, and fairness of the supervised release guidelines 
should be collected in these interviews.  Questions regarding specific district policies and local 
rules for sentencing should also be asked, as well as why judges believe there are differences 
across courts.   
 Another avenue for future research is to examine if and how high profile cases (e.g., 
Jacee Dugard case, David Renz case, etc.) affect supervised release sentences of child 
pornography offenders.  This is important because as mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 
aftermath of the Renz case which happened in the Northern District of New York, judges in 
Northern New York are now less likely to allow pretrial detention than before the case.  A 
potential research strategy to examine this scenario would be to conduct a time series analysis of 
the probability of child pornography offenders sentenced to lifetime supervised release before 
and after the scandals received intense public scrutiny.  In this sense, it would be interesting to 
see how these high profile cases influence lifetime supervised release imposed by the court.   
Another possible avenue for research is to examine decision-making of U.S. Probation 
Officers.  As mentioned earlier, one of the primary functions of U.S. Probation Offices is to 
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complete presentence investigation reports.  Presentence investigations require probation officers 
to investigate not only the instant offense and criminal history, but also report on extralegal 
factors such as family ties, employment, education, substance abuse, military status, and 
finances.  In addition to writing the presentence investigation report, officers are also expected to 
make sentencing recommendations for the sentence of imprisonment and the supervised release 
term.  Thus, it is possible that these extralegal statuses may play into the focal concerns of 
probation officers, particularly the concerns of blameworthiness and protection of the public.  As 
illustrated by Weintraub (1987), “Although the presentence investigation report is intended to be 
an objective document for review by the court, as mere mortals, probation officers necessarily 
inject their subjective impression about the defendant and the offense into the report.” (p. 26).  
Therefore, it is important to study the decision-making of U.S. Probation officers because judges 
generally, but not always, follow the recommendations.   
The Dissertation and the Broader Sentencing Literature 
Given what we know from the findings of this dissertation, where does the current study 
fit within the broader sentencing literature?  There are four answers to this questions. First, the 
dissertation extends federal sentencing research in an important way by examining a federal 
sentencing outcome previously neglected by researchers – supervised release.  Given the 
significance of this second part of the federal sentence, it is hoped that this research is a stepping 
stone for continued growth and research in this area.  Second, the dissertation is consistent with 
sentencing research in general that finds legal factors are the primary determinants of sentencing 
outcomes and that extralegal and district-level factors also influence sentencing outcomes, 
regardless of the difference in the outcome variable.  Third, this study joins the legal literature 
and the very limited empirical literature (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014), on child pornography 
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sentencing that finds wide disparities in sentencing child pornography offenders.  And fourth, 
from a multilevel standpoint, this dissertation adds to the growing body of multilevel research 
showing a great deal of variation in supervised release sentences across courts. In other words, 
this dissertation confirms Kautt’s (2002) notion that variation for differential sentencing patterns 
by federal district (i.e., geographic location) is also a source of extralegal sentencing disparity.  
CONCLUSION 
As I close this dissertation, I reflect to Chapter One wherein I highlighted the 33% 
variability of supervised release sentences.  In doing so, I surmised the variability is suggestive 
of two things: (1) a disconnect between Congress and the judiciary; and (2) the possibility of 
supervised release sentencing disparities.  The findings of my dissertation offer sound evidence 
that there are in fact supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenders.  
In terms of the disconnect between Congress and the judiciary, I offer as evidence the testimony 
of Chief U.S. District Judge M. Casey Rodgers (Northern District of Florida) before the USSC 
on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Criminal Law (February 15, 
2012): 
“Child sex crimes are gravely serious offenses, involving unspeakable acts by offenders and 
unimaginable harm to the child victims, and thus, are deserving of severe punishment.  With 
that understanding, it must also be recognized that within the spectrum of child sex crimes 
there are many offenses, ranging from child sexual abuse offenses at one end to child 
pornography offenses at the other, all representing varying degree of harm and levels of 
culpability.  Thus, the punishment for child sex crimes, while deservingly severe, must be 
made between offenders and their conduct as judges attempt to mete out sentences that do 
justice in each case considering the statutory range of penalties and the pertinent sentencing 
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factors set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act which include consultation of the United 
States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual (Rodgers, 2012, pp. 1-2). 
Judge Rodgers continues:  
“The judiciary as a whole has divided perspectives regarding the reasonableness of child 
pornography guidelines.  While some judges often impose within-guideline sentences in 
child pornography cases, trusting that the guidelines are the product of the Commission’s 
traditional expertise and congressional policy, many are increasingly imposing below-
guideline sentences based on a concern over the integrity and reliability of the guidelines.  
There is a common sentiment among many trial judges that these sentencing guidelines fail 
to provide the appropriate baseline or starting point for child pornography offenses which, 
combined with numerous offense characteristics, restrictions on departures, and 
congressionally mandated provisions not fully supported by the Commission’s empirical 
study, produce guidelines ranges that are too high compared to the statutory range, 
particularly in possession and receipt cases (pp. 3-4).  
He adds:  
“Applying the guidelines as drafted has produced conflict for judges, especially in 
sentencing first-time receipt and possession offenders, because imposing a within-
guidelines sentence often appears disproportionate to the harm and yet imposing a 
sentence that varies in order to achieve a better sense of proportionality frustrates the goal 
of uniformity in sentencing.” (p.7). 
Judge Rodgers exposes the sentencing incongruence stating: 
“A sentencing anomaly becomes apparent when the statutory range is compared with the 
resulting sentencing guidelines range in the average case.  On one hand, Congress has 
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provided a broad statutory range for these offenses, spanning from zero to ten years for 
possession and five to twenty years for receipt offenses, indicating that Congress 
contemplated both a wide spectrum of culpable conduct as well as a broad range of 
appropriate sentences for these two offenses.  On the other hand, Congress has issued 
directives and amendments to the guidelines that have the effect of ignoring this wide 
range by placing all first-time offenders at the high end of the statutory range.  A 
guideline that consistently produced a range for the mine-run first-time offender that far 
exceeds the statutory minimum is an indication of a serious imbalance and calculation.” 
(p. 10-11).  
 Judge Rodgers’ statements, while focused on the sentence of imprisonment, would likely 
be the same for the sentence of supervised release.  Let’s juxtapose the last statement to the 
sentence of supervised release as an example:   
(1) “Congress has provided a broad statutory range for these offenses… 
indicating that Congress contemplated both a wide spectrum of culpable 
conduct as well as a broad range of appropriate sentences for these two 
offenses.” 
 
Now juxtaposed to supervised release: 
The statutory supervised release range for child pornography offenses as 
found in 18 USC 3583(k) is 5 years to life, indicating a wide spectrum of 
culpability for the offenses enumerated under the statute. 
 
 
 
(2) “On the other hand, Congress has issued directives and amendments to the 
guidelines that have the effect of ignoring this wide range… an indication 
of a serious imbalance and calculation.” 
 
Now juxtaposed to supervised release: 
 
The policy statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervised release for all 
child pornography offenders that in effect ignores the wide range of the 
supervised release statute (5 years to life). 
 244 
Judge Rodgers’s testimony is nearly five years old, yet the state of child pornography 
sentencing remains unchanged – that is, the imbalance remains. So long as the imbalance 
remains, it is likely we will continue to witness disparate supervised release sentences of child 
pornography offenders.  I close with a statement from Basbaum (2010) whose words best capture 
and characterize the findings of this dissertation, “The politicization of child pornography has 
resulted in a flawed and irrational sentencing scheme.” (p.5). I would add to his statement by 
saying this flawed and irrational scheme has resulted in supervised release sentencing disparities 
and severe consequences for those disproportionately sentenced to the most severe terms 
including: (1) lifelong formal social control; and (2) the possibility of revocation and life 
imprisonment if revoked.  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ANALYSES  
In this appendix I present the results of supplemental analyses that assess the robustness 
of my results. Specifically, I estimate ordinary least squares regression (OLS), logistic 
regression, and ordinal regression models to determine if the correlates of supervised release 
sentences differ by offense type.  Recall from Chapter Four that I had to use offense seriousness 
as a proxy for offense type to examine the effects of individual-level legal, extralegal, and 
district-level contextual factors because the collinearity between offense seriousness and offense 
type prohibited me from putting both variables in the model at the same time. Here, I use OLS 
logistic regression, and ordinal regression as a robustness check to confirm consistency of 
results.   
Robustness checks: Use of OLS, Logistic Regression, and Ordinal Regression to Further 
Compare Production and Non-Production Offenses 
To begin, I conducted an independent samples t-test to compare the average sentence 
length for those offenders convicted of non-production compared to those offenders who were 
convicted of production of child pornography.  The average sentence length for non-producers 
(M=229.09, SD=167.35) is less than the mean average sentence length for producers (M=332.79; 
167.39) and this difference is statistically significant t(1898) = -103.69403, p=.000, two-tailed.  
The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 103.7, 95% CI: -126.48 to 
80.90492) was small to moderate (eta squared =.04).  I also conducted a chi-square analysis to 
compare the decision to impose lifetime supervised release as well as the four-category ordinal 
measure of sentence length for non-production compared to production cases.  A chi-square test 
for independence indicated a significant association between lifetime supervised release and 
offense type, x2 (1, n=1900) =70.46, p=.000, phi = - .194.  The effect size for the correlation 
coefficient is very small using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of .10 for small effect, .30 for medium 
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effect, and .50 for large effect.  Likewise, there was a significant association between the four-
category ordinal measure of supervised release length and offense type, x2 (1, n=1900) = 76.59, 
p=.000, Cramer’s V =.201.  The effect size for the correlation coefficient is medium to large. 
OLS Regression 
I first started with production cases using OLS regression to assess the impact of legal 
and extralegal factors on supervised release length (log).  First, legal factors were added to the 
model. Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity were included in the model 
because exploratory analyses (described in Chapter 5), indicated the relationship between these 
variables and supervised release length (log) is non-linear.  A significant regression equation was 
found (F(2,225)=5.711, p <.001).  The model explained 20.2% of the variance in supervised 
release sentence length.  Few of the legal variables are statistically significant in predicting 
supervised release length.  Offenders who are detained receive sentences of supervised release 
that are 55.2% longer than those received by offenders who were released, controlling for all 
other factors in the model.  Downward departure/variance, upward departure/variance and plea 
are marginally significant (alpha=.10).  These effects indicate that an upward departure/variance 
increases length of supervised release by 40.7% while a downward departure/variance decreases 
it by 17.1%.  Offenders who plead guilty receive supervised release sentences that are 27.3% 
longer than those who went to trial, controlling for all other factors in the model.  Surprisingly, 
legal factors such as criminal history, offense severity, and number of counts were not 
statistically significant predictors of supervised release length (log). 
Turing to non-production cases, a significant regression equation was found 
(F(10,1646)=32.731, p <.001). This model explained 16.6% of the variance in supervised release 
sentence length compared to the 20.2% of the variance in production cases. In contrast to the 
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production model, several of the legal variables are statistically significant in predicting 
supervised release length including number of counts, criminal history, plea, detention, 
downward departure/variance, offense severity squared, and number of counts squared.  
Specifically, non-producers who accept a guilty plea receive a 35.4% increase in months of 
supervised release than those who went to trial.  Non-producers who receive a downward 
departure/variance receive a 26.3% decrease in months of supervised release compared to those 
sentenced within the guidelines range.  There is a non-linear relationship between offense 
severity and supervised release length (log) as well as number of counts and supervised release 
length (log) indicated by significant quadratic terms for these variables.     
Next, extralegal factors were added to both the production and non-production models to 
see if they explain supervised release sentence length above and beyond the effect of the legally 
relevant variables.  Significant regression equations were found for both models, 
(F(18,212)=3.577, p <.001) and (F(18,1579)=18.462, p <.001), respectively.  The models 
explained 23.3% and 17.4% of the variance of supervised release sentence length, respectively.92  
None of the extralegal factors added to the production model were significant predictors of 
supervised release length, but several of the extralegal factors for the non-production model were 
including citizenship, less than high school, college graduates, and race (white).  Specifically, 
U.S. citizens receive a 22.5% increase in months of supervised release compared to non-citizens, 
controlling for all other factors.  Compared to high school graduates, offenders with less than a 
high school education receive a 14.4% increase in months of supervised release.  College 
graduates similarly faced an increase of 10.8% in months of supervised release compared to high 
school graduates.  Whites receive a 15.4% decrease in months of supervised release compared to 
                                                          
92 The amount of variance explained when adding extralegal factors to the production model only accounts for an 
additional 3% and less than 1% (.8%) for non-production model.  This indicates that legal factors are stronger at 
predicting supervised release length (log) than extralegal factors.   
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non-whites, controlling for all other factors.  Having dependents was significant using a less 
restrictive alpha of p=.10.  All the legal factors for both production and non-production remained 
statistically significant.  In summary, compared to the production model, there were more 
significant predictors in the non-production model.  It is possible the difference is due to the 
increase sample size in non-production. 
Following model estimates, I used the Clogg equation to test the equality of all 
coefficients across the two offense types.  In other words, I tested the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the coefficients for the legal and extralegal factors for production and non-
production were equal.  Using the z table to determine if differences was significant (i.e., alpha = 
.05 (two-tailed test), if z >1.96), I failed to reject the null hypotheses for all of the variables. This 
means that the effects of the legal and extralegal variables do not differ by offense type.  
Logistic Regression  
Next, logistic regression was used to assess the impact of legal and extralegal factors on 
the likelihood of an imposition of lifetime supervised release for production and non-production 
cases.93  First, legal factors were included in both the production and non-production models.  
Starting with production, the full model containing all the predictors was statistically significant, 
x2(10,N=236) = 47.341, p<.001.  The model explained 24.4% of the variance in imposition of 
lifetime supervised release, and correctly classified 69.5 percent of cases.  The full model 
containing all the predictors for non-production offenses was statistically significant, 
x2(10,N=1657) = 238.055, p<.001.  The model explained 19% of the variance in imposition of 
lifetime supervised release, and correctly classified 75 percent of cases 
                                                          
93 Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity squared were include in the model because exploratory 
analyses (described in Chapter 5), indicated the relationship between the variables and the decision to impose 
lifetime supervised release is non-linear. 
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For both the production and non-production models, several of the legal factors made a 
statistically significant contribution including detention, plea, and downward departure/variance. 
For detained offenders, the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release increase by a factor of 
5.3 and 1.4, respectively, controlling for all other variables in the model.  Surprisingly, for 
offenders who pled guilty, the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release was greater by a 
factor of 2.8 and 3.1, respectively compared to those offenders who had a trial.  As anticipated, 
receiving a downward departure/variance decreased the odds of receiving lifetime supervised 
release by a factor of .564 and .440 respectively.94  Upward departure/variance (which is 
expected to increase punishment) was not statistically significant for either model.  There is a 
non-linear relationship between offense severity and the decision to impose lifetime supervised 
release for the non-production model as indicated by the significant quadratic term for this 
variable.  There is also a non-linear relationship for the number of counts for the non-production 
model as indicated by the significant quadratic term.   
Next, extralegal variables were added to both the production and non-production models 
to see if they explain lifetime supervision above and beyond the effect of the legally relevant 
variables.  The production model explained 30.2% of the variance of the imposition of lifetime 
supervised release, and correctly classified 72.7 percent of cases.  Similarly, the non-production 
model explained 19.9% of the variance of the imposition of lifetime supervised release, and 
correctly classified 74.2 percent of cases. 
 None of the extralegal factors added to the models were significant predictors of the 
decision to impose lifetime supervised release except the variable for age (offenders age 50).95  
This effect indicates that the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release is two times greater for 
                                                          
94 The coefficient for the production mode was only marginally significant (p=.06). 
95 For the production model, the effect of age was marginally significant (p=.07). 
 262 
producers age 50 and older and 1.4 times greater for non-producers as compared to younger 
offenders, controlling for all other factors.  Being white decreased the log odds of non-producers 
being sentenced to lifetime supervised release by a factor of .736.  This variable was significant 
at p=.09.  The only legal factors that remained statistically significant is detention, plea, and 
downward departure/variance.  
I also used the Clogg equation to test the equality of coefficients for the logistic 
regression coefficients on the decision to impose lifetime supervised release for both offense 
types.  I failed to reject the null hypotheses and can conclude that the effects of the legal and 
extralegal variables do not differ by offense type. 
Ordinal Regression  
Finally, I examined the ordinal outcome of supervised release for both offense types to 
assess the legal and extralegal factors that affect whether an offender would receive a short-term, 
intermediate, long-term, or life sentence.96  First, legal factors were included in both the models 
for production and non-production.  The full model for producers containing all the predictors 
was statistically significant, x2(10,N=236) = 54.430, p<.001.  Likewise, the full model for non-
producers containing all the predictors was statistically significant, x2(10,N=1657) = 295.062, 
p<.001.  The models explained 23% and 17.4%, respectively of the variance in the categories of 
supervised release.  For the production model, the three statistically significant predictors of the 
odds of being sentenced to the higher supervised release term category were plea, detained and 
downward departure/variance.  Detained offenders are 1.5 times more likely to receive a 
sentence in the higher supervised release category than offenders on bond, controlling for all 
other factors.  Likewise, downward departure/variance recorded an odds ratio of .556, indicating 
that those who received a downward departure are .556 times less likely to be sentenced to the 
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higher supervised release category, compared to those who are sentenced within the guidelines 
range, controlling for all other factors.  Those offenders that pled guilty are .948 times more 
likely to be sentenced to the higher supervised release category, than those who go to trial, 
controlling for all other factors.   
For the non-production model, all the legal factors were statistically significant predictors 
except sex offender enhancement and upward departure/variance.  Pleading guilty recorded an 
odds ratio of .935, indicating that those who pled guilty were .935 times more likely to be 
sentenced to the higher supervised release category than those who went to trial, controlling for 
all other factors.  Downward departure/variance recorded and odds ratio of .654, indicating that 
receiving a downward departure/variance resulted in a .654 decrease in the log odds of being 
sentenced to the higher supervised release category compared to those who were sentenced 
within the guidelines range.  Detention recorded an odds ratio of .387, indicating that those who 
are detained were .387 times more likely to sentenced to the higher supervised release category 
than those who were on bond, controlling for all other factors. 
Next, extralegal factors were added to the models.  The full model for producers 
containing all the predictors was statistically significant, x2(18, N=236) = 63.645, p<.001. 
Similarly, the full model for non-production containing all the predictors was statistically 
significant, x2(18,N=1598) = 299.230, p<.001.  The models explained 27% and 18.3%, 
respectively of the variance in the categories of supervised release.  None of the extralegal 
factors for the production model are significantly associated with the ordinal measure of 
supervised release at alpha level p=.05; however, citizenship was statistically significant at alpha 
level p=.08.  U.S. citizens had a 20% greater likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised 
release category than non-citizens, controlling for all other factors.  For the non-production 
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model, only white was statistically significant at alpha level p=.05.  Being white decreases the 
odds of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category by a factor of .380.  Using a less 
restrictive alpha level (p=.10) for the non-production model showed that citizenship, having 
dependents, having less than a high school education, and being a college graduate was 
statistically significant.  Accordingly, being a U.S. citizen increased the likelihood of being in a 
higher supervised release category by a factor of .511 compared to non-citizens, controlling for 
all other factors.  Likewise, having less than a high school education and being a college 
graduate increased the likelihood of being in higher supervised release category by a factor of 
.294 and .244, respectively compared to those with a high school diploma.   
I used the Clogg equation to test the equality of coefficients for the ordinal regression 
coefficients for both offense types.  I failed to reject the null hypotheses and can conclude that 
the effects of the coefficients for these variables do not differ by offense type.   
Summary 
In conclusion, the supplemental analyses shown here confirm to an extent, the earlier 
results of my multilevel models that the effects of individual-level legal and extralegal factors do 
not differ by offense type.  In addition, these analyses show that legal factors are the primary 
determinants of supervised release sentences, but extralegal factors play a role but to a lesser 
extent. 
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APPENDIX B: CONTENT OF THE STANDARD PRESENTENCE REPORT 
The Face Sheet 
The face sheet contains significant court-related information provided for ease of reference. It 
also contains demographic data provided for the use of the sentencing judge, probation officer, 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Parole Commission, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. 
Part A: The Offense 
Charges and Conviction(s)  
This section provided a brief chronological history of the prosecution of the case from the filing 
of the initial charges to the referral to the probation office for a presentence report. 
The Offense Conduct 
The Offense Conduct section provides all pertinent information regarding the offense to assist 
the court in understanding the facts of the offense and the elements relevant to application of the 
sentencing guidelines in accordance with the provisions of Chapter Two of the guidelines. 
This section may also include information indicating whether the offense of conviction was part 
of a larger scheme or plan that included other criminal conduct which may be relevant to the 
determination of the appropriate guideline, the selection of a sentence within the guideline range, 
and the decision to depart from the guidelines. It further describes the role of the defendant and 
the conduct of codefendants and other participants during the offense, including planning, 
preparation for the offense, and the circumstances leading to the arrest or summons of the 
defendant. The objective of this section is to report what happened as established by the 
probation officer’s investigation, using the officer’s best judgment to resolve factual 
discrepancies among sources. 
Custody Status 
This section provides relevant details of the defendant’s custody status. The following should be 
included at the very minimum: date of arrest; by whom and where; brief history of appearances 
before judicial officers and decisions which have been reached; amount of bail and whether 
made or not; conditions of release and degree to which the defendant has complied. 
Victim Impact 
While the Victim Impact section is actually part of the offense conduct for which the defendant 
is responsible, this information is presented under a separate heading to emphasize its importance 
and the fact that this section includes the impact on all victims of the offense, regardless of 
whether the information affects guideline application. An assessment of the financial, social, 
psychological, and medical impact upon any individual victim of the offense is presented, and 
any financial losses caused by the conduct in the offense are reported. 
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Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice 
This section describes any efforts made by the defendant to impede the investigation or 
prosecution of this case. 
Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility 
This section contains an assessment of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the 
offense of conviction. 
Offense Level Computation 
This section presents the application and calculation of the sentencing guidelines and includes a 
short synopsis of facts underlying each application, providing tentative findings for the court. For 
each count, it identifies the applicable guideline and shows the base offense level and any 
specific offense characteristics or adjustments that modify the base offense level. An explanation 
indicating the reason for grouping or not grouping counts when a case involves multiple counts. 
In all cases, the guideline application is displayed, resulting in the total offense level for the case. 
The guidelines contain enhancements in Chapter IV of the Guidelines Manual that may override 
the initial guideline calculation. For example, if the defendant is a career criminal or committed 
the instant offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct form which he derived a substantial 
portion of his income, the defendant’s total offense level may be increased. Any such increase is 
set forth in this section, following the total offense level computation. 
Offense Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct 
This section describes criminal behavior that has not been reported in The Offense Conduct 
section because it is not considered relevant conduct by the guidelines. This section may include 
offense behavior described in dismissed counts that is not part of relevant conduct for guideline 
calculations. 
Part B: The Defendant’s Criminal History 
Juvenile Adjudications 
This section contains a report of the defendant’s record of juvenile adjudications of crime or 
delinquency and diversionary dispositions based on a finding or admission of guilt. 
Adjudications are included in chronological other, whether or not they are used in calculating the 
criminal history category under the Guidelines. The value assigned to each sentence under 
Chapter IV of the guidelines is also shown. 
Criminal Convictions 
This section contains a report of the defendant’s adult criminal convictions and those diversions 
resulting from a guilty plea in a judicial proceeding. It includes a description of the defendant’s 
 267 
prior criminal convictions and dispositions in each case as well as the defendant’s adjustment 
while incarcerated or under supervision. 
Adult criminal convictions are included in chronological order, whether or not they are used in 
calculating the criminal history score under the guidelines. The value assigned to each sentence 
pursuant to Chapter IV of the guidelines is also shown. 
Criminal History Computation 
This section displays the calculation of the criminal history category and the basis for the 
calculation. 
Pending Charges 
This section lists any pending charges against the defendant. This section is omitted if there are 
no charges. 
Other Criminal Conduct 
This section reports reliable information regarding other past criminal conduct which may 
indicate the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
defendant’s past criminal conduct, or the defendant’s likelihood to commit future crimes. The 
information is relevant in determining the adequacy of the defendant’s criminal history category. 
Other Arrests 
All other arrests of the defendant are reported in this section in order to provide information to 
the court regarding the defendant’s contact with law enforcement authorities. 
 
Part C: Offender Characteristics 
This part sets forth information relative to the defendant’s personal background. Included is 
information concerning: (1) personal and family data; (2) physical condition; (3) mental and 
emotional health; (4) substance abuse; (5) education and vocational skills; (6) employment and 
(7) financial condition, including an assessment of the defendant’s ability to make restitution or 
pay a fine. 
 
Part D: Sentencing Options 
This part sets forth penalties authorized by statute along with the kinds of sentences available 
under the guidelines. Included are the statutory and guideline provisions for custody, impact of 
the plea agreement, supervised release, probation, fines, restitution, forfeitures, and for drug 
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offenses, denial of benefits. By presenting the statutory and guideline provisions, the parameters 
of each may be compared. Guideline sentencing options are found in Chapter V of the Guideline 
Manual. 
Impact of the Plea Agreement 
This part is included in presentence reports that are prepared when a plea agreement has been 
tendered to the court. The probation officer assesses the impact of the plea agreement on the 
guideline sentence by comparing the guidelines applicable under the plea agreement with the 
guidelines that would apply if the defendant were to plead to all counts. 
Part E: Factors That May Warrant Departure 
This part contains the probation officer’s statement of “any factors that may indicate that a 
sentence of a different kind or of a different length from the one within the applicable guideline 
would be more appropriate under all the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (2) (B). 
Inclusion of information in this section does not necessarily constitute a recommendation by the 
probation officer for a departure. 
Part F: Factors That May Warrant a Sentence Outside of the Advisory Guideline System 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), a system was 
developed in which the sentencing courts are required to consider the sentencing options 
recommended by the sentencing guidelines, but the judges are free to impose any sentence 
authorized by Congress. This part contains information identified by the officer as any fact or 
circumstance addressed in the report that may be relevant to sentencing that was not otherwise 
considered in the guideline calculations or departure analysis. Since most grounds will have 
already been considered by the guidelines or policy statements, officers are cautious when 
identifying these factors. 
 
 
 
